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dc.contributor.advisorMorris, Irwin L.en_US
dc.contributor.authorNuñez, Gilbert Daviden_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-14T05:36:03Z
dc.date.available2017-09-14T05:36:03Z
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.13016/M2Z02Z89M
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/19893
dc.description.abstractOur observations of the political world are filled with examples of presidents who move policy with the stroke of a pen. The executive order, one of several tools available to presidents, is a primary example of unilateral governance wherein presidents change policy, create programs, and reorganize the government without a single vote in Congress. In political science, we study these demonstrations of executive action by paying attention to a subgroup of so-called “significant” executive orders, those with policy implications that garner the attention of other institutional actors (including the press). However, this broad category still covers a wide range of salience that muddles our understanding of how and when presidents use unilateral action. In the dissertation, I identify an even narrower set of “critical” executive orders that represent the most impactful unilateral actions of presidents. Focusing on these orders, I study the political context in which they are issued so that we can better understand the dynamics associated with greater presidential prolificacy in their unilateral governance. I use count models to identify the political factors that shape a president’s ability to issue such orders and find that divided government, polarization, presidential approval, the economy, war, and other timing variables all provide clues to the president on whether he or she has a favorable environment for issuing such orders. I also find a difference in the factors that influence the issuance of critical executive orders when broken down by domestic versus foreign and defense-related policies. When these factors are associated with lower numbers of critical executive orders, I argue that presidents are effectively constrained because they recognize that their circumstances do not as easily lend themselves to unilateral action. Recognizing that executive orders are just one of many unilateral tools available to presidents, I close with discussion about the need to identify significant subsets of these other tools and aggregate them to create a fuller picture of unilateral governance in the American system.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleWHEN POLITICS MATTER: UNILATERAL POWER AND CRITICAL EXECUTIVE ORDERSen_US
dc.typeDissertationen_US
dc.contributor.publisherDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_US
dc.contributor.publisherUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_US
dc.contributor.departmentGovernment and Politicsen_US
dc.subject.pqcontrolledPolitical scienceen_US
dc.subject.pqcontrolledPublic policyen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledExecutive Ordersen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledPresidencyen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledUnilateral Governanceen_US


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