Replication Code for "Should We Expect Merger Synergies To Be Passed Through to Consumers?"

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dc.contributor.authorSweeting, Andrew
dc.contributor.authorLecesse, Mario
dc.contributor.authorTao, Xuezhen
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-12T15:35:44Z
dc.date.available2024-07-12T15:35:44Z
dc.date.issued2024-07-01
dc.description.abstractWhen reviewing horizontal mergers, antitrust agencies balance anticompetitive incentives, resulting from market power, with procompetitive incentives, created by efficiencies, assuming complete information and static, simultaneous move Nash equilibrium play. These models miss how a merged firm may prefer not to pass through efficiencies when rivals would respond by lowering their prices. We use an asymmetric information model, where rivals do not observe the size of the realized cost efficiency, to investigate how this incentive could affect post-merger prices. We highlight how the strength of this incentive will depend on the market structure of non-merging rivals and discuss alternative settings where similar issues arise.
dc.description.sponsorshipUS National Science Foundation Grant SES-1658670 (Sweeting) and National Natural Science Foundation of China Grant 72003120 (Tao).
dc.description.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12394
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.13016/0hy8-uk3u
dc.identifier.citationLeccese, Mario, Andrew Sweeting and Xuezhen Tao , "Should We Expect Merger Synergies To Be Passed Through to Consumers?, Journal of Industrial Economics, forthcoming (2024)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/33129
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtEconomicsen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Behavioral and Social Sciencesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, MD)en_us
dc.subjectoligopoly
dc.subjecthorizontal mergers
dc.subjectvertical mergers
dc.subjectasymmetric information
dc.subjectpooling equilibria
dc.subjectfirm conduct
dc.subjectpass-through
dc.subjectstrategic incentives
dc.titleReplication Code for "Should We Expect Merger Synergies To Be Passed Through to Consumers?"
dc.typeSoftware
local.equitableAccessSubmissionNo

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