An Accountability Architecture for the Internet

dc.contributor.advisorBhattacharjee, Bobbyen_US
dc.contributor.authorBender, Adamen_US
dc.contributor.departmentComputer Scienceen_US
dc.contributor.publisherDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_US
dc.contributor.publisherUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_US
dc.description.abstractIn the current Internet, senders are not accountable for the packets they send. As a result, malicious users send unwanted traffic that wastes shared resources and degrades network performance. Stopping such attacks requires identifying the responsible principal and filtering any unwanted traffic it sends. However, senders can obscure their identity: a packet identifies its sender only by the source address, but the Internet Protocol does not enforce that this address be correct. Additionally, affected destinations have no way to prevent the sender from continuing to cause harm. An accountable network binds sender identities to packets they send for the purpose of holding senders responsible for their traffic. In this dissertation, I present an accountable network-level architecture that strongly binds senders to packets and gives receivers control over who can send traffic to them. Holding senders accountable for their actions would prevent many of the attacks that disrupt the Internet today. Previous work in attack prevention proposes methods of binding packets to senders, giving receivers control over who sends what to them, or both. However, they all require trusted elements on the forwarding path, to either assist in identifying the sender or to filter unwanted packets. These elements are often not under the control of the receiver and may become corrupt. This dissertation shows that the Internet architecture can be extended to allow receivers to block traffic from unwanted senders, even in the presence of malicious devices in the forwarding path. This dissertation validates this thesis with three contributions. The first contribution is DNA, a network architecture that strongly binds packets to their sender, allowing routers to reject unaccountable traffic and recipients to block traffic from unwanted senders. Unlike prior work, which trusts on-path devices to behave correctly, the only trusted component in DNA is an identity certification authority. All other entities may misbehave and are either blocked or evicted from the network. The second contribution is NeighborhoodWatch, a secure, distributed, scalable object store that is capable of withstanding misbehavior by its constituent nodes. DNA uses NeighborhoodWatch to store receiver-specific requests block individual senders. The third contribution is VanGuard, an accountable capability architecture. Capabilities are small, receiver-generated tokens that grant the sender permission to send traffic to receiver. Existing capability architectures are not accountable, assume a protected channel for obtaining capabilities, and allow on-path devices to steal capabilities. VanGuard builds a capability architecture on top of DNA, preventing capability theft and protecting the capability request channel by allowing receivers to block senders that flood the channel. Once a sender obtains capabilities, it no longer needs to sign traffic, thus allowing greater efficiency than DNA alone. The DNA architecture demonstrates that it is possible to create an accountable network architecture in which none of the devices on the forwarding path must be trusted. DNA holds senders responsible for their traffic by allowing receivers to block senders; to store this blocking state, DNA relies on the NeighborhoodWatch DHT. VanGuard extends DNA and reduces its overhead by incorporating capabilities, which gives destinations further control over the traffic that sources send to them.en_US
dc.subject.pqcontrolledComputer Scienceen_US
dc.titleAn Accountability Architecture for the Interneten_US


Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
818.36 KB
Adobe Portable Document Format