Psychology
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Item On the (Un)intended Consequences of Forgiveness: Creativity After Conflict(2010) Fehr, Ryan; Gelfand, Michele J; Psychology; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Within the psychological and organizational sciences, research on forgiveness as an offender-directed motivational response to victimization is flourishing. Scholars have drawn from a wide range of theoretical perspectives to better understand the meaning of forgiveness and the antecedents of victims' forgiving motivations. Underlying this research is a near-unanimous assumption that forgiveness leads to beneficial outcomes, which has paradoxically hampered scholars' understanding of the precise nature of those benefits. The purpose of the current research is to consider a previously unforeseen yet broadly significant potential consequence of forgiveness - creativity. Drawing from evolutionary process models of creative performance (Simonton, 1999; 2003), forgiveness is theorized to impact creativity by broadening the set of ideas, concepts, and knowledge structures utilized during the creative process, referred to collectively as the participant's "domain set". Specifically, forgiveness and creativity are theoretically linked via three distinct mechanisms: mood, motivation, and cognitive resources. Two pilot studies were conducted to ensure the efficacy of a forgiveness priming procedure and explore a theoretically consistent set of lab-based creative performance measures. Three primary studies were subsequently conducted to fully test the effect of forgiveness on creative performance and the theorized mediating mechanisms. In Study 1, a brainstorming task was utilized to provide initial support for the forgiveness-creativity link and the role of domain set over simple task persistence. Mood was furthermore measured as a mediating mechanism. Study 2 replicated and extended the Study 1 findings via a different creativity task (creative drawing) and tests of both mood and motivation as potential mediators. In Study 3, further evidence for a forgiveness-creativity effect was sought via a creative problem solving exercise (the Duncker candle task). Mood and motivation were again measured as mediators. In addition, the cognitive resource theory was explored via the addition of a cognitive load manipulation. Results cumulatively supported the cognitive resource perspective. In all three studies, forgiveness predicted creative performance. The forgiveness-creativity link disappeared under cognitive load (Study 3), but was unrelated to victim mood (Studies 1-3) or motivation (Studies 2 and 3). In the discussion section, theoretical and practical implications are reviewed along with limitations and potential future directions.Item MULTIFINAL NO MORE: DEACTIVATION OF THE BACKGROUND GOAL CAUSES (PRICE) DEVALUATION OF MULTIFINAL MEANS(2010) Schultz, Jeremy; Kruglanski, Arie W; Psychology; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Motivation has been of interest to psychological researchers going back as far a Kurt Lewin (1936), but recent advances using the "New Look" in motivation paradigm have led to an explosion of research over the past fifteen years. One such new theory, goal systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002), predicts that multifinal means will lose their advantaged valuation over unifinal mean when the background goal they facilitate is deactivated. Seven studies sought to provide evidence that this will occur whether the goal is deactivated due to loss of desirability, loss of attainability, or due to attainment of the goal. Evidence was obtained suggesting that goal attainment does in fact deactivate the goal and eliminate the valuation advantage, although evidence obtained from testing the the mechanism of goal desirability was not supportive of the theory. The evidence for the role of goal unattainability deactivating the goal and eliminating the overvaluation was mixed, suggesting a potentially more complex mechanism than had been theorized. These studies provide insight not only on a basic psychological process, but to illustrate potential applications in consumer and financial markets as well.Item The goal of low self-monitors: To thine own self be true?(2010) Freidus, Rachel Amanda; Sigall, Harold; Psychology; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Traditionally, low self-monitors have been viewed as individuals who are less likely than high self-monitors to monitor their expressive behavior and to present themselves a certain way for the sake of desired public appearances. However, recent research suggests that low self-monitors may have self-presentational concerns, which seem to relate to low self-monitors' desire to appear to be sincere. In order to examine low self-monitors' goal, a study was conducted in which the participants were placed in a situation where they had to choose between being sincere and only appearing to be sincere. Participants revealed their attitudes to another participant, whose attitudes were known to them, and who would be forming an impression of them based on their attitudes. Results of this experiment demonstrated that low self-monitors chose to conform to the attitudes of the other participant, and did not choose either to be sincere or to appear to be sincere. Although the hypothesis was not supported, the experiment revealed that low self-monitors do actively present themselves. Results and implications are discussed in terms of understanding the goals of low self-monitors by distinguishing between the ability and motivational components of the construct of self-monitoring.Item The Role of the Need for Cognitive Closure in Implicit and Explicit Rule Learning(2009) Sheveland, Anna Cecile; Kruglanski, Arie W; Psychology; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Two studies investigated the role of the need for cognitive closure in implicit and explicit rule learning. I generally hypothesized the existence of a relationship between the need for closure (NFC) and the learning of rules moderated by the type of learning, implicit versus explicit, occurring (Hypothesis 1). More specifically, I predicted that high (vs. low) NFC would predict better performance on an explicit rule learning task (Hypothesis 2) but worse performance on an implicit rule learning task (Hypothesis 3). I tested these hypotheses both by measuring the NFC as a stable, dispositional trait variable (Study 1) and manipulating it as a transient state variable (Study 2). The findings of Study 1 provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 but not Hypothesis 3. The findings of Study 2 provide support for Hypothesis 3 but not Hypotheses 1 and 2.Item Effects of Group Status and Cognitive Appraisal Prime on Integrative Complexity in a Decision Making Context(2009) Van Allen, Katherine Lynn; Stangor, Charles; Psychology; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Integrative complexity has been shown to influence information-processing and decision-making in different social situations. The present research assessed the effects of group status and cognitive appraisal prime on complexity in a group decision-making context. Experiment 1 assessed group status effects, and Experiment 2 tested whether priming threat or challenge would moderate those effects. Both experiments found that minority members showed greater complexity than majority members. Experiment 2 found that appraisal prime moderated the relationship between status and complexity. Minority members receiving the threat prime were the most complex, while majority members in the threat and control conditions were the least complex. The mediating roles of cognitive appraisal, anxiety, and coping expectancy were assessed, but none were found to be significant mediators of complexity.Item Cognitive and Motivational Parameters in Motivated Biases in Human Judgment(2009) Chen, Xiaoyan; Kruglanski, Arie W.; Psychology; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Motivational and cognitive factors can determine the extent and direction of information processing in judgment. When biasing motives are present, information can be distorted and judgment biased. The extent of this bias can be determined by the nature of the information, the relative magnitude of competing goals, and the individual's cognitive resources. Studies 1, 2 and 3 explored the effect of resource depletion on motivated distortions in judgment. Studies 4 and 5 examined the role of relative goal magnitude (of a biasing goal vs. a specific judgment goal) in the phenomena. I departed from the assumption that human knowledge is malleable, and that its alteration in a motivationally desirable direction may vary in difficulty across instances. It was assumed that overcoming the difficulty requires cognitive and/or motivational resources hence under certain circumstances resource-depletion should diminish individuals' ability to motivationally bias judgments. I also hypothesized when information is clear-cut (rather than ambiguous) making distortion difficult, a sufficient amount of biasing motivation could overcome the "reality constraints," holding the cognitive resources constant. In my first two studies participants' resources were depleted either via complex or simple presentational format of the information given (Study 1), or via engagement in a fatiguing prior activity (Study 2). In the third study (Study 3), I measured participants' stable cognitive capacity as a proxy for their available cognitive resources. All three studies provided supportive evidence for the hypothesis that motivated distortion is resource dependent. In Study 4 I manipulated the relative goal magnitude by experimentally increasing goal importance for either an academic success goal in line with the specific judgment task or a social wellbeing goal as the biasing goal. In Study 5 I altered relative goal magnitude through enhancing either a neutral goal or health concerns as the biasing goal. In both Study 4 and 5, orthogonal to the relative goal magnitude manipulation, stimulus ambiguity was made either high or low. Findings from Study 4 and 5 supported the hypothesis that sufficient magnitude of biasing goal could overcome distortion difficulty even in highly constraining circumstances.Item The Role of Epistemic Motivation in the Link between Arousal and Focus of Attention(2009) Orehek, Edward; Kruglanski, Arie W; Psychology; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Over 60 years of research has led to a law-like acceptance of the Easterbrook (1959) hypothesis. Easterbrook (1959) famously reviewed the evidence on the arousal-attention link and concluded that as arousal increases, the range of cues utilized decreases, and the focus of attention narrows. However, the present set of eight studies suggests that the Easterbrook hypothesis needs to be seriously qualified. Recent developments in the understanding of the role of arousal in information processing suggests that rather than invariably leading to a focus of attention, arousal instead serves as information regarding the urgency and/or importance of active processing strategies (Storbeck & Clore, 2008). Because some processing strategies lead to a broadening of attention, arousal should sometimes be negatively related to a focusing of attention. A first set of four studies investigated the need for closure as it relates to the arousal-attention link. The need for closure refers to the motivation to make quick, firm judgments, and has been shown to lead to the use of fewer available cues. Because of this, it seems that the need for closure should lead to a tendency to focus one's attention. However, when need for closure is low, individuals tend to process more available cues, broadening attention in order to avoid reaching premature closure. The results indicate that when individuals are high on the need for closure, arousal is positively related to focus of attention, whereas when individuals are low on the need for closure, arousal is negatively related to focus of attention. A second set of four studies investigated the influence of the regulatory modes of locomotion and assessment on the arousal-attention link. Because locomotion is oriented towards movement, it should lead to a focus of attention. Because assessment is oriented towards making evaluations based on comparisons among alternatives, it should lead to a broadening of attention. The results show that when a locomotion mode is active, arousal is positively related to focus of attention, whereas, when an assessment mode is active, arousal is negatively related to focus of attention.Item SOCIAL ATTENTION THEORY: A NEW LOOK AT KNOWLEDGE FORMATION IN GROUPS(2009) Shteynberg, Garriy; Gelfand, Michele J; Psychology; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Individuals in crowded theaters, stadiums and lecture halls know that they attend to the events on the stage, on the field, and at the podium with others. Extending the literature on social foundations of knowledge formation, Social Attention Theory posits that knowingly attending to a stimulus with one's group renders that stimulus more cognitively accessible in memory. The theory is tested across three studies where participants attend to stimuli such as words (study 1), goals (study 2), and time pressure (study 3) with members of their group or a control group. Across all three experiments, participants exhibited greater cognitive accessibility for the stimuli attended to with their group (i.e., similar others). Results also showed that individuals felt more social when attending to stimuli with their group, but did not feel happier, more motivated or more alert.Item Affect and Cognition as Antecedents of Intergroup Attitudes: The Role of Applicability and Judged Usability(2009) Leary, Scott; Stangor, Charles; Psychology; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)When making intergroup evaluations we experience cognitive and affective responses. Given that the content of the cognitions or affective reactions are applicable and judged usable, each has the potential to influence one's attitudes towards that group. In a Pilot Study participants reported significantly more disgust than fear when thinking about gay men, and significantly more fear than disgust when thinking about African-Americans. Studies 1 and 2 provided initial support that these specific emotional responses to social groups are moderated by the extent to which that information is judged as usable. Data from Study 3 did not fully support my hypotheses, as personal relevance did not moderate the extent to which affect was related to social distance. Implications and limitations are discussed.Item Effects on Communal Relationships of the Presence of Need, Responsibility for the Need, and the Ability to Satisfy the Need.(2008-12-08) Buzinski, Steven G.; Sigall, Harold; Psychology; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)The relationship between a communal other's needs and one's communal strength toward that other, and general communal orientation were examined. Three variables were examined in a 2 x 2 x 2 experimental design: a communal other's need (need-unmet vs. need-met), the other's responsibility for creating the need (yes vs. no), and the other's ability to satisfy the need (yes vs. no). Participants (N = 48) completed pre- and post-test measures of communal strength toward the other and communal orientation. Results showed that the presence of need and the other's responsibility affected communal orientation. An interaction between these variables was observed as well: communal orientation was lower when the need was met and the other was not responsible for creating it than in the other conditions. There were no effects on communal strength. The relationship between the needs of a communal other and both communal strength and communal orientation are discussed.