UMD Theses and Dissertations
Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/3
New submissions to the thesis/dissertation collections are added automatically as they are received from the Graduate School. Currently, the Graduate School deposits all theses and dissertations from a given semester after the official graduation date. This means that there may be up to a 4 month delay in the appearance of a given thesis/dissertation in DRUM.
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Item The Life Cycle of Issue Spaces(2024) Hightower, Tristan Matthew; Miler, Kristina; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)In this dissertation I explore the dynamics of interest group populations through the development and application of a novel life cycle theory. Building on the work of population ecologists and other interest group scholars, this theory examines the stages of formation, growth, and decline of interest groups within various issue spaces. I conduct empirical analyses across three distinct domains: the agricultural sector with a focus on cranberries, the contentious and ideologically driven area of reproductive rights, and the declining population of banking institutions. These cases illustrate how interest groups navigate their life cycles and influence policy outcomes. Life cycle theory emphasizes the role of density dependence and interspecific competition, providing a comprehensive framework for analyzing the long-term trends and adaptive strategies of interest groups. The analysis of the cranberry lobby demonstrates how group diversity and population density affect policy attention. The analysis of reproductive rights organizations highlights the complex interplay between opposing groups and the significance of group population dynamics in shaping legislative outcomes. Finally, the analysis of the banking sector focuses on how regulatory changes and economic shifts impact the life cycles of financial institutions. My findings underscore the importance of considering group populations in understanding group formation, policy attention, and democratic engagement. I conclude that interest groups are essential components of American democratic processes, providing marginalized communities with avenues for influence amidst overburdened institutions. By offering a framework for analyzing the adaptive strategies and long-term trends of interest groups, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of how interests are advanced and under what conditions they thrive.Item BY INVITATION ONLY: A LEGISLATIVE THEORY ON PUBLIC LOBBYING AND THE GATEKEEPERS OF INFLUENCE(2019) Vallejo Vera, Sebastián; Calvo, Ernesto; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)In democratic politics, the participation of interest groups in policymaking is commonly understood as a secluded affair; an exchange were interest groups actively influence the fine print of statutory laws without being observed by the public at large. Why would interest groups and policymakers make public an otherwise private affair? By focusing on the public participation of interest groups in legislative committees, I argue that legislators use the public participation of interest groups in the legislative process as a means to raise the salience of issues they own. By taking advantage of the sequential organization of the legislature, legislators with gatekeeping authority will open the gates of committees to interest groups when the party benefits from the increased public attention and close them when the party does not. Interest groups, on their part, are granted access to micro-manage policy--to benefit from specific modifications of a law--. Evidence to test my arguments comes from an original dataset of 6,989 instances of interest group participation in committee meetings in the Ecuadorian Congress between 1979 and 2018, as well as over 30 semi-structured interviews to interest group representatives, legislators, and congressional staff. I find that, not only are legislators inviting interest groups to participate in issues the party owns, but they are doing so at a greater rate when the exposure of the party brand matters the most: before an election.Item Interest Representation as a Clash of Unequal Allies(2016) Parrott, Michael David; Lee, Frances E; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Organized interests do not have direct control over the fate of their policy agendas in Congress. They cannot introduce bills, vote on legislation, or serve on House committees. If organized interests want to achieve virtually any of their legislative goals they must rely on and work through members of Congress. As an interest group seeks to move its policy agenda forward in Congress, then, one of the most important challenges it faces is the recruitment of effective legislative allies. Legislative allies are members of Congress who “share the same policy objective as the group” and who use their limited time and resources to advocate for the group’s policy needs (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 76). For all the financial resources that a group can bring to bear as it competes with other interests to win policy outcomes, it will be ineffective without the help of members of Congress that are willing to expend their time and effort to advocate for its policy positions (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999). Given the importance of legislative allies to interest group success, are some organized interests better able to recruit legislative allies than others? This question has received little attention in the literature. This dissertation offers an original theoretical framework describing both when we should expect some types of interests to generate more legislative allies than others and how interests vary in their effectiveness at mobilizing these allies toward effective legislative advocacy. It then tests these theoretical expectations on variation in group representation during the stage in the legislative process that many scholars have argued is crucial to policy influence, interest representation on legislative committees. The dissertation uncovers pervasive evidence that interests with a presence across more congressional districts stand a better chance of having legislative allies on their key committees. It also reveals that interests with greater amounts of leverage over jobs and economic investment will be better positioned to win more allies on key committees. In addition, interests with a policy agenda that closely overlaps with the jurisdiction of just one committee in Congress are more likely to have legislative allies on their key committees than are interests that have a policy agenda divided across many committee jurisdictions. In short, how groups are distributed across districts, the leverage that interests have over local jobs and economic investment, and how committee jurisdictions align with their policy goals affects their influence in Congress.