POLICY IMPACTS FOR DEVELOPMENT: EXAMPLES FROM A MARRIAGE LAW AND A LAND REFORM

Abstract

This abstract outlines the chapters that form my doctoral dissertation. The first two chapters analyze the impacts of the 1974 Age-of-Marriage law in Indonesia, which aimed to curb child marriage.In the first chapter, I study the effectiveness of age-of-marriage laws. I discuss how age-of-marriage restrictions delay marriages and also affect the marriage market equilibrium, including not only when people marry but also who they marry. I build a theoretical model and illustrate graphically what happens when a law abruptly shifts the supply of marriageable brides and grooms. My model predicts that the age-of-marriage laws are expected to postpone first marriages universally. However, the extent of their impact on the marriage market varies depending on the strength of age-related preferences. In cases where individuals strongly favor a specific age gap between spouses, no marriage market effects are anticipated. Conversely, under weaker age-related preferences, the law alters matching in the marriage market and can affect bride prices, age gaps, or marriage rates. I then test some of those predictions with regression discontinuity estimates using birth cohort as the running variable. Using a large nationally-representative dataset, I estimate impacts of the Indonesian Law on age of marriage and probability of underage marriage for both women and men. In addition, I examine marriage-market effects by estimating impacts on the age gap between spouses as well as spouse education. My estimations based on large survey datasets support the notion that the marriage law delayed marriages and prevented under-age marriages, and also altered matching patterns, at least in the short run. Because the estimation in an RD design is complicated by the misreporting of birth dates, I deploy a range of robustness checks to bolster my findings. Though some of the robustness checks raise important caveats, my overall findings still suggest the law effectively delays marriage and alters matching in the marriage market. The second chapter further explores the effects of delaying marriage on life outcomes. I continue to rely on Indonesia’s Age-of-Marriage law and the same nationally representative dataset. I leverage a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to explore whether the law further brought about other commonly expected desirable outcomes of delayed marriage, such as higher education attainment, employment participation, health, wealth, and more. My results show that the law had a strong impact on girls education. It led to significant increases in all completion rates for girls, from primary school to bachelor degrees. This is consistent with some existing studies finding that delayed marriage can prevent girls from dropping out of school. I do not find similar impacts for men, for whom the marriageable age is 19. My results further do not suggest strong impacts on employment, but I significant positive effects on access to banking and communications, as well as health insurance. Echoing results from Chapter 1, I find strong impacts on spouse outcomes, suggesting that women who delayed their wedding married more educated and more successful men. The third chapter examines the land rental market effects of increased tenure security in the context of China’s land titling reform. Between 2009 and 2018, the Chinese government introduced a nationwide reform to register land titles for rural individual households in over 600,000 villages. To estimate the causal effect of the land reform, I leverage differences across villages induced by a pilot project of the reform conducted between 2009 and 2013. Estimates suggest that registering land titles for individual households led to a substantial increase in their participation in farmland rental markets, and allowed a shift towards non-kin tenants with a higher willingness to pay.