Simulation and Self-knowledge
dc.contributor.author | Carruthers, Peter | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-03-23T20:18:31Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-03-23T20:18:31Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1996 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this chapter I shall be attempting to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I shall argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency. | en |
dc.format.extent | 64477 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/html | |
dc.identifier.citation | Peter Carruthers, Simulation and self-knowledge: a defence of theory-theory. In P.Carruthers and P.K.Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1903/4347 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | en |
dc.relation.isAvailableAt | College of Arts & Humanities | en_us |
dc.relation.isAvailableAt | Philosophy | en_us |
dc.relation.isAvailableAt | Digital Repository at the University of Maryland | en_us |
dc.relation.isAvailableAt | University of Maryland (College Park, Md.) | en_us |
dc.rights.license | Copyright Cambridge University Press - http://www.cambridge.org/us/0521559162 | en |
dc.subject | simulationism | en |
dc.subject | simulation | en |
dc.subject | mind | en |
dc.subject | minded agency | en |
dc.subject | self-knowledge | en |
dc.title | Simulation and Self-knowledge | en |
dc.type | Book chapter | en |
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