Browsing by Author "Gallagher, Nancy"
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Item Americans on Nuclear Weapons(2019-05) Kull, Steven; Gallagher, Nancy; Fehsenfeld, Evan; Lewitus, Evan Charles; Read, EmmalyUS-Russian Arms Control Treaties: More than eight in ten favor the US continuing to have arms control treaties with Russia, with support among Republicans comparable to that of Democrats. Extending New START: Eight in ten favor the United States agreeing to extend the New START Treaty. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Two thirds, including a majority of Republicans, oppose withdrawing from the INF Treaty and favor instead staying within the Treaty and redoubling efforts to work with the Russians to address concerns of both sides. Nuclear Weapons Testing: Overwhelming majorities from both parties approve of the US continuing its moratorium on nuclear testing, effectively abiding by the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In the event the US develops a technological innovation that might make it possible to build a new type of nuclear weapon that could destroy more of an adversary’s nuclear weapons, a majority still said they would oppose breaking the moratorium, though a bare majority of Republicans favored it. US NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES: Minimum Retaliatory Capability: Eight in ten or more from both parties support the US having a retaliatory nuclear capability destructive enough that no country could think that there would be any advantage in attacking the United States with nuclear weapons. Low Yield Warheads and the Need for Matching Nuclear Options Respondents were presented a rationale for developing nuclear capabilities over and above the minimum retaliatory capability based on the need to threaten to match any type of nuclear capability an adversary might use. When presented a specific example of the current debate over whether the US should put low-yield nuclear warheads on missiles on submarines to match corresponding Russian capabilities, a bipartisan majority of two-thirds supported adding a low-yield option to nuclear missiles on submarines. Yet, when asked about the general principle, a plurality endorsed the view that a minimum retaliatory capability is adequate, over the view that the US must have the capability to retaliate against a major attack using only a type of weapon similar to the type the adversary used. Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): Knowing that the United States currently has strategic weapons on submarines, bombers, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, six in ten, including a majority of Republicans, favor phasing out the ICBM force. However, only one-third favor unilaterally reducing the net number of strategic warheads in the U.S. arsenal instead of putting more warheads on submarines and bombers to keep the same total as the Russians. FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: US Declaratory Policy on First Use: Only one in five endorsed the United States explicitly declaring that it would consider using nuclear weapons first and stating what kinds of non-nuclear attacks would prompt the United States to consider doing so. Just slightly more than one in five favored explicitly declaring that the United States will never use nuclear weapons first. A majority favored continuing the current policy of being ambiguous about whether and under what conditions the United States would consider using nuclear weapons first. Presented a list of possible types of attack, less than one in six favored declaring that the United States would consider using nuclear weapons in response to any of them. Limiting Presidential First Use: Two thirds, including six in ten Republicans, support Congressional legislation requiring that to use nuclear weapons first, the President would first have to consult Congress and it would have to issue a declaration of war on the country to be attacked with nuclear weapons.Item Assessing the Iran Deal(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-09-01) Gallagher, Nancy; Mohseni, Ebrahim; Ramsay, ClayOn July 14, 2015, after two years of negotiations, the United States, the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and Iran announced they had reached agreement on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran’s nuclear program. On July 20 the Security Council endorsed the agreement unanimously. Under terms agreed between the U.S. Congress and the White House, Congress has until September 17th to disapprove the JCPOA if it wants to prevent President Obama from suspending U.S. nuclear sanctions after Iran fulfills its nuclear commitments. Thus an intense debate is underway. Advocates on both sides have been making their appeals to the American public at a volume, and with a forcefulness, seen in foreign policy issues only a few times a decade. After the initial rollout of the agreement—a phase in which the White House essentially held the floor—critics of the agreement have been widely heard, both in and out of Congress. Media polls have been sporadic and inconsistent. In polls that offer respondents the opportunity to say that they do not have enough information to say, approximately half take it. In this case, the minority opposing the deal tends to outweigh those favoring it. In some polls that give respondents minimal information about the basic outlines of the deal, majorities have approved of it. Apparently Americans have low levels of information and their responses are affected by minimal inputs. Citizen Cabinet surveys are not meant to simply be another poll. Rather the goal is to find out what a representative panel of registered voters recommends when they are given a briefing and hear arguments for and against the key options. The process they go through is called a ‘policymaking simulation,’ in that the goal is to put the respondent into the shoes of a policymaker. The content of the simulation is vetted with Congressional staffers and other experts to assure accuracy and balance. Earlier Citizen Cabinet surveys on the Iran deal focused on the central debate at the time as to whether the US should make a deal based on allowing Iran limited uranium enrichment with intrusive inspections or if it should seek to ramp up economic sanctions in an effort to get Iran to give up its enrichment program entirely. Arguments for both options were found convincing but in the end, in February, 61% in a national Citizen Cabinet recommended in favor of making the deal. In June Citizen Cabinet surveys in three states (Oklahoma, Maryland, and Virginia) went through the same process but with more detail about the draft agreement. In all states seven in ten recommended the deal over ramping up sanctions. In the current Citizen Cabinet survey the simulation focused much more deeply on the terms of the deal, especially the terms that have been highly criticized by Members of Congress. Panelists were first briefed on the origins of the international dispute over Iran’s nuclear program and the main issues during the negotiations and given a detailed summary of the agreement’s main features. Then panelists evaluated a series of critiques—some general, some quite specific—prominent in the Congressional debate, and assessed a rebuttal offered for each. Panelists then assessed proposals for three alternative courses of action that have been proposed, evaluating arguments for and against each and also assessing each one’s chances of success. Finally panelists were asked what they would recommend to their member of Congress—to approve the deal, or disapprove of it, and, if the latter, what alternative course to take.Item Assessing the Iran Deal(2015-09) Kull, Steven; Ramsay, Clay; Lewis (aka Fehsenfeld), Evan; Gallagher, Nancy; Pierce, EricA majority of a national citizen advisory panel, made up of a representative sample of American registered voters, recommends Congress approve the deal recently negotiated between Iran, the United States and other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (plus Germany) on Iran’s nuclear program. After assessing strong critiques of the terms of the deal – including rebuttals – and then evaluating the pros and cons of alternatives, 55 percent concluded that Congress should approve the agreement, despite serious concerns about some of its details. Twenty-three percent recommended ratcheting up sanctions instead, 14 percent favored renewing negotiations to get better terms, and 7 percent recommended threatening Iran with military strikes unless they agree to better terms.Item Building Confidence in the Cybersphere: A Path to Multilateral Progress(2018-03-31) Hitchens, Theresa; Gallagher, NancyAs use of the Internet has become critical to global economic development and international security, there is near-unanimous agreement on the need for more international cooperation to increase stability and security in cyberspace. Several multilateral initiatives over the last five years have begun to spell out cooperative measures, norms of behavior, and transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) that could help improve mutual cybersecurity. These efforts have been painstakingly slow, and some have stalled due to competing interests. Nonetheless, a United Nations (UN) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) have achieved some high-level agreement on principles, norms, and “rules of the road” for national Internet activities and transnational cyber interactions. Their agreements include commitments to share more information, improve national protective capacities, cooperate on incident response, and restrain certain destabilizing state practices. Voluntary international agreements are worth little, unless states implement their commitments. So far, implementation has been crippled by vague language, national security considerations, complex relations between public and private actors in cyberspace, and privacy concerns. This is particularly true regarding the upfront sharing of information on threats and the willingness of participants to cooperate on incident investigations, including identifying perpetrators. With multilateral forums struggling to find a way forward with norm-setting and implementation, alternate pathways are needed to protect and build on what has been accomplished so far. Different strategies can help advance implementation of measures in the UN and OSCE agreements. Some commitments, such as establishing and sharing information about national points of contact, are best handled unilaterally or through bilateral or regional inter-governmental cooperation. Other objectives, such as protecting the core architecture and functions of the Internet that support trans-border critical infrastructure and underpin the global financial system, require a multi-stakeholder approach that includes not only governments but also private sector service providers, academic experts, and nongovernmental organizations. This paper compares what the GGE and OSCE norm-building processes have achieved so far and what disagreements have impeded these efforts. It identifies several priorities for cooperation identified by participants in both forums. It also proposes three practical projects related to these priorities that members of regional or global organizations might be able to work on together despite political tensions and philosophical disputes. The first would help state and non-state actors share information and communicate about various types of cybersecurity threats using a flexible and intuitive effects-based taxonomy to categorize cyber activity. The second would develop a more sophisticated way for state and non-state actors to assess the risks of different types of cyber incidents and the potential benefits of cooperation. The third would identify aspects of the Internet that might be considered the core of a public utility, worthy of special protection in their own right and for their support of trans-border critical infrastructure.Item Categorizing and Assessing the Severity of Disruptive Cyber Incidents(Center for International & Security Studies, 2017-04) Harry, Charles; Gallagher, NancyFaced with a rapidly growing volume and range of cyber attacks, policymakers and organizational leaders have had difficulty setting priorities, allocating resources, and responding effectively without a standard way to categorize cyber events and estimate their consequences. Presidential Policy Directive 41 laid out the Obama administration’s principles for executive branch responses to significant cyber incidents in the public or private sector. But it neither drew important distinctions between different types of cyber incidents, nor gave a standard way to determine where a particular incident falls on its 0-5 point severity scale. This policy brief demonstrates how an analytical framework developed at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland (CISSM) can help address these problems. It first differentiates between low-level incidents and more significant cyber events that result in either exploitation of information and/or disruption of operations. It categorizes five types of disruptive events and analyzes 2,030 cyber events in a dataset developed from media sources, showing that cyber exploitation remains more common than disruption, and that most disruptive activity fits into two categories: message manipulation and external denial of service attacks. Finally, the brief offers a standard method to assess the severity of different categories of disruptive attacks against different kinds of organizations based on the scope, magnitude, and duration of the event. This Cyber Disruption Index (CDI) is then applied to survey data on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in the private sector to assess severity within a common category of disruptive events. Of 3,900 cases reported, only 5 events (less than 1% of the DDoS cases) had a combined scope, magnitude, and duration severe enough to be a priority for prevention and potentially warrant government involvement.Item Comprehensive Nuclear Material Accounting(2014-03) Siegel, Jonas; Steinbruner, John; Gallagher, NancyExisting national and international standards for accounting for nuclear materials, including those designated for military use, are insufficient to meet current and future nuclear security, nonproliferation, and weapons reduction demands. Improved accounting practices are needed to provide reliable assurance that nuclear materials designated for peaceful use have not been diverted to state-level nuclear weapons programs or stolen by non-state actors, as well as to deter or detect diversion or the, were it to occur. Implementing an effective and efficient comprehensive, global nuclear accounting system is also a critical element of creating the conditions for future nuclear security if global nuclear energy use increases as part of the effort to mitigate climate change and countries make deep cuts to, or potentially eliminate, their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials designated for military use. Policy makers from around the globe have recognized the importance of ensuring that all countries with nuclear materials or weapons practice high standards of material control and accounting (MC&A), but the emphasis of current initiatives to improve MC&A has been on national laws and regulations—and primarily in states without nuclear weapons. States have yet to develop comprehensive requirements that address the full scope of nuclear risks and that are meant to be adopted by all states—including nuclear weapons states. This study examines a range of current material accounting practices and requirements and argues that in order for MC&A to fully perform the functions necessary to reduce global nuclear risks to an acceptably low level, its emphasis needs to transition from ensuring the non-diversion of nuclear materials to military uses to providing positive inventory control of nuclear materials, whereby national and international authorities can actively account for the location and form of all designated nuclear materials on a continuous and detailed basis.Item Controlling Dangerous Pathogens(2007-03) Steinbruner, John; Harris, Elisa D.; Gallagher, Nancy; M., StacyAdvances in science has led to a situation where dangerous pathogens that are enormously beneficial for research can also be greatly destructive. However, scientific institutions are not prepared to handle such a burden. Proposals advanced by scientific societies are voluntary by nature but do not alone provide robust global protection. This monograph outlines an advanced oversight arrangement, provisionally labeled the Biological Research Security System (BRRS), which is designed to help prevent destructive applications of biology, whether inadvertent or deliberate. Unfortunately, in order to provide adequate protection, constraints might be necessary on freedom of action at the level of fundamental research, and infringing on autonomy of researchers. In addition a great deal of conceptual innovation, legal specification, institutional design and political accommodation would admittedly be required to establish oversight processes. The author concludes that due to the demands and burdens imposed, that human societies might accept lesser standards of protection and rather acquiesce to more limited and incremental measures.Item Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype Protective Oversight System(2005-12-01) Steinbruner, John; Harris, Elisa D.; Gallagher, Nancy; Okutani, Stacy; CISSMAs has become increasingly evident in recent years, advances in biology are posing an acute and arguably unprecedented dilemma. The same basic science that could in principle be highly beneficial could also be enormously destructive, depending on how it is applied. Although the scope of actual consequence remains uncertain, the potential is clearly extraordinary with the health of individuals, the stability of societies and the viability of the global ecology all apparently at stake. Since compelling good and appalling harm cannot be disentangled at the level of fundamental science, a burden of management is being imposed that human institutions are not currently prepared to handle. The dilemma itself has been exemplified in several widely noted experiments1 and professionally acknowledged in reports issued by the United States National Academies of Science (NAS) and by the British Royal Society. Not surprisingly, however, and perhaps inevitably, efforts to devise an effective response are still at an embryonic stage. The proposals separately advanced by the two scientific societies are directed at their own communities and are largely voluntary in character. Those are natural initial steps but would not alone provide robust global protection. In an effort to encourage productive discussion of the problem and its implications, this monograph discusses an oversight process designed to bring independent scrutiny to bear throughout the world without exception on fundamental research activities that might plausibly generate massively destructive or otherwise highly dangerous consequences. The suggestion is that a mandatory, globally implemented process of that sort would provide the most obvious means of protecting against the dangers of advances in biology while also pursuing the benefits. The underlying principle of independent scrutiny is the central measure of protection used in other areas of major consequence, such as the handling of money, and it is reasonable to expect that principle will have to be actively applied to biology as well. The monograph outlines an advanced oversight arrangement, provisionally labeled the Biological Research Security System (BRSS), which is designed to help prevent destructive applications of biology, whether inadvertent or deliberate. The arrangement is put forward with full realization that meaningful protection can only be achieved by imposing some constraint on freedom of action at the level of fundamental research, where individual autonomy has traditionally been highly valued for the best of reasons. Constraints of any sort on research will not be intrinsically welcome and will have to demonstrate that the protection provided justifies the costs entailed. A great deal of conceptual innovation, legal specification, institutional design and political accommodation would admittedly be required to establish such an oversight process, and there is very little precedent to work with. Because of the demands imposed and the inconvenience involved, the monograph concedes that human societies after due reflection might choose at least initially to accept lesser standards of protection and it discusses more limited incremental measures that might be undertaken. The central contention, however, is that the eventual outcome should be a fully considered choice and not the default result of inertia or neglect. John Steinbruner is the Director of the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland.Elisa D. Harris is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center. Nancy Gallagher is the Associate Director for Research at the Center. Stacy Okutani is a Graduate Fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program.Item Faith and Global Policy Challenges(2011-12) Kull, Steven; Steinbruner, John; Gallagher, Nancy; Ramsay, Clay; Lewis (aka Fehsenfeld), Evan; Siegel, Jonas; Jones, Kevin; Subias, StefanIn an effort to understand how the general public and individuals with specific religious traditions think that their spiritual faith intersects with global policy challenges, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and its Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) conducted a public opinion poll. This poll is part of a larger effort to engage faith communities in addressing these challenges. As national governments and civil society contend with these issues, the involvement of religious communities and the application of their convictions could prove decisive.Item Faith and Global Policy Challenges Questionnaire(2011-12) Kull, Steven; Steinbruner, John; Gallagher, Nancy; Ramsay, Clay; Lewis (aka Fehsenfeld), Evan; Siegel, Jonas; Jones, Kevin; Subias, StefanThis document includes the complete survey questionnaire for the study "Faith and Global Policy Challenges," as well as the study's raw data.Item Faith and Global Policy Challenges: How Spiritual Values Shape Views on Poverty, Nuclear Risks, and Environmental Degradation(2011-12) Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA); Kull, Steven; Steinbruner, John; Gallagher, Nancy; Ramsay, Clay; Lewis (aka Fehsenfeld), Evan; Siegel, Jonas; Jones, Kevin; Subias, StefanA majority of Americans professing a belief in God favor cooperative international efforts to combat climate change, environmental degradation, and the spread of nuclear weapons, according to the findings of this public opinion poll conducted jointly by the University of Maryland's Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and its Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA). The study also finds that a majority of "believers" consider addressing global poverty a "spiritual obligation" and think that the United States should work cooperatively with other nations to reduce it. The poll was fielded from September 9 to 19, 2011, with a sample of 1,496 adult Americans, including large numbers of Catholics and Evangelicals.Item International Security on the Road to Nuclear Zero(2011-07) Gallagher, NancyThe disappointingly slow pace of progress on efforts to prevent proliferation, reduce nuclear weapons, and eliminate nuclear risks has many causes. The factor that might be easiest for individuals in the arms control and nonproliferation community to change stems from their own ambivalence about major questions that must be addressed on the road to reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world to zero. This essay explores how ambivalence about four key issues—strategic stability, alliance relations, institution-building, and nuclear energy—often leads community members to take positions that play well at home and within their like-minded group but raise unintended impediments to achieving their own long-term goals. The author suggests alternative ways to handle these questions to improve the prospects for domestic and international agreement on practical measures that would eliminate, not perpetuate, nuclear risks.Item Iranian Attitudes in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2016-02-03) Gallagher, Nancy; Mohseni, Ebrahim; Ramsay, ClayThe Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), in conjunction with the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) has been conducting a series of studies about Iranian and American public opinion to explore how public attitudes might be affecting the negotiation, ratification, and implementation of the JCPOA. This study repeats many of the questions asked in previous surveys of Iranian public opinion conducted with the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) and Iranpoll.com, an independent Toronto-based polling company. The July 2014 study focused on what types of limitations and transparency measures the Iranian public might be willing to place on Iran’s nuclear program in return for sanctions relief. The May 2015 study assessed Iranian public attitudes toward the framework for a deal that negotiators made public before they worked out the detailed provisions of the JCPOA. The September 2015 study explored what the Iranian public thought about the agreement reached on July 14 of that year, including how understanding of the terms and expectations regarding sanctions relief affected attitudes toward the JCPOA, the leaders who had negotiated it, and Rouhani’s foreign policy of equitable cooperation with the West. These studies and the reports on U.S. attitudes towards the negotiations with Iran are available at: http:www.cissm.umd.edu. This study repeats a number of the same questions asked before, revealing how public attitudes and expectations have changed as Iran carried out its own review and approval process, then started shipping most of its stockpile of low enriched uranium out of Iran, disabling the Arak reactor, and taking a number of other actions prior to getting any sanctions relief. Public support for the JCPOA, for Rouhani, and for moderate candidates in the upcoming election remain strong—albeit not as strong as before—even though more Iranian’s know that the terms of the deal are not as favorable for Iran as they had previously believed. But there are also signs that Rouhani could become the victim of dashed expectations in the 2017 presidential election if he cannot translate sanctions relief into rapid economic improvements, especially reductions in unemployment. This study also includes many new questions to explore how implementation of the deal, and simultaneous debates in the U.S. Congress about imposing new sanctions on Iran for other reasons, might be influencing Iranian attitudes about working with the United States on other 4 Iranian Attitudes in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections | January 2016 problems, like terrorism and civil violence in the Middle East. In addition to repeating a question asked previously about cooperating to help the government of Iraq counter ISIS, we probed extensively into Iranian attitudes towards ISIS and other non-state actors in the region, toward various forms of involvement by Iran and other countries in Syria, and toward current diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in Syria and concentrate international military action on defeating ISIS. The data was collected from December 29, 2015 through January 15, 2016. During this period, a growing number of observers expected Implementation Day to happen soon, but there were still questions about when the IAEA would certify that Iran had fulfilled its commitments, and about whether the United States would impose new sanctions for Iran’s ballistic missile activities. This was also shortly before new visa rules took effect in the United States that might discourage Europeans from visiting Iran after sanctions were lifted. The most noteworthy development during the data collection period that may have influenced Iranian attitudes about regional security issues was Saudi Arabia’s beheading of a prominent Shia cleric on January 2. This study was designed, managed, and analyzed by CISSM in conjunction with the Program for Public Consultation, both of which are at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. The data was collected by IranPoll.com working in conjunction with UTCPOR.Item Iranian Attitudes on Iranian-U.S. Relations in the Trump Era(Center for International & Security Studies, 2017-01-25) Mohseni, Ebrahim; Gallagher, Nancy; Ramsay, ClayThe transition of leadership in the United States and the 1-year anniversary of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s implementation day served as the impetus for this new study. It is the latest in a series of Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) studies of Iranian and American attitudes about Iran’s nuclear program, the negotiations that led to the nuclear deal, and other facets of the countries’ economic and security policies. Data for this study was collected in mid-December 2016, after the election of U.S. President Donald Trump.Item Iranian Public Attitudes Before & After Parliamentary Elections(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2016-03-31) Gallagher, Nancy; Mohseni, Ebrahim; Ramsay, ClayThis report is the latest in a series of in-depth studies about Iranian public opinion regarding the nuclear negotiations, political and economic conditions in Iran, security in the Middle East, and Iran’s foreign relations that the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has been conducting in conjunction with the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) and Iranpoll.com, an independent Toronto-based polling company. It builds on a January 2016 study conducted shortly before the International Atomic Energy Agency certified that Iran had fulfilled the nuclear commitments made in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and could start receiving sanctions relief. It includes some data collected in a second pre-election survey, as well as data from a survey done shortly after the first round of elections. CISSM’s previous studies of Iranian public opinion, and related articles and studies of American public opinion towards the nuclear negotiations with Iran are available at: http://www.cissm.umd.edu/projects/program-public-consultation.Item Iranian Public Opinion after the Protests(CISSM, 2018-07-09) Gallagher, Nancy; Mohseni, Ebrahim; Ramsay, ClaySummary of Findings 1. More Iranians See Economy as Bad and Getting Worse Growing majorities say Iran’s economic situation is bad and getting worse. Less than a fifth now say the economic condition of their family has improved over the last four years. Most say economic mismanagement and corruption are having a greater negative impact than sanctions. Unemployment remains the top concern of the Iranian people. They are divided on whether the next generation will be better off financially than their parents are today. 2. Approval of Nuclear Deal Drops as Disappointment with its Benefits Rises Enthusiasm for the JCPOA has dropped significantly. Slightly more than half approve of the agreement, while a third oppose it. Two years into the implementation of the deal, majorities believe Iran has not received most of the promised benefits and that people’s living conditions have not been improved by the nuclear deal. An overwhelming majority says the deal did not improve Iran’s relations with the United States, but are more positive about its effect on relations with Europe. As Rouhani’s administration steps up its efforts to defend the deal against its domestic opponents, public misperceptions about the terms of the deal have undergone a revival. Clear majorities incorrectly believe that per the agreement, all U.S. sanctions on Iran must eventually be lifted, and that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is not allowed to inspect Iranian military sites under any circumstances. Most Iranians still believe that it is important for Iran to develop its nuclear program, although the percentage that is very supportive has decreased slightly since the JCPOA was signed. 3. Increasing Majority Supports Retaliation if U.S. Abrogates JCPOA Attitudes about how Iran should respond if the United States violates the JCPOA have hardened. A growing majority says that were the United States to abrogate the deal, Iran should retaliate by restarting the aspects of its nuclear program it has agreed to suspend under the JCPOA rather than taking the matter to the UN. A modest majority says Iran should withdraw if the United States withdraws, even if other P5+1 countries remain committed to the deal. Most Iranians, however, would support their government if it decides that remaining in the deal is in Iran’s best interest. 4. Staunch Resistance to Renegotiating the Nuclear Deal with Trump Large majorities say that Iran should refuse to increase the duration of the special nuclear limits it accepted under the JCPOA or to stop developing more advanced missiles, even if the United States threatens to re-impose sanctions lifted under the JCPOA or offers to lift more sanctions. 5. Majority Rejects Halting Development of Missiles An overwhelming majority thinks it is important for Iran to develop missiles, primarily to defend Iran, deter attacks, and increase Iran’s security. Large majorities say Iran should continue testing ballistic missiles despite U.S. demands for Iran to halt such tests. 6. Views of P5+1 Countries Iranians’ views of all the P5+1 countries besides the United States have improved, and a clear majority expresses confidence that these countries will uphold their end of the JCPOA. Majorities now regard Russia, China, Germany, and even France favorably, but retain negative views of the United States and Britain. For the first time, a majority now says they have an unfavorable view of the American people as well as of their government. A majority believes that Iranian relations with European countries have improved due to the deal; almost no one says that about the United States. Far from showing implacable hostility toward the West, a majority continues to think it is possible for the Islamic world and the West to find common ground, though the number who say conflict between the two is inevitable has increased. 7. Majority Sees No Value in Negotiations; Support for Self-Sufficiency Grows Two in three say the JCPOA experience shows that it is not worthwhile to make concessions as part of international negotiations, because Iran cannot have confidence that world powers would honor their sides of an agreement. Accordingly, an increasing majority thinks Iran should strive to achieve economic self-sufficiency rather than focus on increasing its trade with other countries. Willingness to compromise and make reciprocal concessions is higher among those who think the nuclear deal has improved the living conditions of ordinary Iranians, as well as those who voice confidence that the United States will abide by its side of the agreement. 8. Strong Sympathy with Complaints about Economic Policies and Corruption During late December 2017 and early January 2018, large street protests took place across Iran. These protests were organized by different groups of people for varying reasons. To see what proportion of the Iranian population sympathizes with each type of protest, this study asked respondents to indicate the degree to which they sympathized with each of the complaints voiced. Large majorities say they sympathize with complaints voiced by some protestors that the government should do more to keep food and gasoline prices from rising; not cut cash subsidies; and compensate people who lost money when some financial institutions in Iran collapsed. They also agree that the government is not doing enough to help the poor and farmers who are suffering as a result of the drought. Iranians are also almost unanimous in their demand that more should be done to fight financial and bureaucratic corruption in Iran. 9. Majorities Disagree with Protestors who Critiqued Iran’s Domestic Political System and Foreign Operations Three in four disagree that Iran’s political system needs to undergo fundamental change. Two in three also disagree with the view that the government interferes too much in people’s personal lives; indeed, six in ten reject the idea that the government should not strictly enforce Islamic laws. As in the past, about three in four believe that when making decisions, Iranian policymakers should take religious teachings into account. Clear majorities also reject other complaints voiced by some protestors—that the military should spend much less on developing missiles, and that Iran’s current level of involvement in Iraq and Syria is not in Iran’s national interests. U.S. expressions of support for protests were generally regarded as irrelevant or unhelpful. 10. Majority Approves of Police Handling of the Protests Two in three approve of how the police handled the protests and say they used an appropriate amount of force. Views about how arrested protestors should be treated depend on how they acted. Almost two in three think that protestors who were arrested while peacefully voicing their complaints against government policies should be released. A smaller majority wants protestors who accidentally injured bystanders to be prosecuted, but not punished harshly. Most Iranians want the judiciary to prosecute protestors who chanted slogans against Islam or Iran’s system of government, but only a minority demand harsh punishment. About six in ten want the judiciary to prosecute and harshly punish those who are found guilty of attacking the police, damaging public property, or burning Iran’s flag. 11. Media Consumption Habits Majorities follow news regarding domestic and international affairs. Domestic television, followed by social networking apps, such as Telegram, and the internet are the media used by a majority of Iranians to become informed about the news. The numbers of people relying on VOA and BBC news programs have declined significantly since the rise of social media in Iran. 12. A Range of Views on Regional Issues About half of Iranians say their government should try to find mutually acceptable solutions to regional problems, and the other half say that Iran should seek to become the most powerful country in the region. A large majority says Iran should either increase or maintain its current level of support for groups fighting terrorist groups like ISIS. Most Iranians want Iran to use its influence in Iraq to support policies that benefit both Shiites and Sunnis, rather than policies that primarily benefit Shiites. Now that Iran and Russia have declared victory over ISIS in Syria, almost as many Iranians want to end or reduce assistance to President Bashar Assad as want to continue it until his government regains full control over all Syrian territory. An overwhelming majority reject the idea that Assad should not be allowed to remain as Syria’s president and say the Syrian people should decide whether he remains in office. 13. General Soleimani’s Popularity Soars, while Rouhani and Zarif Slip General Qasem Soleimani’s popularity is at an all-time high, with two in three saying that they hold a very favorable opinion of him. He is followed in popularity by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, whose favorability rating has decreased slightly since June 2017. President Rouhani’s popularity has dropped sharply since his victory in the May 2017 presidential elections. Opinions of Ebrahim Raisi, Rouhani’s conservative opponent in the election, have held steady. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s former president, remains the most polarizing figure among Iranian politicians. 14. Majority Sees Climate Change as a Very Serious Problem Iranians almost unanimously see global climate change as a serious issue and a majority says these changes are harming people around the world today. Two in three say they are very concerned that climate change will affect them personally. A large majority wants the government to do more to protect the environment, even if the economy suffers as a result. Two in three say they approve of Iran taking steps to significantly reduce its air pollution over the next 15 years, even if it leads to higher prices and unemployment rates in the short-term.Item Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Agreement(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-09-09) Gallagher, Nancy; Mohseni, Ebrahim; Ramsay, ClayThe current study was conducted shortly after the JCPOA was released and approved by the U.N. Security Council. The survey seeks to understand how attitudes and expectations have changed since the nuclear deal was achieved. It also explores the relationship between Iranians’ assumptions about the terms of the deal, their expectations about its benefits and risks, and their attitudes toward their current political leaders, the United States, and the other countries in the negotiations. These assumptions, expectations, and attitudes set the context in which Iranian leaders will decide whether or not to approve the deal. They are also likely to influence how Iranian policymakers and the public respond to whatever actions the United States takes as it reviews the JCPOA and reassesses its policies towards Iran. The telephone poll of 1,000 Iranians was conducted August 8-18, 2015, by IranPoll.com, an independent, Toronto-based polling organization, for the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. The margin of error was +/- 3.2%. Full Report | Questionnaire and frequency tables. Summary of Findings 1. Iran - P5+1 Nuclear Agreement Vast majorities of Iranians approve of the nuclear agreement that was reached between Iran and the P5+1 countries in Vienna, whereas only a fifth disapprove of it. While about a third sees the agreement as mostly a victory for Iran, over four in ten see it as beneficial for both Iran and the P5+1, though Iran is perceived to have made fewer concessions. Iranians overwhelmingly approve of the performance of their negotiators. A majority of Iranians are optimistic that both the UN Security Council and the United States are likely to act in good faith and remove sanctions as the deal requires. Nevertheless, three in four continue to believe that the Majlis (Iran’s parliament) should be able to prevent the agreement from taking effect if it finds the terms to be at odds with Iran’s national interests. Also, almost all Iranians continue to believe that it is very important for Iran to develop its nuclear program. 2. Views of Rouhani As a result of the nuclear agreement, a large majority says it now has a better opinion of President Hassan Rouhani. As Iran’s parliamentary elections near, three in five Iranians now want Rouhani’s supporters to win, while only about one in five favor his critics. President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s already high approval ratings have risen even more since the agreement was reached while their opponents’ popularity has declined slightly. 3. Misperceptions about the Nuclear Agreement While Iranians have a positive view of the nuclear agreement, they also underestimate the scope and extent of the commitments Iran has made under the deal. Substantial majorities incorrectly believe that according to the agreement: -all U.S. sanctions, not just nuclear-related ones—will be lifted eventually; - the sanctions on Iran will start to be lifted either before or at the same time as Iran takes most of the steps it has agreed to take under the deal; -Iran has not agreed to any limitations on its nuclear research and development activities; -the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cannot inspect Iranian military sites under any conditions. Those who hold these misperceptions are far more supportive of the deal than those who don’t. Among those who don’t hold these misperceptions, support is lower, but generally half or more still approve of the deal. Also, Rouhani supporters are more likely to hold these misperceptions than critics. 4. High Expectations about Positive Effects of the Deal Iranians express high expectations that the nuclear deal will have significant positive effects in the near term. Growing majorities say that as a result of the deal they expect to see, within a year, better access to foreign medicines and medical equipment, significantly more foreign investment, a significant drop in Iran’s unemployment rate, and tangible improvement in living standards. Almost three in five Iranians now think that the economic conditions in Iran are getting better. Half of Iranians now think that rather than aiming to achieve self-sufficiency, Iran should strive to increase its trade with other countries—up from four in ten a year ago. 5. Iran’s Relations with the United States in the Wake of the Deal A majority of Iranians believes that relations with the United States will improve after the nuclear deal. Several trend questions show strong shifts on views of the United States. A majority no longer believes that Iran’s nuclear concessions will likely lead the United States to use pressure to extract more concessions on other issues. Majorities approve of Iran and the United States collaborating with each other to help the government of Iraq and counter ISIS. Large majorities continue to say that they have an unfavorable view of the United States, but a growing number believe that Iran and the United States should strive to mitigate conflicts between the two countries. 6. Changing Views of Other Countries and Economic Relations Iranians show warming attitudes toward the P5+1 countries as a whole and toward Europe. A plurality now says that it trusts the P5+1 countries, and large majorities say they expect relations with Europe to improve. Iranians also believe that as a result of the agreement, other countries view their country with more respect. Views of all P5+1 countries have become a bit more favorable and majorities now have favorable attitudes toward Germany, Russia, and China. Iranians are also showing increasing openness to economic relations with other countries.Item Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-06-23) Gallagher, Nancy; Mohseni, Ebrahim; Ramsay, ClayAs the marathon negotiation between Iran and the P5+1 countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) nears its third self-imposed deadline on June 30, many around the world wonder if this round of negotiations is going to resolve all remaining issues, and if so, whether the officials involved are going to be able to sell the deal they have worked out back in their own capitals. As to whether or not a deal will be reached, diplomats from Iran as well as the P5+1 countries have consistently been cautiously optimistic. While all sides indicate that they are committed to reaching a deal by the June 30 deadline, recent reports suggest that gaps remain between concrete positions on the main elements of a deal. And as negotiators struggle with various elements of the deal outside their capitals, there is significant controversy inside the capitals on what would constitute a “good deal.” The U.S. Congress has passed legislation giving Congress at least a month to review the details of any agreement reached before President Obama could waive any congressionally imposed sanctions on Iran. Lawmakers and officials in Tehran have been pressing their case that any deal that would not result in speedy termination of sanctions or would open Iran’s sensitive non-nuclear military and security installations to Iran-specific inspections is unacceptable. To better understand the domestic political environments that constrain how much negotiating room the key players have, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has conducted several studies of American and Iranian public opinion on the nuclear negotiations. Its first study of American public opinion, “Americans on Negotiations with Iran,” was conducted in collaboration with the Program for Public Consultation in July 2014, followed by another study which was released on March 3, 2015. Both of these reports are available at www.cissm.umd.edu. CISSM also conducted a study of Iranian public opinion on the nuclear negotiations in collaboration with the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) in July 2014, focusing mostly on the steps Iran would be willing to take in return for removal of unilateral and multilateral sanctions, and published the results of that study on September 17, 2014. The current study was conducted after Iran and the P5+1 reached an understanding regarding the main elements of the final deal in Lausanne, Switzerland. It seeks to illuminate the specific views and preferences of Iranian citizens regarding the ongoing nuclear negotiations, their support for a deal along the lines of the framework understanding, their assumptions regarding the elements of the final deal, and their expectations from a deal. This study also explores a broad range of Iranian political preferences and attitudes that shape the context in which the nuclear negotiations are occurring.Item Iranian Public Opinion, One Year After the Nuclear Deal(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2016-07-13) Gallagher, Nancy; Mohseni, Ebrahim; Ramsay, ClayItem Nuclear Weapons and New Security Challenges(2002-05-30) Gallagher, Nancy; CISSMReligious leaders have made strong and influential statements about nuclear weapons at critical moments. The 1983 Pastoral Letter on War and Peace from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops was released shortly before I started working as a first-year teacher at Our Lady Queen of Peace School in Madison Wisconsin. I found that statement very empowering even though I was not a Catholic, and did not even consider myself to be especially religious at that time. It helped channel my own amorphous fears of nuclear war into a more focused plan of action. It provided cogent analysis and moral authority which increased my confidence when I spoke about nuclear issues to parents and the principal at my school. It strengthened my commitment to teaching about war and peace in the nuclear age, which is one reason why I returned to graduate school and devoted my professional life to nuclear arms control. More typically, a different type of theology shapes debates about nuclear weapons. When I accompanied General Shalikashvili and Ambassador Goodby to speak with U.S. Senators, government officials, and others about the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, we were often told that controversies surrounding the Treaty stemmed from basic "theological disagreements." Of course, nobody was suggesting that attitudes toward nuclear weapons are necessarily determined by people"s religious affiliation. Instead, they meant that ideas about nuclear weapons are heavily influenced by worldviews i.e. fundamental beliefs about human nature and about how people should behave in a world that lacks an overarching secular authority. Tonight, I want to start by talking about how the interplay between different worldviews during the Cold War led to a grand bargain and what is sometimes called the "nuclear restraint regime." I will say a few words about why the new security challenges that have emerged since make a legally based nuclear restraint regime more, not less, important. I will then make the case that the Bush Administration has responded to these new security challenges by systematically repudiating the grand bargain and undermining central elements of the nuclear restraint regime. Finally, I will conclude by suggesting that the situation today is much like it was in 1983, in that the security policies being pursued by the government are spreading fear, increasing hatred, and producing actions that degrade the quality of life as they raise the risk of nuclear war. What is missing now is any serious democratic debate or sustained opposition to rhetoric and policies that reflect an extreme version of one worldview and a narrow conception of national interests while violating key tenets of other worldviews and more comprehensive conceptions of the global good. Nancy Gallagher is Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland.