Essays on investor preferences and corporate strategies

Abstract

Time horizon, an investment’s expected payback period, is a consequential investor preference and a crucial determinant of corporate strategy as it can constrain firms’ investment options. However, a gap exists between research focusing on investor temporal preferences and on corporate intertemporal strategy. Therefore, my dissertation offers a multi-level analysis to examine the dynamic relationship between investor temporal preferences and firm strategy. In the first essay, I construct a real-options signaling game model in which time horizon serves as a key determinant of firm strategic responses to shifts in investor temporal preferences. I test my predictions using the emergence of low-carbon energy innovation in the U.S. Oil and Gas industry during 1980-2018. I find that firms adjust their strategies in response to changes in investor time horizons. When faced with a lengthened investor time horizon, firms are more inclined to prioritize long-term inventive innovation, whereas a shortened investor time horizon prompts a greater focus on short-term adoptive innovation. Furthermore, I find suggestive evidence that such commitments when firms align their strategies to investor temporal preferences enhance firms' innovation performance. The second essay extends my investigation in the first chapter to explore the impacts of the inherent information asymmetry between firms and investors on investor-induced firm strategies. I find that, in high information asymmetry contexts, firms overshoot their investor-induced responses to effectively signal their alignment to shifts in investor temporal preferences. In the third (co-authored) essay, we explore the interplay between investor temporal preferences and firm strategies via top management teams. We study how the career experience of top management influences firm strategies and investor temporal preferences. We construct a novel metric to capture, standardize, and compare executives’ career paths across different functional roles, firms, and industries. Our findings indicate that executives with heightened diversity of experience across various functional roles tend to support longer-term strategies, such as income smoothing over time, aligning with the interests of long-term investors. In contrast, executives with more transitions between firms and industries often exhibit more short-term actions, namely cuts in R&D investments, rendering their firms more appealing to short-term investors.