Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland

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    Missile Defense in Europe: Progress Toward an Uncertain Outcome
    (Center for International & Security Studies, 2017-01-02) Frierson, Nate; Goren, Nilsu; Kelleher, Catherine
    Even before its announced completion date of 2018, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to regional missile defense in Europe can declare victory. So far it has been implemented close to schedule and below budget despite continuing problems related to cost, debates about financial burden sharing, and Russia’s warnings about its threat, real or imagined, to European security and stability. Russian aggression in Crimea and Ukraine and its intervention in Syria have helped to shore up broad political support for the project. The sharp tension trajectory of Russian-NATO relations and the need to reassure Eastern European allies does however mean that Russia and a few domestic critics will continue to see EPAA as a political lever to stoke the fires of uncertainty about U.S. commitment and to play on the fears in Eastern Europe of abandonment in their first hours of need should a Russian attack occur. Expansion of the EPAA’s capabilities beyond the current projected capability of the system by 2018 will be difficult given the costs and the competing demands for missile defense assets elsewhere around the globe. Barring any significant ratcheting up of Russian threats and other security risks in Europe, significant expansion of the EPAA is unlikely, but so is any reduction in commitment to the project as it stands now. However, there are many assumptions and challenges still to be discussed and confronted if EPAA is to fulfill all of the political and military expectations set first by the George W. Bush administration and the revised version under the Obama administration. This essay will examine each of these challenges in turn, and gauge the seriousness of the dangers and risks, both political and military, involved. There is little present evidence that the EPAA is at risk of drastic changes to its planned deployment, either in favor of increased capability or a decreased U.S. commitment to fulfilling the promises already made. This is as it should be. The EPAA, to quote Brad Roberts, is not a “fool’s errand.”i What remains to be seen is how the United States and NATO will address the challenges, old and new, that face the EPAA and indeed all aspects of reliance on missile defense to deter and defend against growing threats.
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    Seeing Missile Defense as U.S. Hostility, North Korea Aims at More and Better Weapons
    (Center for International & Security Studies, 2017-01-02) Aoki, Naoko
    North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have spurred Japan and South Korea to develop their own ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and to regenerate their interest in regional missile defense cooperation with the United States. Has North Korea reacted to such developments, and if so, how? This paper looks at North Korea’s missile capacity development as well as its official proclamations and concludes that while Pyongyang likely does not believe that it is the region’s sole target for U.S. and allied BMD, it feels deeply threatened by its deployment. Existing and potential BMD systems have not discouraged Pyongyang from building its own missiles. Rather, North Korea is accelerating its efforts to improve and expand its missile arsenal to develop a survivable force, likely perceiving BMD systems as part of an overall U.S. strategy that is hostile to Pyongyang.
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    Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century
    (Center for International & Security Studies, 2017-01-02) Kelleher, Catherine; Frierson, Nate; Goren, Nilsu; Kattan, Ari; Pollack, Joshua; Sankaran, Jaganath; Aoki, Naoko
    The following papers were commissioned as part of the Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century project supported by the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC). The papers have two general purposes: 1) to create a body of work that provides an overview of the missile defense developments in major regions of the world; and 2) to provide emerging scholars the opportunity to conduct research, publish, and connect with each other. We believe we have succeeded on both counts. The papers written for this project will be valuable for academics and policymakers alike, and will be published and disseminated by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. This element of the project has also been successful in further bringing together a new cadre of experts in the field and developing the next generation of academics and public servants who will benefit from their participation in this project. These papers were completed in the Fall of 2016.
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    Debating Space Security: Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
    (2012) Sankaran, Jaganath; Steinbruner, John D; Public Policy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
    The U.S. position in the debate on space security has been that (1) space-based systems could be developed and used to obtain decisive warghting superiority over an adversary, and (2) these space-based systems, because they might give such an inordinate advantage over any adversary, will be attacked. The Russians and Chinese, in contrast, claim to be threatened by U.S. aspirations in space but deny that they pose a serious threat to U.S. space-based systems. They view the development of advanced military space systems by the United States as evidence of a growing gap of military capabilities limited only by technological--not political--constraints. They argue that U.S. missile defense systems operating in coordination with advanced satellite sensors would weaken their nuclear retaliatory potential. This dissertation argues that the positions held by both of these parties are more extreme than warranted. An analytical evaluation quickly narrows the touted capabilities and assumed vulnerabilities of space systems to a much smaller set of concerns that can be addressed by collaboration. Chapter 2: Operationally Responsive Space (ORS): Is 24/7 Warghter Support Feasible? demonstrates the infeasibility of dramatically increasing U.S. warfighting superiority by using satellites. Chapter 3: What Can be Achieved by Attacking Satellites? makes the case that although U.S. armed forces rely extensively on its satellite infrastructure, that does not immediately make them desirable targets. The functions performed by military satellites are diffused among large constellations with redundancies. Also, some of the functions performed by these satellites can be substituted for by other terrestrial and aerial systems. Chapter 4: The Limits of Chinese Anti-Satellite Missiles demonstrates that anti-satellite (ASAT) intercepts are very complex under realistic conditions and that a potential adversary with space capabilities comparable to China's has very limited capability to use ASATs in a real-world battle scenario. Finally, in order to evaluate the chief concern raised by the Russians and Chinese, chapter 5: Satellites, Missile Defense and Space Security simulates a boost-phase missile defense system cued by the advanced Space Tracking and Surveillance (STSS) sensors. It demonstrates that even under best case assumptions, the STSS sensors are not good enough for the boost-phase missile defense system to successfully intercept and destroy an ICBM. Together, these chapters aim to narrow the contentions in the debate on space security thereby fostering the international colloboration and data sharing needed to ensure safe operations in space.