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Detection of Greedy Individual and Colluding MAC Layer Attackers

dc.contributor.advisorBaras, John S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorRadosavac, Svetlanaen_US
dc.contributor.authorCardenas, Alvaro A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBaras, John S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMoustakides, George V.en_US
dc.description.abstractSelfish behavior at the Medium Access (MAC) Layer can have devastating side effects on the performance of wireless networks, with effects similar to those of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In this paper we consider the problem of detection and prevention of node misbehavior at the MAC layer, focusing on the back-off manipulation by selfish nodes. We propose an algorithm that ensures honest behavior of non-colluding participants. Furthermore, we analyze the problem of colluding selfish nodes, casting the problem within a minimax robust detection framework, providing a detection rule of optimum performance for the worst-case attack. Finally, we compare the effects of colluding attackers with a single attacker in terms of the detection delay. Although our approach is general and can serve as a guideline for the design of any probabilistic distributed MAC protocol, we focus our analysis on the IEEE 802.11 MAC.en_US
dc.format.extent127816 bytes
dc.relation.ispartofseriesISR; TR 2006-8en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSEIL; TR 2006-3en_US
dc.subjectNetwork Securityen_US
dc.titleDetection of Greedy Individual and Colluding MAC Layer Attackersen_US
dc.typeTechnical Reporten_US

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