The Principal Uncertainty: U.S. Atomic Intelligence, 1942-1949
The Principal Uncertainty: U.S. Atomic Intelligence, 1942-1949
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Date
2013
Authors
Houghton, Vincent
Advisor
Sumida, Jon T
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Abstract
ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: THE PRINCIPAL UNCERTAINTY: U.S. ATOMIC
INTELLIGENCE, 1942-1949
Vincent Jonathan Houghton,
Doctor of Philosophy, 2013
Dissertation directed by: Professor Jon T. Sumida
Department of History
The subject of this dissertation is the U. S. atomic intelligence effort against both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the period 1942-1949. Both of these intelligence efforts operated within the framework of an entirely new field of intelligence: scientific intelligence. Because of the atomic bomb, for the first time in history a nation's scientific resources - the abilities of its scientists, the state of its research institutions and laboratories, its scientific educational system - became a key consideration in assessing a potential national security threat.
Considering how successfully the United States conducted the atomic intelligence effort against the Germans in the Second World War, why was the United States Government unable to create an effective atomic intelligence apparatus to monitor Soviet scientific and nuclear capabilities? Put another way, why did the effort against the Soviet Union fail so badly, so completely, in all potential metrics - collection, analysis, and dissemination? In addition, did the general assessment of German and Soviet science lead to particular assumptions about their abilities to produce nuclear weapons? How did this assessment affect American presuppositions regarding the German and Soviet strategic threats? Despite extensive historical work on atomic intelligence, the current historiography has not adequately addressed these questions.