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    Sympathy and Subjectivity

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    Date
    1999-12
    Author
    Carruthers, Peter
    Citation
    Peter Carruthers. "Sympathy and Subjectivity," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 77, No. 4 December 1999 , p. 465 - 482.
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    Abstract
    This paper shows that even if the mental states of non-human animals lack phenomenological properties, as some accounts of mental-state consciousness imply, this need not prevent those states from being appropriate objects of sympathy and moral concern. The paper argues that the most basic form of mental (as opposed to biological) harm lies in the existence of thwarted agency, or thwarted desire, rather than in anything phenomenological.
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4340
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    • Philosophy Research Works
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    Taylor and Francis Group, Australasian Journal of Philosophy: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/00048402.asp

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