PROMOTING SAFETY IN FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS: NAVIGATING REGULATIONS, INSPECTOR SCHEDULES, AND INCENTIVE STRUCTURES

Abstract

The dissertation examines different aspects around safety in U.S. food supply chains, using the context of regulatory policy implementation and inspections. The first essay explores the impact of supply chain accountability regulations on firm level inventory performance within the context of global sourcing. Using the case of the Food Safety Modernization Act, the study suggests that regulatory policies have the potential to negatively impact a firm’s inventory performance by increasing regulatory stress. Using the stress-coping theory, the study finds that sourcing from developed markets exacerbates the regulatory stress, while sourcing from emerging markets alleviates it, thus altering the firm’s coping response as reflected by its inventory leanness performance. The essay has implications for safety in food supply chains. The second essay investigates the impact of work-break schedules on task performance of field staff. Using the context of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s regulatory inspections, the study explores different work-break regimes and their impact on food inspectors’ quality assessments of food facilities. The study finds that temporal pacing of inspections increases task performance, but at a diminishing rate. Multi-tasking and non-standard schedules negatively affect performance, while intermittent breaks and start-day of inspections may have a positive effect on inspection outcomes. Strategic scheduling of inspections may increase violation detection. The third essay investigates the impact of incentive design on task performance of field staff. Using the context of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s regulatory inspections, the study explores how salary differences relative to multiple referent groups impact food inspectors’ quality assessment of food facilities. Grounded in equity theory, the study finds that a higher salary as compared to previous year, internal peers, and operational interface referents, leads to work withdrawals due to complacency. Conversely, a higher salary as compared to industry referents enhances inspector task performance. A strategic incentive design for inspectors may increase the detection of violations. These studies contribute to the literature at the intersection of supply chain and operations management, public policy, and public sector operations. They do so by advancing our understanding of the factors affecting safety in food supply chains.