SYMMETRIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND QUERY COMPLEXITY IN THE QUANTUM WORLD

dc.contributor.advisorKatz, Jonathanen_US
dc.contributor.advisorAlagic, Gorjanen_US
dc.contributor.authorBai, Chenen_US
dc.contributor.departmentElectrical Engineeringen_US
dc.contributor.publisherDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_US
dc.contributor.publisherUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_US
dc.date.accessioned2024-09-18T05:43:13Z
dc.date.available2024-09-18T05:43:13Z
dc.date.issued2024en_US
dc.description.abstractQuantum computers are likely to have a significant impact on cryptography. Many commonly used cryptosystems will be completely broken once large quantum computers are available. Since quantum computers can solve the factoring problem in polynomial time, the security of RSA would not hold against quantum computers. For symmetric-key cryptosystems, the primary quantum attack is key recovery via Grover search, which provides a quadratic speedup. One way to address this is to double the key length. However, recent results have shown that doubling the key length may not be sufficient in all cases. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the security of various symmetric-key constructions against quantum attackers. In this thesis, we give the first proof of post-quantum security for certain symmetric primitives. We begin with a fundamental block cipher, the Even-Mansour cipher, and the tweakable Even-Mansour construction. Our research shows that both are secure in a realistic quantum attack model. For example, we prove that 2^{n/3} quantum queries are necessary to break the Even-Mansour cipher. We also consider the practical applications that our work implies. Using our framework, we derive post-quantum security proofs for three concrete symmetric-key schemes: Elephant (an Authenticated Encryption (AE) finalist of NIST’s lightweight cryptography standardization effort), Chaskey (an ISO-standardized Message Authentication Code), and Minalpher (an AE second-round candidate of the CAESAR competition). In addition, we consider the two-sided permutation inversion problem in the quantum query model. In this problem, given an image y and quantum oracle access to a permutation P (and its inverse oracle), the goal is to find its pre-image x such that P(x)=y. We prove an optimal lower bound \Omega(\sqrt{2^n}) for this problem against an adaptive quantum adversary. Moreover, we apply our lower bound above to show that a natural encryption scheme constructed from random permutations is secure against quantum attacks.en_US
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.13016/mjww-myss
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/33209
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subject.pqcontrolledComputer scienceen_US
dc.subject.pqcontrolledMathematicsen_US
dc.subject.pqcontrolledPhysicsen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledComplexityen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledCryptographyen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledPost-quantum Cryptographyen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledQuantum Computingen_US
dc.titleSYMMETRIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND QUERY COMPLEXITY IN THE QUANTUM WORLDen_US
dc.typeDissertationen_US

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