Skip to content
University of Maryland LibrariesDigital Repository at the University of Maryland
    • Login
    View Item 
    •   DRUM
    • A. James Clark School of Engineering
    • Institute for Systems Research Technical Reports
    • View Item
    •   DRUM
    • A. James Clark School of Engineering
    • Institute for Systems Research Technical Reports
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    A Certificate-based Light-weight Authentication Algorithm For Resource-constrained Devices

    Thumbnail
    View/Open
    TR_2005-83.pdf (149.0Kb)
    No. of downloads: 617

    Date
    2005
    Author
    Roy-Chowdhury, Ayan
    Baras, John S.
    Advisor
    Baras, John S.
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    In this work, we analyze and extend a recently proposed design of digital certificates called TESLA certificates. Certificates are a necessary tool in today's secure networks to certify the identity of nodes taking part in communication. Most prevalent certificate technologies make use of public-key cryptography. Messages generated by the user are signed using its private key, and the signature can be verified by any node who knows the user's public key via its certificate. Signature generation and verification using public-key cryptography is computationally expensive for devices with limited computation power and energy resources. In this situation TESLA certificates can be very useful to certify identity, since they rely on symmetric cryptography which is computationally much more efficient. In this paper we explain the concept of TESLA certificates and provide a preliminary description of proposed modifications to the original algorithm to strengthen its security. We extend the original proposal by combining hash chains with TESLA certificates and come up with an efficient source and message authentication protocol based on symmetric key certificates. We also propose a new type of TESLA certificates called Group Certificates for use in multicast group communication. Through analysis, we show that our protocol is secure against malicious adversaries. We also give an initial estimate of the performance of our algorithm and the related comparison to public-key signatures, and we highlight network scenarios where the TESLA certificates could be particularly useful.
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/1903/6547
    Collections
    • Institute for Systems Research Technical Reports

    DRUM is brought to you by the University of Maryland Libraries
    University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7011 (301)314-1328.
    Please send us your comments.
    Web Accessibility
     

     

    Browse

    All of DRUMCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    My Account

    LoginRegister
    Pages
    About DRUMAbout Download Statistics

    DRUM is brought to you by the University of Maryland Libraries
    University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7011 (301)314-1328.
    Please send us your comments.
    Web Accessibility