Public Policy Research Works

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Author: search.filters.author.von Hippel, Frank

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    A Step-by-step Approach to a Global Fissile Materials Cutoff
    (Arms Control Today, 1995-10) Fetter, Steve; von Hippel, Frank
    Despite its centrality to the future of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, progress toward a fissile cutoff has lost momentum. To regain momentum, and to capture many of the security benefits of a cutoff as soon as possible, groups and countries advocating nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament should press the nuclear-weapon and threshold states to commit themselves publicly to a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons. Fissile materials—plutonium and highly enriched uranium—are the fundamental ingredients of all nuclear weapons. They are also the most difficult and expensive part of a nuclear weapon to produce. A global, verified ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives is therefore an essential part of any comprehensive nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime. A cutoff would limit the size of potential nuclear arsenals. It would make reductions irreversible if fissile material were transferred from dismantled weapons and other unsafeguarded stocks to nonweapons use or disposal under international safeguards. A cutoff would also strengthen the nonproliferation regime by opening up nuclear facilities in all states to international inspection.
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    Does the U.S. Need a New Plutonium-Pit Facility?
    (Arms Control Today, 2004-05) Fetter, Steve; von Hippel, Frank
    Each nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal contains a “pit,” a hollow shell of plutonium clad in a corrosion- resistant metal, which is surrounded by chemical explosive. When the weapon is detonated, the explosives compress the pit into a supercritical mass and a fission chain reaction is triggered. All the pits in the current U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile were manufactured at the Department of Energy’s Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado, which was shut down in 1989 because of flagrant violations of safety and environmental regulations. During the Cold War, warheads were replaced by new designs well before the end of their design lifetimes. With the end of the Soviet-U.S. arms race, however, the need for new weapon designs also ended, and the longevity of the pits has become an issue. The pits in current U.S. warheads are expected slowly to deteriorate and at some point they will have to be replaced if the warheads are to remain in the stockpile.
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    Nuclear Energy and Proliferation Resistance: Securing Benefits, Limiting Risks
    (American Physical Society, 2005-05) Fetter, Steve; Hagengruber, Roger; Ahearne, John; Budnitz, Robert J.; Moniz, Ernest; Richter, Burton; Shea, Thomas E.; Tape, Jim; von Hippel, Frank
    Global electricity demand is expected to increase by more than 50 percent by 2025 and nuclear power is a primary carbon-free energy source for meeting this extensive global energy expansion. At the same time, the technologies used in peaceful nuclear power programs overlap with those used in the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons. This report examines technological steps that the US can take to enhance the proliferation resistance of nuclear power systems.