|dc.description.abstract||Secure computation involves multiple parties computing a common function while keeping their inputs private, and is a growing field of cryptography due to its potential for maintaining privacy guarantees in real-world applications. However, current secure computation protocols are not yet efficient enough to be
used in practice. We argue that this is due to much of the research effort being focused on generality rather than specificity. Namely, current research tends to focus on constructing and improving protocols for the strongest notions of security or for an arbitrary number of parties. However, in real-world deployments, these security notions are often too strong, or the number of parties running a protocol would be smaller. In this thesis we make several steps towards bridging the efficiency gap of secure computation by focusing on constructing efficient protocols for specific real-world settings and security models. In particular, we make the following four contributions:
- We show an efficient (when amortized over multiple runs) maliciously secure two-party secure computation (2PC) protocol in the multiple-execution setting, where the same function is computed multiple times by the same pair of parties.
- We improve the efficiency of 2PC protocols in the publicly verifiable covert security model, where a party can cheat with some probability but if it gets caught then the honest party obtains a certificate proving that the given party cheated.
- We show how to optimize existing 2PC protocols when the function to be computed includes predicate checks on its inputs.
- We demonstrate an efficient maliciously secure protocol in the three-party setting.||en_US