Secure Degrees of Freedom in Networks with User Misbehavior

dc.contributor.authorBanawan, Karim
dc.contributor.authorUlukus, Sennur
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-14T15:49:21Z
dc.date.available2023-11-14T15:49:21Z
dc.date.issued2019-09-26
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) of three new channel models: broadcast channel with combating helpers, interference channel with selfish users, and multiple access wiretap channel with deviating users. The goal of introducing these channel models is to investigate various malicious interactions that arise in networks, including active adversaries. That is in contrast with the common assumption in the literature that the users follow a certain protocol altruistically and transmit both message-carrying and cooperative jamming signals in an optimum manner. In the first model, over a classical broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCCM), there are two helpers, each associated with one of the receivers. In the second model, over a classical interference channel with confidential messages (ICCM), there is a helper and users are selfish. By casting each problem as an extensive-form game and applying recursive real interference alignment, we show that, for the first model, the combating intentions of the helpers are neutralized and the full s.d.o.f. is retained; for the second model, selfishness precludes secure communication and no s.d.o.f. is achieved. In the third model, we consider the multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WTC), where multiple legitimate users wish to have secure communication with a legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper. We consider the case when a subset of users deviate from the optimum protocol that attains the exact s.d.o.f. of this channel. We consider two kinds of deviation: when some of the users stop transmitting cooperative jamming signals, and when a user starts sending intentional jamming signals. For the first scenario, we investigate possible responses of the remaining users to counteract such deviation. For the second scenario, we use an extensive-form game formulation for the interactions of the deviating and well-behaving users. We prove that a deviating user can drive the s.d.o.f. to zero; however, the remaining users can exploit its intentional jamming signals as cooperative jamming signals against the eavesdropper and achieve an optimum s.d.o.f.
dc.description.urihttps://doi.org/10.3390/e21100945
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.13016/dspace/2zxy-qoh6
dc.identifier.citationBanawan, K.; Ulukus, S. Secure Degrees of Freedom in Networks with User Misbehavior. Entropy 2019, 21, 945.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/31394
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMDPI
dc.relation.isAvailableAtA. James Clark School of Engineeringen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtElectrical & Computer Engineeringen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, MD)en_us
dc.subjectsecure degrees of freedom
dc.subjectinterference alignment
dc.subjectextensive-form games
dc.titleSecure Degrees of Freedom in Networks with User Misbehavior
dc.typeArticle
local.equitableAccessSubmissionNo

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