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dc.contributor.advisorSumida, Jon Ten_US
dc.contributor.authorPitrof, Tyleren_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-02-12T06:31:29Z
dc.date.available2014-02-12T06:31:29Z
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/14951
dc.description.abstractThe US Navy's move to high-pressure and -temperature steam propulsion, otherwise known as "high steam," has been viewed in the postwar period as a critical advance that made long-range operations possible during World War II. This position, which is almost entirely reliant on the autobiography of Rear Admiral Harold G. Bowen, has neglected to consider the complex and problematic nature of the supply chain required to produce high-steam turbines. Archival research has revealed that the US Navy's insensitivity to these changes after 1938 caused severe bottlenecks in wartime destroyer production. Also overlooked was the aggressive administrative action on the part of the Navy's Bureau of Ships and its turbine subcontractors required to mitigate this crisis. Together, these events formed an important example of the need to adapt administratively to match the advance of technology.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.titleAdapting to Innovation: The US Navy, High-Steam Destroyers, and the Second World Waren_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.publisherDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_US
dc.contributor.publisherUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_US
dc.contributor.departmentHistoryen_US
dc.subject.pqcontrolledMilitary historyen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledDestroyeren_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledHarold G. Bowenen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledHigh Steamen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledTurbinesen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledWorld War IIen_US


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