Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland

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Biological Weapons Arms Control
(1996-05-01) Leitenberg, Milton; CISSM
The Participation of Japanese Military Forces in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
(1996-06) Leitenberg, Milton
In September 1992, the first Japanese military forces were committed to participation in a U.N. peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). This occurred under new Japanese legislation enacted in June 1992. It was followed by other short-term deployments with U.N. contingents in Mozambique in May 1993, in Zaire in 1994, and most recently with U.N. Peacekeeping forces on the Golan Heights in 1996. In September 1994, the Japanese Socialists reversed their policies of decades, accepting all that they had opposed before in regard to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF), including its basic constitutionality and legitimacy. However, the constitutional question has always been a proxy for a less symbolic and more basic issue: How can the Japanese public and political leadership guard against a resurgence of "militarism," the accretion of both forces and political power that would permit the use of Japanese military forces for aggressive purposes? Has the discussion of this question been realistic? Could such a process any longer take place without the approval and direction of the government? Is any incremental step toward the involvement and integration of the Japanese military in international collaborative activities, such as U.N. peacekeeping, the initiation of unavoidable and inevitable military independence, and the loss of control over the military by Japanese civil society and government? What would be the most desirable policies to follow so that the Japanese military behaved in accordance with international norms for the indefinite future? Is the most likely inhibitor of its misbehaving in the long term its integration with the military forces of other Asian and worldwide militaries, after 50 years of isolation, or attempting to maintain that total isolation indefinitely? And what does the question of a thoroughgoing and heretofore essentially absent Japanese national understanding of the practices of its armies in Asia between 1931 and 1945 have to do with these questions?
The Nixon Administration
(1998-12-08) Daalder, Ivo H.; Destler, I.M.; CISSM
The Nixon administration brought far-reaching changes to the National Security Council. Building on a strong mandate from (and a strong policy relationship with) the President, National Security Assistant Henry A. Kissinger achieved operational policy dominance greater than any predecessor or successor. His role and methods generated enormous controversy. They were also tied to substantial policy achievements: an opening to China, arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, and eventually an historic, albeit flawed, Vietnam peace accord. One means of gaining insight into how the Nixon NSC actually worked is to ask those who were there. This was the purpose of the Nixon NSC Oral History Roundtable, conducted on December 8, 1998, at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. Thirty years almost to the day after Kissinger and other Nixon transition planners developed a blueprint for a new system, we brought together a group of ten veteran practitioners and observers of American foreign policy who were directly involved in the Nixon process to share their recollections with us. The participants drew on their experiences as advisers in the Nixon transition; as members of President Nixon"s NSC staff; and as officials who dealt with the Nixon NSC from important vantage points in other agencies. For over three hours, they spoke informally about how and why the new system was established, how it operated, and how it evolved over time. The discussion confirmed much that is already in the public domain, but it also brought to light new facts and insights. We hope students of the Nixon administration and of the modern foreign policy process and its institutions will find it useful. I.M. "Mac" Destler is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. Ivo Daalder is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
The Bush Administration
(1999-04-19) Daalder, Ivo; Destler, I.M.; CISSM
The Bush administration was home to a particularly collegial team of senior nationalsecurity policymakers. They had worked together in the Ford and Reagan administrations and held compatible views on both the substance of policy and how it should be made. And during the Bush administration they faced "a world transformed" (the apt title of the unique memoir co-authored by the president and his national security adviser). This roundtable examines the National Security Council process during the Bush administration, as seen through the eyes of officials a level or two below the principals. They were responding to substantial changes throughout the world: Tiananmen Square, the fall of the Berlin wall, the unification of Germany, the Gulf War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. As they address specific questions about the policy process (reprinted as Appendix A), the participants in the roundtable recorded in this transcript tell the story of a National Security Council whose collegiality and substantive effectiveness extended to a number of key NSC and State Department officials (although not to some at the assistant secretary level). This is the third in a series of roundtables held by the National Security Council Project, co-sponsored by the Center for International and Security Studies at the Maryland School of Public Affairs and the Foreign Policy Studies program of the Brookings Institution. Transcripts of two previous roundtables on the Nixon NSC and the role of the NSC in international economic policymaking have been published. Three additional transcripts on the role of the national security adviser, the NSC and U.S. policy toward China, and on the NSC and arms control policy will be published in the near future. Other roundtables are planned for the fall of 2000. These have been conducted for their own independent value. They also will provide useful input to a report on the NSC we plan to publish in the fall of 2000 and a book to be published in 2001. We are grateful to the participants for coming and talking with candor and insight. We would also particularly like to thank Karla Nieting for help in organizing the roundtable and her work with the participants in bringing this edited version of the proceedings to publication. Responsibility for any remaining errors rests with us. I.M. "Mac" Destler is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. Ivo Daalder is a Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
China Policy and the National Security Council
(1999-11-04) Daalder, Ivo; Destler, I.M.; CISSM
Over the past three decades, no area of U.S. foreign policy has been more dramatic than the opening and development of relations with the People"s Republic of China. And on no policy subject has the National Security Council played a more central role. From Henry Kissinger"s secret journey to Beijing in July 1971 to Anthony Lake"s trip a quarter century later in the wake of military confrontation in the Taiwan Straits, the assistant to the president for national security affairs has personally played a leading role. All governments take it particularly seriously when the American president sends his personal aide to them on a negotiating mission. The Chinese government has particularly invited, and welcomed, such White House engagement in diplomacy. This pattern has created particular problems, however, for the secretary of state, the State Department, and the overall coordination of U.S. policy both toward China and toward relations with other countries that have strong stakes in how Washington and Beijing interact. With these policy and organizational concerns in mind, the Brookings Institution and the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland convened this Oral History Roundtable bringing together officials from the National Security Council, the Department of State, and other government agencies to discuss how China policy was actually made over the past decades. We were delighted with the quality and range of policy players who were able to join in the discussion. When we learned that Ambassador Winston Lord a key policy participant over twenty-five years could not be present, we invited him to provide comments at appropriate points in the discussion. He did so, and these have been inserted and highlighted in the text. (We would refer readers also to Lord"s discussion of the China opening in our Oral History Roundtable on the Nixon administration.1) This is the fifth in a series of Oral History Roundtables carried out as part of the National Security Council Project, co-sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). We are grateful to the participants who gave freely of their time and insights. We also wish to express our appreciation to Shakira Edwards, who served as the primary editor of the manuscript, to Josh Pollack, who helped organize the meeting and worked with the original transcript, and to Karla Nieting, who brought the project to completion. I.M. "Mac" Destler is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. Ivo Daalder is a Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Arms Control Policy and the National Security Council
(2000-03-23) Daalder, Ivo; Destler, I.M.; CISSM
During the cold war, arms control policy was a focal point in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The progress of negotiations was closely tracked by observers both within and outside of successive administrations, and the outcome of such negotiations frequently proved to be a harbinger of the entire superpower relationship. Thus the process for making policy was crucial. Since arms control, almost uniquely among national security issues, involves both the expertise and equities of all the key national security agencies including the Departments of State and Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Staff, and the Intelligence Community the National Security Council has long played a central role in coordinating policy making and implementation. This process has often worked well defining the central issues, and helping to forge interagency consensus on policy directions. But it has also broken down on occasion either because the issue proved to be too difficult or contentious or because some players decided to ignore the interagency process altogether. To shed light on this variation, the National Security Council Project convened a roundtable panel on March 23, 2000, to explore the ways NSC"s in different administrations worked to coordinate U.S. policy on arms control. Participants in this roundtable represented a broad range of experiences across administrations, from Eisenhower to Clinton. Participants were asked to respond to a set of questions (Appendix A) to draw upon their understanding of how the decision making processes on arms control worked in relation to the National Security Council. This is the sixth in a series of roundtables held by the NSC Project, which is cosponsored by the Center for International and Security Studies at the Maryland School of Public Affairs and the Foreign Policy Studies program of the Brookings Institution. Transcripts of four previous roundtables on the Nixon NSC, on the role of the NSC in international economic policymaking, on the Bush NSC, and on the role of the national security adviser have already been published and are available on the Brookings website at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/ projects/nsc.htm. Two additional transcripts on the NSC and U.S. policy toward China and on the Clinton administration NSC will be published in the near future. These seminars have been conducted for their own independent value. They also provided useful insight for "A New NSC for a New Administration," a policy brief published by the Brookings Institution in November 2000 (also available on the Brookings website at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/nsc.htm) and a book to be published in 2001. We are grateful to the participants for coming and talking with candor and insight. We are also particularly grateful to Karla Nieting for her help in organizing the roundtable, editing the transcript, and working with the participants in bringing this edited version of the proceedings to publication. Responsibility for any remaining errors rests with us. I.M. "Mac" Destler is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. Ivo Daalder is a Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Renovating Arms Control through Reassurance
(2000-04-01) Steinbruner, John; CISSM
Security policy has traditionally focused on the threat of deliberate aggression with a clarity and emotional intensity that presumably derives from the far recesses of time. For most of history, it was appropriate to be primarily concerned with intentional aggression since the destruction human beings could inflict on one another had to be consciously organized if it was to occur on a major scale. It is increasingly evident, however, that advanced technology and the sheer magnitude of human activity are generating a different form of threat. Today, an unanticipated chain of spontaneous effects might rival or exceed the destructiveness of intentional war. This sort of accidental war might erupt, ironically, from the military operations designed to protect against the risk of classic aggression itself. The danger of accidental war was demonstrated in World War I and was recognized in its aftermath. The experience of World War II, however, obscured the lesson and powerfully reinforced the traditional concern of intentional aggression. Over the ensuing decades, as the instruments of warfare acquired capacities for rapid and massive destruction, the military forces that wielded them were configured to deter or to defeat deliberate attack. Precautions were taken to assure that their enormously destructive power would not be employed without legitimate authorization, but those precautions were clearly subordinated to the purpose of deterrence. That effect was achieved and is plausibly credited with preventing at least the largest forms of deliberate aggression, but the accomplishment has enabled a massive accident to occur. Overwhelming deterrence entails some inherent risk of inadvertent catastrophe. John Steinbruner is the director of the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland.
Conference on the Evolution of the Nation-State through 2015
(2000-04-18) Lahmeman, William J.; CISSM
In the summer of 1999, the National Intelligence Council tasked the University of Maryland to serve as a portal for identifying and presenting leading academic research on topics of particular interest to the US intelligence community, based on the Strategic Themes laid down by the Director of Central Intelligence. The project"s investigation into forces shaping the evolution of the nation-state will contribute to Global Trends 2015, a NIC publication due to be issued in the fall of 2000. Global Trends 2015 will describe significant international characteristics and trends likely to affect the future security of the United States. The Conference on the Evolution of the Nation-State Through 2015 was the culmination of an intensive inquiry into the factors that influence state performance and their likely effect upon state capacity, cohesion, and legitimacy in the year 2015. Several conceptual planning sessions, three one-day workshops and a number of expert consultations were conducted prior to the conference. Leading scholars in each research field applicable to the project"s central topic participated in the project. Principal project participants are listed following the Summary of Proceedings. Bill Lahneman is the Associate Director for Programs at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland.
NMD and the Wistful Pursuit of Common Sense
(2000-08-01) Steinbruner, John; CISSM
The best that can plausibly be claimed for the national missile defense scheme currently proposed by the United States is it would provide unreliable protection against an improbable form of threat. However well the proposed system might perform in controlled tests, it always would have to be assumed a strategic opponent capable of developing a long range ballistic missile would also be able to equip it with penetration devices likely to be effective under operational conditions. Of course, a "state of concern" (the new name given to states formerly known as "rogue") would presumably bypass the envisaged system with more readily concealed means of attack. The entire project promises to stimulate threats it cannot handle. Therein lies the reason it is considered to be so provocative. No one is prepared to believe the United States or more precisely, its decision makers is now or would forever remain that stupid. Potential strategic opponents are compelled to assume the nonsensically limited system is but a stalking horse for a more serious effort, and the principal U.S. advocates of ballistic missile defense loudly encourage that assumption. The initiative is interpreted, moreover, in the context of very assertive plans for further elaboration of the already imposing offensive capabilities of U.S. forces. Against an initiating opponent who can choose the timing and operational details of an attack, the proposed U.S. system is basically worthless. Against an opponent who had first been subjected to a U.S. attack, an expanded version of the proposed system could be a very serious matter indeed the final element needed to establish decisive, intimidating superiority. The real issue in question is the balance of offensive capability and more generally the fundamental terms of international security. John Steinbruner is the Director of the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland.
The Clinton Administration
(2000-09-27) Daalder, Ivo; Destler, I.M.; CISSM
The Clinton administration entered office at a time of great opportunity and challenge. The end of the cold war meant that the new administration had the rare opportunity to craft a foreign policy for a new age. The defining U.S.-Soviet rivalry was gone and the United States had emerged as a uniquely powerful state. The question and the challenge then was how the United States would use its power and for what purposes. What were the new threats in the new world? Among the challenges that the new administration identified were the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and the vulnerability of civilian and military infrastructure to cyberattack, and the rise of internal conflicts with potentially huge humanitarian costs. But the new era also offered great opportunities, not least by advancing democracy and economic prosperity. Therefore, U.S. foreign policy would increasingly have to take account of economic policy. The Clinton administration structured its National Security Council staff to reflect these priorities. It created new directoratesincluding the first ever dedicated to nonproliferation and export controls, as well as a directorate addressing global issues and multilateral affairs, with responsibility for managing the growing challenges and opportunities in an increasingly globalized world (ranging from drug trafficking and counterterrorism to peacekeeping, humanitarian affairs and the promotion of democracy). It also established the National Economic Council to integrate domestic and international economic policy. The NEC staff dealing with the latter set of issues was dual-hatted, reporting to heads of both the NEC and the NSC. Another innovation of the Clinton NSC was the creation of a communications and press component. Traditionally considered a function of the White House press staff, the new administration began to see the need to more effectively articulate its foreign policy in the wake of crises in Somalia and Haiti. The emphasis placed on an effective communication was not without controversy, however, as the administration as a whole was criticized for placing too much emphasis on style rather than substance. This is the seventh in a series of roundtables held by the NSC Project, which is cosponsored by the Center for International and Security Studies at the Maryland School of Public Affairs and the Foreign Policy Studies program of the Brookings Institution. Transcripts of five previous roundtables on the Nixon NSC, the role of the NSC in international economic policymaking, the Bush NSC, the role of the national security adviser, and the role of the NSC in arms control policy have already been published and are available on the Brookings website at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/ nsc.htm. A sixth transcript on the NSC and U.S. policy toward China will be published in the near future. These seminars have been conducted for their own independent value. They also provided useful insight for "A New NSC for a New Administration," a policy brief published by the Brookings Institution in November 2000 (also available on the Brookings website at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/nsc.htm) and a book to be published in 2002. We are grateful to the participants for coming and talking with candor and insight. We are also particularly grateful to Karla Nieting for her help in organizing the roundtable, editing the transcript, and working with the participants in bringing this edited version of the proceedings to publication. Responsibility for any remaining errors rests with us. I.M. "Mac" Destler is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. Ivo Daalder is a Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Prospects for Succession and the Orderly Evolution of Political Power in Cuba
(2001-01-25) Members of Workshop; CISSM
Fulton Armstrong opened the workshop by describing the assumptions the participants would make in analyzing the prospects for political succession in Cuba. First, they could assume that Fidel Castro wants a "legacy" whereby his own followers would be in charge after he abdicates. Second, Castro"s people want to stay in power afterwards and therefore need a "Plan" that is not widely known. Third, Castro is involved in this planning, but is not likely to hand over power in advance, as he would like to control the change. Fourth and last, as no one can fill Castro"s role precisely, how much change is likely and how fast will it come? The key variables that the participants were asked to consider were level of violence (if any) upon regime change, military/state security support of transition, the credibility of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP) during transition, existence of an united opposition (i.e. with or without popular support), and the likely international reaction to these events.
The Significance of Joint Missile Surveillance
(2001-07-01) Steinbruner, John; CISSM
At a summit meeting in Moscow in September of 1998, the presidents of the United States and Russia signed an agreement to share information on the launch of ballistic missiles. The announcement was not received as a major accomplishment. There had been a minimum amount of bureaucratic preparation within the two governments and only cursory negotiation between them. The essential details were yet to be worked out and would obviously be troublesome. Moreover, at the time of the meeting neither of the individuals involved commanded the personal political authority normally considered necessary to sponsor a meaningful venture. The visiting President Clinton was entangled in the blooming phases of an impeachment proceeding. The hosting President Yeltsin was widely believed to be in the waning stages of personal health and political stature. Despite the burdens of the moment, however, the agreement was intrinsically significant. It addressed an underlying problem grave enough to compel attention regardless of the circumstances. There were reasons to take the core idea seriously whatever immediate sentiment might be. The problem was then and still remains a legacy of the cold war. Although not proclaiming themselves to be strategic opponents, Russia and the United States nonetheless continuously maintain thousands of nuclear weapons in an operational state poised to initiate a massive attack within a few minutes. As a result of that practice, each country constantly presents to the other the greatest physical threat that it encounters from any source. The force configurations are justified as protective deterrent threats, whose overwhelming destructiveness are meant to assure that no such attack will ever occur. But as an unavoidable corollary of that logic, each side must also convey credible reassurance that no error of judgment would ever be made. Both countries for their own safety mustbe absolutely certain that the forces of the other side are not susceptible to false alarm. The two societies entangled in this active deterrent relationship are forced to trust each other on that latter point. John Steinbruner is the Director of the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland.
Federal Regulation of Scientific Research
(2001-08-23) Okutani, Stacy; CISSM
The enclosed review of federal regulations of scientific research is a draft and is based on an initial survey of the available information. As such, it is not intended as a final, or authoritative accounting of the web of federal regulations applicable to biotechnology research and development in corporate, academic, or government institutions. I must clarify the overlapping roles USDA and EPA play on plant and animal pathogens and environmental release and the extent of voluntary compliance with the various regulations (especially non-federally funded research). To the extent that this account is accurate, however, four important implications can be derived. First, a comprehensive government review like that undertaken in 1986 has apparently not been conducted since although the technology has progressed and the scale of work has increased. Second, research with human pathogens seems to require less federal oversight than for plant and animal pathogens. Even for rDNA research that falls under mandatory federal guidelines (e.g. the NIH Guidelines) it is uncertain how rigorous the review process " the work of the Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) " is. It is at least possible that a large amount of research on human pathogens falls outside mandatory federal oversight. For example, although the Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA)/NIH has over 400 IBCs registered, their office could not give an approximation as to what percentage of the total rDNA work in the US was thereby covered. (BIO estimates that there are over 1200 biotechnology companies in the US, PhRMA has 67 members, with 24 affiliated research organizations.) Third, because the regulations are based on the products of biotechnology and not the process, oversight increases as an organism moves further from the laboratory (less oversight of research before it is pursued and more of field trials and environmental release). Fourth, non-commercial research that is not federally funded seems to require no regulatory oversight.
Testimony on The Biological Weapons Convention: Rethinking Our Priorities After September 11th
(2001-11-15) Harris, Elisa D.; CISSM
The biological weapons threat to the United States is fundamentally different today than in the period during and after the completion of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. At that time, only four countries -- the Soviet Union, North Korea, Egypt, and probably Israel -- had biological weapons programs. Among those countries, the Soviet biological weapons program posed the most direct and serious threat to the security of the United States. Based on defector and other information, we now know that the Soviet program was the largest in the world, eventually employing upwards of 60,000 personnel. R&D and production of biological weapons was undertaken at secret facilities run by the Soviet military and, beginning in the 1970s, also at civilian facilities under the management of an organization known as Biopreparat. The Soviet program explored the full-spectrum of traditional biological agents, ranging from lethal agents such as anthrax, smallpox and plague to incapacitating agents such as tularemia, glanders and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. It also used genetic engineering techniques to modify traditional agents, for example by imparting antibiotic resistance, and to explore possible cocktails or combinations of agents. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered the termination of this illegal biological weapons program. In the years that followed, some research and production facilities were deactivated and many others underwent severe personnel and funding cuts. Although the U.S government continues to be concerned that some elements of the former Soviet program remain, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which Russia would use this residual capability deliberately against the United States. Elisa D. Harris is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland.
Testimony on "Russia, Iraq, and Other Potential Sources of Anthrax, Smallpox, and other Terrorist Weapons"
(2001-12-05) Harris, Elisa D.; CISSM
The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and subsequent anthrax attacks in Florida, New York and Washington have focused renewed attention on the threat of biological weapons use by terrorists or other sub-national groups. In a statement on November 1, President Bush declared: "... the threat is growing. Since September 11, America and others have been confronted by the evils these weapons can inflict. This threat is real and extremely dangerous. Rogue states and terrorists possess these weapons and are willing to use them." It is certainly the case that, over the past two months, America has had a glimpse of what it can mean to use disease for hostile purposes. Before October, no American ever died as a consequence of a terrorist attack with biological agents, although some 750 people were poisoned with salmonella by the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon in 1984. Today, five people are dead from inhalation anthrax. Six others have been treated for the inhalation form of the disease and another seven are recovering from the cutaneous or skin form. In addition, tens of thousands of media, postal and government employees have been prescribed powerful antibiotics prophylactically because of possible anthrax exposure. Elisa D. Harris is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland.
Intervention in Internal Conflict: Insights for Afghanistan
(2001-12-07) Lahneman, Bill; CISSM
This conference was the capstone event for an examination into the phenomenon of internal conflict, the reasons for third party intervention in internal conflict, and the role of the United States in such interventions. Three principal questions guided this process: What were the prospects regarding the nature and number of future internal conflicts? What were the challenges posed by internal conflicts and what could be learned by studying responses to internal conflict over the past decade? Under what circumstances was intervention in internal conflict managed more or less successfully? This last inquiry raised another series of questions. How does one define success? Is "success" an ability to stop fighting and achieve temporary stability, or must it include the achievement of long-term stability through "nation-building?" In narrowly defined national security terms, why should the United States ever consider "humanitarian" intervention? The original purpose of the conference was to provide a forum for the presentation of several case studies of internal conflict during the last decade. However, the events of last September 11th provided a real world case in which the answers to many of these questions were urgently needed to inform important US foreign policy decisions. As a result, the theme of the conference was changed. Now, instead of summarizing lessons learned about internal conflict and intervention, the conference sought to interpret how these lessons learned could help guide US policies toward Afghanistan following the collapse of the Taliban regime, which was perceived to be imminent. To assist in this effort, presentations by several Afghanistan area specialists were added to the event program. In addition to providing specific information concerning how Afghan culture, politics, and other factors might affect US conduct in post-Taliban Afghanistan, these scholars offered constructive criticism of the general lessons learned proposed by the case study authors. The seven case studies on intervention in internal conflict are: Somalia David Laitin, Stanford University Bosnia Steven Burg, Brandeis University Rwanda Gilbert Khadiagala, Johns Hopkins SAIS East Timor Eric Schwartz, Wilson Center Sierra Leone I William Zartman and Kwaku Nuamah, Johns Hopkins SAIS Cambodia David Chandler Haiti Chetan Kumar, United Nations They are available on CISSM"s and the NIC"s websites. Only pertinent aspects are reproduced in these proceedings, which emphasize potential lessons learned from each study, similarities running through the different studies, and lessons considered applicable to Afghanistan. Bill Lahneman is the Associate Director for Programs at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland.
Sustaining Peace in War-Torn Societies: Lessons from the Hatian Experience
(2001-12-07) Kumar, Chetan; CISSM
The US-led intervention in Haiti has often been held up as an example of how not to conduct foreign policy. Ill-defined and open-ended interventions in affairs of other countries for reasons tangential to national security are seen as primarily squandering US military resources and readiness on dubious results and outcomes that only generate more ill-will among those targeted for intervention. Furthermore, to the extent that problems in these countries may have been decades or centuries in the making, they are seen as only being fixed through the "n"-wordnation-buildingwhereby expensive ventures are undertaken to rebuild entire polities or economies. For many contemporary experts, such nation-building is at best misplaced hubris, at worst sheer folly. This paper uses the example of Haiti to propose that efforts to build peace in war-torn societies need not be endlessly expensive or open-ended, and if conducted with precision and moderation, can lead to the achievement of key long-term US foreign goals without undermining short-term priorities. This argument is presented from the prism of Haiti"s historical and current experience.
Somalia: Intervention in Internal Conflict
(2001-12-07) Laitin, David D.; CISSM
Massive international efforts beginning in 1992 to ameliorate the devastating effects of the Somali civil war and to reconstitute a functioning government in that country brought some notable achievements but they were overshadowed bygrievous failures. This paper in section I provides background information on the Somali conflict that precipitated the international intervention. In section II, it delineates the special problems for military intervention in the current era in civil wars like Somalia"s. In sections III-V, it develops three points, listed here, that have implications for future international interventions in civil wars. * Early decisive diplomatic attention to the Somali crisis, backed by fiscal and military threats, probably could have nipped the civil war in its bud, averting the catastrophe that followed.* The goals of the humanitarian relief mission, while impressively fulfilled, undermined the chances for a political settlement, and therefore set the stage for an ignominious exit by the international gendarmerie.* The strategic situation in the United Nations Security Council, between the leading permanent missions (the P-5) and the Secretary General (SG) creates a bias towards ambitious goals combined with paltry resources. The UN"s Somali operations reflected that unfortunate bias. In section VI, an evaluation of the international effort in Somalia is offered
The Case of Rwanda
(2001-12-07) Khadiagala, Gilbert M.; CISSM
Post-colonial Rwanda was born out of a decisive reversal of power from the minority Tutsi to the majority Hutu occasioned by the 1959 revolution. The revolution inaugurated an era of massive movement of refugees in the region, endemic communal violence, and political frailty. In the early 1980s, the government of Juvenal Habyarimana and the one-party state he had erected since 1973, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (Mouvement Rvolutionnaire National pour le Dveloppement, MRND), was under siege from three fronts. First, as the Habyarimana government grew more authoritarian, the intra-Hutu common political front frayed, shifting military and economic power to the president"s narrow northern ruling elites. Second, inequitable access to resources heightened intra-Hutu cleavages amidst a worsening economy. With the highest population density in mainland Africa (256 persons per square kilometer), Rwanda typifies the dilemma of overpopulation and resource scarcity compounded by severe dependence on coffee production. By the second half of the 1980s, with economic growth rates falling behind a burgeoning population, the government admitted that it could only feed five million people. Internal and external economic shocks were to worsen the class and regional Economic decline and external pressure for democratization galvanized domestic opposition groups to demand political reforms. In response, Habyarimana appointed a commission in September 1990 to work out a National Political Charter that would allow the establishment of different political parties. Third, against the backdrop of economic and political weakness, Tutsi exiles in Uganda organized in the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded in October 1990. Caught in an uncertain exile, RPF units that had been part of Uganda"s National Resistance Army (NRA) took the initiative, at the opportune instance of regime weakness, to force the issue of return, restoration of citizenship rights, national unity, and an end to a dictatorial system that generates refugees.
Case Study: Intervention in Sierra Leone
(2001-12-07) Nuamah, Kwaku; Zartman, I William; CISSM
Sierra Leone is a case of state collapse, in which the conflicts of the 1990s were not an independent event but merely the work of the maggots on a dead body. Thus no intervention could have done anything more, at best, than removing the momentary parasites taking advantage of the situation. It would require a longer, deeper, and more sustained effort of the Sierra Leoneans, necessarily with help from the international community, to restore a functioning political, economic and social structure necessary to prevent a recurrence of conflict. At the same time, it is noteworthy that this internal conflict was not an ethnic conflict, despite some secondary ethnic ramifications. The collapse of the Sierra Leonean state, already a weak creation of colonization and decolonization, took place under the long reign of Siaka Stevens (1968-85) and his All Peoples Congress (APC) drawing primarily on the interior Temne and Limba people from the northern part of the country, reacting against the previous predominance of the coastal Mende people from the south and east. Collapse was consummated under Stevens" handpicked, ineptsuccessor, Gen. Joseph Momoh, overthrown by dissatisfied junior officers led by Capt Valentine Strasser in April 1992. The main rebel groups operated under the name of the Revolutionary United Force (RUF), led by ex-cpl Foday Sankoh and Samuel Bokarie and operating with the active support of the rebel movement and then the government of Liberia under Charles Taylor. The rebellion expanded into neighboring countries and then wore down under the falling away of external and internal support.