| dc.description.abstract | This thesis makes use of the little studied records of
the Military Stores or Ordnance, Department during the
American Revolution to examine the commonly held assumption
that the Continental Army was inadequately supplied with the
materials necessary for waging war. The evidence suggests
that contrary to this assumption, the Ordnance Department,
following the reforms of 1778, kept the army well supplied
with military stores.
This study will examine three phases which illustrate
the evolution of the Ordnance Department and the Army as a
whole. The first phase, 1775-1777, illustrates the extemporized
approach to war waged by Congressional committees
lacking in military knowledge and experience. From 1777 to
1779, we witness the maturation and professionalism that
evolved following the failure of the old colonial, citizenmilitia
approach to war. The final phase, 1779-1783,
provides the evidence that the professionalization worked.
Under the guidance of General Henry Knox and the
leadership of its two wartime administrators, Benjamin
Flower and samuel Hodgdon, the Ordnance Department, like the army it supported, evolved into a complex and sophisticated
organization. Under Knox and Hodgdon, the Department grew
from a divided and unresponsive system under political
controls imposed by Congress into an efficient organization
responsive to the army's needs. In many ways, the Department
became superior to the British system upon which it was
initially based and, except for spot shortages arising from
poor fiscal or political planning and transportation
problems, the Department kept the army well supplied with
the weaponry and military stores needed for victory. | en_US |
