History Theses and Dissertations
Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/2778
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Item "Pillaged and Robbed so Well": Captains in the Hundred Years War 1350-1380(2024) Ament, Nathaniel; Baron, Sabrina; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Captains were among the most influential military figures of the Hundred Years War. Despite this, there is scant scholarship on captaincy as a position within medieval society. This thesis seeks to rectify this gap in the scholarship by exploring the careers of influential captains serving England and France during the period from 1350-80. Drawing primarily from chronicle sources, this thesis examines the careers of this group of captains chronologically. It examines how their careers progressed and how they interacted with key cultural systems such as territorial lordship, chivalric culture, and the economic mechanisms of war. The overall findings of this paper reveal that these three systems mutually reinforced each other through captaincy by justifying chivalric violence.Item “Quite Young Limbs that Bled”: Accidents, Apathy, and the Failure of American Aviation During the First World War(2024) Getka, Dana; Giovacchini, Saverio; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)The advent of the First World War saw America’s first concerted attempt at building a world-class air service. Desperate to join the ranks of Britain, Germany, and France, it pushed poorly-built planes out of factories and poorly-trained cadets out of flying schools at an alarming rate. In this thesis, I argue that in blind pursuit of its goals, the United States air service ultimately doomed those whose efforts would bring the organization its prestige: the pilots. Aviators, especially non-combatants in roles such as training, testing, and ferrying, faced unavoidable death or harm every time they stepped into a plane, be it physically, emotionally, or psychologically. Despite their role as non-combatants, these pilots well understood that destruction would characterize their world, provoking emotional responses expected of those engaged in fighting on active fronts. Indeed, flying was a world of combat unto itself, and by war’s end, the Army Air Service had earned the dubious distinction of being the only arm of the United States military in which more men were violently killed in non-combat than in combat roles.Item LOCAL RESISTANCE AND RECOVERY IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF THE 1993 NAVAL BASE CLOSURE IN CHARLESTON, SC(2024) Verkouw, Clay Stephen; Chung, Patrick; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission transformed military base communities throughout the United States from 1988-2005. This work offers an account of military base closure from the local level, tracing the origins, resistance, impacts, and recovery in Charleston, South Carolina. A neoliberal turn in domestic politics resulted in the closure of hundreds of military bases, like the Charleston Naval Shipyard. Despite significant local resistance, the BRAC Commission shuttered the shipyard, ending decades of military investment and thousands of stable government jobs in the Charleston region. Yet, Charleston leaders took important steps in the post-closure years to maintain the traditions of military Keynesianism in Charleston, leading to a very successful economic recovery from the naval base closure crisis. This case study seeks to complicate existing narratives of U.S. military industry resilience, post-Cold War base closure, and military privatization benefits through a local history of a transformative period in Charleston.Item Perpetuating Conflict: Postcolonial Intervention in Afghanistan During the Cold War(2023) Dauphin, Edward George; Chung, Patrick; Woods, Colleen; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)ArgumentThis thesis argues that during the postcolonial era, Cold War hegemons – The United States of America and the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan’s modernization to ensure their methods of modernization – capitalism and communism – remained the only options for developing nations to modernize. While most believe that American and Soviet intervention into Afghanistan was the result of Cold War geopolitics, I argue that questions of statehood and nation-making were the central factors in superpower involvement in the country. Amid a resurgence of traditional Islamic values, Afghanistan sought to modernize outside of the realm of bi-polar developmental paths imposed by American nation-state capitalism and Soviet communism. Largely founded on Orientalist beliefs, the hegemons refused to recognize the legitimacy of a modern Afghan nation built on Islamism. The hegemons believed that without First World influence, Afghan “tribalism” and “Islamism” were too primitive to possess the capability of progressing towards a modern state, one which they defined using western-orthodox models. Statehood, according to American and Soviet concepts of high modernism posited that a developing nations’ path to modernity adhered to a linear model centered on a market-based economy. According to the hegemons, once the developing nation established a market-based economy, the developing nation would adapt to either a communist or capitalist modes. Method This research for this thesis was conducted using recently declassified primary source material from the CIA’s CREST database, the Wilson Center Online for recently declassified KGB documents, and select memoirs from key individuals. Secondary source material was used to frame the historiographical context of my argument – focusing on how many historians degrade the Afghan peoples’ own agency in their modernization. When necessary, secondary source material was also used in order to fill the gaps left by redacted primary source material. Key concepts used for framing both the USG and KGB’s reasons for intervention included postcolonial modernization, High Modernism and Orientalism, and Traditional Islam. Major FindingsMajor Findings included: 1) Though they “officially” supported self-determination, the Soviet Politburo and USG found new methods to control developing nations; 2) Despite their Orientalist beliefs and hesitancy to support the PDPA, the Soviet Politburo seized the initiative in Afghanistan by planting KGB agents in PDPA; 3) The Soviet Politburo legitimized the PDPA’s modernization as high modernism by claiming that Afghanistan's tribalism created a market system, and the civil war was merely the next step in revolution towards socialism. 4) Realizing they could no longer control the PDPA, the Politburo was compelled to commit military forces to support the PDPA and maintain their influence; 5) The USG refused to recognized Afghanistan's modernization according to their own concepts of high modernism; 6) The USG sought to undermine the PDPA, the Soviet Politburo’s support of the PDPA, and Islamism as a means to modernization. De-legitimizing all three would prove American capitalism as the only viable means to modernization; 7) With no intention of establishing a long-term solution, and with no desire to threaten détente, the USG relied on the CIA and clandestine operations to perpetuate the Afghan Civil War; and 8) By perpetuating the Civil War to drive Afghanistan to become a failed state, the USG gained credibility over the Soviet Politburo. ConclusionWestern definitions of statehood and nationmaking were the driving factors behind USG and KGB intervention in Afghanistan. Afghanistan did not merely serve as the next battleground for hegemonic proxy war, instead the Afghan people sought to pursue a third method of modernization, one which conflicted with western views of high modernism. Due to preconceived notions of Orientalism, the USG and Soviet Politburo were compelled to prevent an alternative method of nationmaking to maintain their bipolar control of the world.Item WARFIGHTING: JOHN BOYD’S THEORY OF CONFLICT, THE ORIGINS OF MANEUVER WARFARE, AND THE COMPLEX PROCESS OF DOCTRINAL CHANGE IN THE U.S. MARINE CORPS, 1975-1989(2023) Callahan, Shawn Patrick; Sumida, Jon T; Chung, Patrick; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This dissertation analyzes the origins of the American concept of maneuver warfare and the process through which that concept was first encoded as military doctrine in 1989 by the U.S. Marine Corps in Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1), Warfighting. Examining the process through which these ideas were incepted, matured, and encoded in doctrine makes it clear that the prevailing narrative is deficient in several important ways, and these misconceptions obstruct an accurate understanding of what maneuver warfare is and how military organizations deal with radical new ideas. A detailed examination of the ideas advanced by John Boyd, the man commonly thought to be the creator of maneuver warfare based upon his Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Cycle theory, shows that neither of those concepts was ever his central argument. Rather, Boyd was developing a much more expansive theory of competition and conflict, and his method and ideas are widely misunderstood. It was a military reform colleague of Boyd’s named William S. Lind who originated the concept of maneuver warfare based on his own interpretation of German military history. He promoted this style of fighting through a dichotomous model contrasting it with firepower/attrition warfare in an effort to help the U.S. Army understand how it needed to change its approach to warfare. Ultimately, Lind’s ideas about maneuver warfare found better reception within the U.S. Marine Corps, where he worked with Marines in several different organizations to further develop the concept. The way that Lind incorporated Boyd’s early ideas to promote maneuver warfare has much to do with why Boyd’s role and theory are misunderstood today. The Marines who interacted with Lind, and to a lesser degree Boyd, meanwhile, played an important role in developing the supporting concepts and techniques needed to make maneuver warfare an actionable approach to war. Efforts to incorporate the new ideas in Marine Corps doctrine were limited less by simple institutional conservatism than they were by the inability of the service’s bureaucracy to incorporate fundamentally new concepts, which required a particular new, shared understanding of war. The most important achievement of FMFM 1 was not that it formally adopted maneuver warfare, but its definition of a common conception of war within which maneuver warfare made sense, emphasizing moral and mental factors, the inherent nonlinearity of warfare, and the fundamental uncertainty that surrounded military decision-making. This, defining a new way of thinking about war that all Marines would share, was the most significant accomplishment of FMFM 1. However, this accomplishment has been undercut by several misconceptions about maneuver warfare, all of which were byproducts of the process through which the concept was formed and promoted.Item “THE GREAT QUESTION”: SLAVERY, SECTIONALISM, AND THE U.S. NAVAL OFFICER CORPS, 1820-1861(2021) Bailey, Roger; Bell, Richard; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This dissertation analyzes how United States naval officers’ beliefs about race and slavery shaped sectionalism between the North and South in the antebellum era. As agents of the federal government operating far from the capital, naval officers had significant influence on the implementation of American foreign policy. With reputations as respected professionals and travelers, they also shaped national discourse with their reports, speeches, and publications. These traits made officers important public figures as the future of slavery became a pervasive issue that increasingly affected American naval operations. The study examines the US Navy’s suppression of the transatlantic slave trade, support for African colonization in Liberia, policing of unauthorized “filibustering” invasions in Latin America, and exploring expeditions. It argues that up until the secession crisis at the outbreak of the Civil War, the naval officer corps was remarkably resilient to the growing divide between the North and South. Most officers considered themselves to be politically moderate on the issue of slavery, and they tried to curtail the institution’s worst excesses, eliminate threats to the stability of slavery, and promote external, compromise solutions to the nation’s domestic crisis that prioritized rule of law. These solutions sought to unify white Americans around visions of empire and the expatriation of African Americans. In pursuing such goals, officers tried to enact their own version of American foreign policy. Though they had limited material success, their efforts supported political moderatism in the antebellum United States. As more and more Americans took up pro- and antislavery stances, naval officers used federal power and their personal influence to help maintain the belief that compromise could preserve the Union.Item Send in the Reserves! The Development and Significance of the Reserve Dilemma in Military History(2021) Chadwick, Andrew Lewis; Sumida, Jon T; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This dissertation examines the origins and evolution of the trained reserve—a 19th-century military institution that most states continue to depend upon for national defense. In doing so, it argues that the rising complexity, speed, and lethality of warfare over the last century challenged the viability of industrial era reservist personnel and training policies, which many states retain today. Such policies have largely proven incapable of providing reservists with the time and resources to keep up with changing technical and tactical character of warfare, as evidenced by the poor performance of many reservists in the conflicts of the past century. However, armies preparing for large-scale combat operations generally could not reduce their reliance on reservists because of a combination of political, military, and socio-economic constraints and compulsions. Namely, they lacked the financial means, military resources, and, in some cases, the political capital to rely solely on full-time soldiers who often are better resourced to keep up with the rising complexity of modern warfare compared to part-time reservists.Thus, as this dissertation reveals using archival sources, recently declassified intelligence reports, and a host of other printed primary sources, armies confronted a dilemma regarding reserve policy over the past century. They could, as the U.S. Army has done since the 1970s, increase reserve training standards, but risk incurring higher overhead costs or sparking a political backlash from reservists who often resisted efforts to increase their service obligations. Alternatively, they could reduce their dependency on reservists, as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have done since the late 1980s. But doing this threatened to overstretch active duty units who, as this dissertation shows, generally cannot fight protracted or large-scale wars without reservists. In short, this dissertation shows how the dynamics of reserve policymaking and the combat performance of reservists can—and often had—significant political, strategic, operational, and tactical effects throughout recent history.Item THE FORGOTTEN ALLY: U.S./SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS DURING THE VIETNAM WAR(2021) Matheny, Michael; Chung, Patrick; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)South Korea participated in the Vietnam War as America’s ally on a tremendous scale involving over 300,000 soldiers from 1964-1973. Despite this massive commitment, South Korea’s involvement has attracted little scholarly interest or public attention. The prevailing explanation in relevant historiography often dismisses South Korea’s role as a mercenary exchange taken under U.S. pressure or in pursuit of economic incentives. Alternatively, I argue that the South Korean government had a legitimate national interest in participating in the Vietnam War in pursuit of political, national defense, and economic advancements that were uniquely motivated by concurrent hostilities with North Korea. South Korea’s national interests aligned with the U.S. such that they willingly and effectively contributed to the Vietnam War. By the war’s end, U.S. and South Korean national interests diverged sharply as relations declined, which left South Korea’s wartime role as an embattled and largely forgotten memory in the U.S.Item "Too Far on a Whim to Walk Back on a Hunch:" The US Navy and High-Steam Technology, 1930-1945(2020) Pitrof, Tyler Antone; Sumida, Jon T; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)American interwar development of a high-pressure, high-temperature steam propulsion system for its navy has long been hailed by scholars as a major operational advantage in the Pacific Theater of World War II. This study challenges that narrative, which is almost entirely dependent on the autobiographical account of Vice Admiral Harold G. Bowen, Sr. “High steam,” as the system was called, was a major part of Admiral Bowen’s legacy as Chief of the Bureau of Engineering from 1935 to 1939. His account should therefore be analyzed critically as a partisan primary source. Using this approach, and through consultation of the archival records of the Navy, it is clear that while high-steam developments improved the operational ranges of US Navy warships, the system failed to reach the lofty endurance levels claimed during its development and parroted in subsequent scholarship. This was largely due to faulty assumptions that were made about the nature of modern operational environments. To make matters worse, the improvements that were obtained were accompanied by substantial production and training problems. All of these issues combined with the bureaucratic subdivision of the Navy to place significant limits on the pace of US naval operations in the Pacific Theater of World War II.Item SUSTAINING THE PACIFIC CARRIER AIR WAR: THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE AND THE ENLISTED AIRCRAFT TECHNICIAN IN WORLD WAR II(2019) Fisher, Stanford Edward; Sumida, Jon T; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)The ability of the United States Navy to fight a protracted war throughout the Pacific Ocean in World War II was not solely the result of technology, tactics, or admiralship. Naval aviation maintenance played a major role in the U.S. victory over Japan. Naval aviation leadership throughout the period between World War I and World War II focused on the improvement of technology and tactics rather than training a new, and in the event of war, necessarily large cohort of enlisted personnel. Aircraft maintenance was an afterthought for much of the era because of the small number of carriers and aircraft. When the United States realized a two-ocean naval war was imminent and a drastic increase in the size of its aviation fleet was ordered, the navy was forced to reconsider its earlier practices and forge new polices and processes. The U.S. naval air war against Japan did not achieve sustained success until enough aircraft technicians were in place to support the doctrine of the Fast Carrier Task Force. The United States Navy was not ready to fight a protracted war at sea until its carrier aircraft technicians were trained and in place. The historiography of U.S. naval warfare in the modern era lacks any comprehensive study on the subject of naval aviation maintenance. This dissertation demonstrates the importance of considering all elements of the military institution, not just those that correspond to operational-battle history when studying the full dimensions of modern naval war in the age of the aircraft carrier. Recognizing the drastic institutional changes that accompanied an increase in maintenance personnel from less than 10,000 to nearly 250,000 over four years, a complete restructuring of the aviation navy’s technical educational system, and the development of highly specialized skilled labor force on board the aircraft carrier are essential to creating a more complete historiography World War II naval warfare. Analyzing the effect that aircraft maintenance and the aircraft technician had on carrier warfare is an added layer to the complex study of war that should not be overlooked. Even in the era of modern-technologically advanced warfare, people still matter.