Public Policy Research Works

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1995 - 19993

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End date: 2006Subject: search.filters.subject.nuclear arms control

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    A Step-by-step Approach to a Global Fissile Materials Cutoff
    (Arms Control Today, 1995-10) Fetter, Steve; von Hippel, Frank
    Despite its centrality to the future of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, progress toward a fissile cutoff has lost momentum. To regain momentum, and to capture many of the security benefits of a cutoff as soon as possible, groups and countries advocating nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament should press the nuclear-weapon and threshold states to commit themselves publicly to a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons. Fissile materials—plutonium and highly enriched uranium—are the fundamental ingredients of all nuclear weapons. They are also the most difficult and expensive part of a nuclear weapon to produce. A global, verified ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives is therefore an essential part of any comprehensive nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime. A cutoff would limit the size of potential nuclear arsenals. It would make reductions irreversible if fissile material were transferred from dismantled weapons and other unsafeguarded stocks to nonweapons use or disposal under international safeguards. A cutoff would also strengthen the nonproliferation regime by opening up nuclear facilities in all states to international inspection.
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    Future Directions in Nuclear Arms Control and Verification
    (International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP), 1998-04) Fetter, Steve
    To date, nuclear arms control has focused on restricting the number and capabilities of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles— intercontinental missiles and bombers. In the future, it will become increasingly important to combine these measures with restrictions on nuclear warhead and fissile-material stockpiles and on the operation and targeting of nuclear forces. Restrictions on nuclear warheads, materials, operations, and targeting would not only help improve stability, but would also help reduce the risk of accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous use of nuclear weapons. A major challenge is verifying compliance with such restrictions. This paper outlines the technical possibilities for verifying limits on stockpiles of warheads and fissile materials, on the dismantling of nuclear warheads and the disposition of fissile materials, and on the launch-readiness of nuclear forces in the hope of stimulating further research on these topics.
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    The Future of Nuclear Arms Control
    (American Physical Society, 1999-10) Fetter, Steve
    It’s a great privilege for me to be invited to join this very distinguished panel. As you can tell from the color of my hair, I represent the next generation of physicists involved in public policy. Rather than talk about the history of physics in national defense, I’ll talk about the future—in particular, the future of nuclear arms control.