This dissertation test the premise that peasant hoarding of surplus grain to state procurement apparatus during the late New Economic Policy period, caused the Grain Crisis of 1928. The peasants' reluctance to sell grain and claims of peasant hoarding could only occur if sufficient grain surpluses existed during this period. The existence of these assumed grain surpluses is show to be highly improbable. First, the large but inconsistent body of 1920s grain statistics was evaluated per se and related to two periods of pre-WWI data, the Witte and Stolypin years, on a practical comparison whenever possible. For both these pre-World War I periods, intensive links between rapid industrialization and agriculture had been established similar to the conditions of the 1920s. The climatic conditions of the two imperial and one Soviet period in the 1920s, especially drought in 1927, was analyzed, and its impact on grain production estimated and interpreted. The conclusion was reached that the cause of drop in grain production in 1927 was due to long-term and persistent trend of regional drought affecting spring wheat yields, especially in the areas of the Middle Volga and Kazakhstan. Second, the resultant conclusion was reached that there was insufficient bread grain on a national basis in the 1927 to meet the essential needs of the rural peasants, much less the increasing demands of the government procurements. Third, the government's 1917 policy of monopolizing all available "surpluses" on the grain market under the false assumption that these surpluses were abundant, demonstrated either naivete and incompetence, or political expediency. This monopolization contributed to a breakdown in the marketing distribution of available grain, and generally exacerbated the poor procurement situation which was publically and incorrectly blamed on the peasants' hoarding.