The 1992 Nuclear Suppliers (NSG) Agreement remains the only multilateral forum, with the exception of the complementary Zangger Committee, in which states capable of supplying nuclear and nuclear-related technologies attempt to constrain the flow of these technologies to countries of proliferation concern. This study reviews the history of multilateral nuclear nonproliferation export control cooperation and complementary international safeguards systems leading up to the conclusion of the 1992 NSG Agreement. This review reveals that nuclear-related crises like the Indian nuclear explosion of the 1974 and the discovery of the Iraqi near-proliferation in 1991 have been the most proximate causes of multilateral reforms, but that U.S. domestic politics has been the primary filter through which these crises have been interpreted and subsequently translated into domestic and multilateral export control arrangements. This study therefore asks the question as to whether or not the "feedback loop" between proliferation-related crises and multilateral export control reform remains in place. To evaluate the main variables responsible for reform and the evolving relationships between them, three increasingly stringent stages of multilateral export controls on nuclear weapons-related technology from 1943 to 1992 are analyzed. These variables are then reviewed for the 1992-2002 period and compared to the three earlier stages of reform to assess the continued relevance of the determinative factors of Cold War-era export control reforms to the export control challenges of the 21st century. This study concludes that the crisis-reform dynamic is unlikely to repeat itself due to changes at the U.S. domestic level, but that knowledgeable bureaucrats and outside experts remain prepared to pursue reform should U.S. leaders attempt to pursue reform in the absence of the public pressures created by a nuclear-related crisis.