College of Arts & Humanities
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The collections in this community comprise faculty research works, as well as graduate theses and dissertations.
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Item Global Justice as Fairness: Non-domination, Human Rights & the Global Basic Structure(2013) Hoitink, Aaron Philip; Morris, Christopher W.; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Most Rawlsian approaches to global justice fall into one of two main types—cosmopolitanisms that expand the scope of Rawls's domestic theory to the entire world, and those that, following Rawls's The Law of Peoples, develop a liberal foreign policy rooted in the toleration of “decent” but nonliberal peoples. Global Justice as Fairness offers an alternative to these by incorporating some aspects of each, as well as some unique features, into a coherent whole that avoids their more significant drawbacks. Employing a distinctive understanding of the global original position and a republican view of freedom, the theory generates two principles that aim to ensure the agency and non-domination of peoples. These principles provide the broad outlines of a just global basic structure for states that is both realistic and utopian. The most basic parameters of Rawlsian theories of global justice are the subject of and parties to the original position(s). Global Justice as Fairness is unique among such theories by identifying the global basic structure as subject (as cosmopolitans do) while also taking peoples, not persons, as the parties (following Rawls's law of peoples). It is also alone in severing the tie between domestic and global justice and recognizing the fact of reasonable global pluralism, according to which it is unreasonable to expect all peoples to hold liberal conceptions of domestic justice. Global Justice as Fairness excludes the parties’ knowledge of their domestic conceptions behind the veil of ignorance, forcing them to rely on their generic interests as peoples. This picture of peoples’ rationality is developed with an account of global primary goods rooted in their agency and a global analog of citizenship. Thus situated, the parties are led to select two principles of justice for a global basic structure formulated in terms of the republican vision of freedom. The first principle specifies a human rights regime that ensures the minimal conditions needed for peoples to maintain their distinctly political form of group agency. The second provides guidelines for minimizing the domination of peoples through a just global political and economic order within which they can freely exercise that agency.Item An East and West Debate on Human Rights(2011) Chan, Benedict Shing Bun; Morris, Christopher W.; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)In an East and West debate on human rights, scholars from different cultures disagree on whether all civil and political rights are human rights. While they generally agree that basic civil rights such as rights against torture and slavery (i.e., physical security rights) are human rights, some of them argue that traditional political rights in the West such as freedom of speech and political participation (i.e., liberal rights) are not human rights. Some scholars, such as Daniel A. Bell, argue that liberal rights are not human rights because liberal rights conflict with some East Asian cultures. In this dissertation, I argue that both physical security rights and liberal rights are human rights, and explain the relationship between these rights and East Asian cultures. First, I argue that if liberal rights are not human rights because they conflict with some East Asian cultures, then physical security rights are also not human rights because physical security rights also conflict with some East Asian cultures. Next, I discuss the idea from Daniel Bell and Michael Walzer that physical security rights are human rights because they are minimal values. Based on their idea, I explain what minimal values are, and why it is possible to develop some maximal theories of physical security rights in East Asian cultures. I argue that since physical security rights are minimal values, they are still human rights even they conflict with some East Asian cultures. I then argue that liberal rights, similar to physical security rights, are also minimal values, and it is possible to develop some maximal theories of them in East Asian cultures. Therefore, similar to physical security rights, liberal rights are also human rights even they also conflict with some East Asian cultures. I also discuss other human rights debates, especially the debates between Daniel Bell and other philosophers. Charles Taylor argues for an overlapping consensus approach on human rights; Jack Donnelly argues for a Western liberalist approach on human rights. I explain the relationship between these approaches and my arguments, and how my arguments can help them to reply to the challenges from Daniel Bell.Item Exploring the Empowerment Effects of the Internet on Active Publics(2007-12-10) Halvorson, Erik; Toth, Elizabeth; Communication; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)The purpose of this study was to explore the effects of the Internet on the power of active publics using qualitative in-depth interviews with 19 human rights advocates. The study examines how the participants make meaning of power, use the Internet to achieve their goals, and the extent to which they feel empowered by the Internet. The results suggested four types of power in human rights advocacy, while advocates themselves rely primarily on the power of persuasion to achieve objectives. While the Internet has led to empowerment in some limited instances, no uniform empowerment for advocates was suggested by the data. The findings suggest numerous practical uses for Internet technologies in advocacy as well as important themes and theories to be incorporated into future studies.Item Rwanda and the Moral Obligation of Humanitarian Intervention(2007-04-25) Kassner, Joshua James; Morris, Christopher W; Morris, Christopher W; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)In 1994, nearly one million Men, women, and children were slaughtered because of their ethnicity. The tragedy of the Rwandan genocide has caused many to question the international community's choice not to intervene. I use the Rwandan genocide as a means of discussing international morality and the role of morality in international relations. The first half of my project focuses on humanitarian intervention as an issue of global ethics. I argue that the international community, as a collection of duty-bearing states, had a moral obligation to intervene in Rwanda. To defend this proposition I must first establish the conceptual possibility of global ethics. In that vein, I begin by arguing against various skeptical arguments made by communitarians, relativists, and political realists. Having made the conceptual room for global ethics, I then develop a weak moral principle in support of the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention by identifying the set of conditions under which no one could reasonably deny that such an obligation exists. I next explain how states can and why they on occasion do bear that obligation. Lastly, I argue that the Rwandan genocide fulfilled such conditions; as a consequence, not only was intervention permissible, it was obligatory. The second half of my project is concerned with the role moral demands should play in the practical deliberations of states. Many international relations scholars contend that questions of intervention are largely determined by the right of nonintervention which precludes other states from considering reasons for action that would require intervention. Against such scholars I argue that the role the right of nonintervention played in the practical deliberations of states during the Rwandan genocide was, and remains, unjustified. In the alternative, I argue that we ought to adopt a rebuttable presumption in favor of nonintervention. Such a rule would serve the same goals as the right of nonintervention, but without the unjustified preclusion of moral reasons for action. I conclude that the presumption of nonintervention would have been rebutted during the Rwandan genocide, and that the international community ought to have intervened.