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Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing

dc.contributor.authorAusubel, Lawrence M.
dc.contributor.authorCramton, Peter
dc.identifier.citation"Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing," (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) Economic Theory, 23, 493-505, April 2004. Reprinted in Charalambos Aliprantis, et al. (eds.), Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 355-368, 2003.en
dc.description.abstractWe generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders’ reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings with perfect resale, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues.en
dc.format.extent101894 bytes
dc.subjectVickrey auctionsen
dc.subjectMulti-unit auctionsen
dc.subjectReserve priceen
dc.titleVickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricingen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Behavioral and Social Sciencesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, MD)en_us

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