Verifying Nuclear Disarmament
Verifying Nuclear Disarmament
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Date
1998-03
Authors
Fetter, Steve
Advisor
Citation
Fetter, Steve. "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," in Frank Blackaby and Joseph Rotblat, ed., Nuclear Weapons: The Road to Zero (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 71-100.
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Abstract
Commentators differ on whether nuclear disarmament would be desirable, but
many argue that disarmament is impractical because it could not be verified. Three
reasons are often offered for such pessimism. First, nuclear weapons are small and
difficult to detect, and one could not be sure that a few weapons had not been
hidden away. Second, nuclear weapons are so destructive that a mere handful would
confer enormous military and political advantages over non-nuclear adversaries.
Finally, nuclear know-how cannot be eliminated, and any nation that had dismantled
its nuclear weapons would be capable of quickly assembling a new arsenal from
scratch or using civilian nuclear materials. Because of the difficulty of verifying that
other states had eliminated all their weapons and providing adequate warning of
their rearming, it is argued, states would not agree to disarm in the first place.