Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing
| dc.contributor.author | Ausubel, Lawrence M. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Cramton, Peter | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-08-31T15:00:30Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2007-08-31T15:00:30Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2004-04 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders’ reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings with perfect resale, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 101894 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.citation | "Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing," (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) Economic Theory, 23, 493-505, April 2004. Reprinted in Charalambos Aliprantis, et al. (eds.), Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 355-368, 2003. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1903/7116 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
| dc.publisher | Springer-Verlag | en |
| dc.relation.isAvailableAt | Digital Repository at the University of Maryland | en_us |
| dc.relation.isAvailableAt | Economics | en_us |
| dc.relation.isAvailableAt | College of Behavioral and Social Sciences | en_us |
| dc.relation.isAvailableAt | University of Maryland (College Park, MD) | en_us |
| dc.subject | Auctions | en |
| dc.subject | Vickrey auctions | en |
| dc.subject | Multi-unit auctions | en |
| dc.subject | Reserve price | en |
| dc.subject | Resale | en |
| dc.title | Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing | en |
| dc.type | Article | en |