Sympathy and Subjectivity

dc.contributor.author	Carruthers, Peter
dc.date.accessioned	2007-03-16T16:45:48Z
dc.date.available	2007-03-16T16:45:48Z
dc.date.issued	1999-12
dc.description.abstract	This paper shows that even if the mental states of non-human animals lack phenomenological properties, as some accounts of mental-state consciousness imply, this need not prevent those states from being appropriate objects of sympathy and moral concern. The paper argues that the most basic form of mental (as opposed to biological) harm lies in the existence of thwarted agency, or thwarted desire, rather than in anything phenomenological.	en
dc.format.extent	107139 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	text/html
dc.identifier.citation	Peter Carruthers. "Sympathy and Subjectivity," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 77, No. 4 December 1999 , p. 465 - 482.	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4340
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.publisher	Taylor and Francis Group	en
dc.relation.isAvailableAt	College of Arts & Humanities	en_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAt	Philosophy	en_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAt	Digital Repository at the University of Maryland	en_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAt	University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)	en_us
dc.rights.license	Taylor and Francis Group, Australasian Journal of Philosophy: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/00048402.asp	en
dc.subject	sympathy	en
dc.subject	subjectivity	en
dc.subject	consciousness	en
dc.subject	mental-state	en
dc.subject	agency	en
dc.subject	desire	en
dc.title	Sympathy and Subjectivity	en
dc.type	Article	en

Files

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1