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Computational and Experimental Market Design

dc.contributor.advisorMcConnell, Kenneth Een_US
dc.contributor.advisorCramton, Peteren_US
dc.contributor.authorHiggins, Nathaniel Alanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-02T05:41:15Z
dc.date.available2010-07-02T05:41:15Z
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/10260
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation contributes to the literature on the market design of auctions. I use computational and experimental techniques to make two types of contributions to the literature. First, I provide a program that implements a state-of-the-art algorithm for solving multi-unit auctions with asymmetric bidders. This methodological contribution can be used by other economists to solve a variety of auction problems not considered in this dissertation. Second, I undertake the study of one auction environment in particular, utilizing my program to generate hypotheses when bidders participate in a particular sealed-bid, asymmetric multi-unit auction. These hypotheses are then tested in an experimental setting.en_US
dc.titleComputational and Experimental Market Designen_US
dc.typeDissertationen_US
dc.contributor.publisherDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_US
dc.contributor.publisherUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_US
dc.contributor.departmentAgricultural and Resource Economicsen_US
dc.subject.pqcontrolledEconomics, Generalen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledAsymmetric Auctionsen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledAuctionsen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledComputational Economicsen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledExperimental Economicsen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledGame Theoryen_US
dc.subject.pquncontrolledMarket Designen_US


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