The Impact of Earnings Manipulation on the Science and Practice of Strategic Management

Abstract

Strategic management research frequently seeks to explain variation in organizational performance using metrics such as accounting profits scaled by firm assets (ROA). Essay 1 addresses a concern with such accrual-based accounting methods—perhaps best illustrated by a large discontinuity in the distribution of ROA around zero for U.S. public firms—that operational and accounting practices will artificially inflate/deflate accounting profit. The essay establishes that such earnings management is common, introduces non-classical noise, and distorts our understanding of broad drivers of firm performance. It concludes with an analysis showing that an alternative performance measure, Cash Flows from Operations on Assets (OCFOA), offers a robust vehicle for checking results using accounting profits. Essay 2 addresses a core prediction of the behavioral theory of the firm—that a firm is more likely to engage in strategic change when its performance falls short of its aspirations. If a firm manipulates income to report above aspirations when otherwise it would have fallen short, this creates a theoretical tension—does the firm engage in strategic change or not? This study utilizes two instrumental variables for a firm’s capability to smooth earnings to analyze the linkage between earnings smoothing and strategic change. The results suggest that public firms actively smoothing earnings have a lower propensity to subsequently change the firm’s major resource allocations, and that avoiding reporting performance below aspirations is a mechanism through which this may occur.