Simulation and Self-knowledge

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dc.contributor.authorCarruthers, Peter
dc.date.accessioned2007-03-23T20:18:31Z
dc.date.available2007-03-23T20:18:31Z
dc.date.issued1996
dc.description.abstractIn this chapter I shall be attempting to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I shall argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency.en
dc.format.extent64477 bytes
dc.format.mimetypetext/html
dc.identifier.citationPeter Carruthers, Simulation and self-knowledge: a defence of theory-theory. In P.Carruthers and P.K.Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/4347
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Arts & Humanitiesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtPhilosophyen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_us
dc.rights.licenseCopyright Cambridge University Press - http://www.cambridge.org/us/0521559162en
dc.subjectsimulationismen
dc.subjectsimulationen
dc.subjectminden
dc.subjectminded agencyen
dc.subjectself-knowledgeen
dc.titleSimulation and Self-knowledgeen
dc.typeBook chapteren

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