Philosophy

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Action, Perception, and the Living Body: Aristotle on the Physiological Foundations of Moral Psychology
(2009) Russo, Michael P.; Singpurwalla, Rachel G. K.; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
In this dissertation I show that Aristotle's moral psychology is grounded in his natural philosophy of the living body. Moral psychology studies the ways in which agency and moral responsibility are rooted in the functional structure of the psyche. For Aristotle, the psyche - that is, the soul (psychê) - is unified with the living body, and its functional structure is integrated with the dispositional propensities of the body's material constituents. On account of this, "the soul neither does anything nor has anything done to it without the body..." (DA I.1, 403a 5) Accordingly, Aristotle considers it an "absurdity" of the accounts of his predecessors that "they attach the soul to the body and set it into it, determining no further what the cause of this is or what the condition of the body is..." (DA I.3, 407b 14) However, most contemporary interpretations of Aristotle's moral psychology suffer from essentially this same problem: they interpret Aristotle's explanation of, say, voluntary action or lack of self-restraint (akrasia) in entirely psychological terms, and say nothing about the physiological processes that Aristotle takes to partially constitute, and to critically influence, these phenomena. Here I address this imbalance by exploring Aristotle's view of the somatic dimension of moral psychology. More specifically, I examine Aristotle's so-called "hylomorphism" - the view that a living thing's body and soul are its material and its form (respectively) - and his account of the physiological functions underlying "incidental perception" (roughly, "seeing as" or perceiving particulars under a description), voluntary action, practical reasoning and its role in moving us to act, lack of self-restraint, and moral development.
TOPIC SENSITIVE BELIEF REVISION
(2009) Parsia, Bijan; Horty, John F; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
When asked to change one's beliefs in the face of new information, or to revise a book given errata, we commonly strive to keep our changes relevant, that is, we try to restrict the beliefs (or chapters) we change to those that bear some content relation to the new information. One kind of relevance, topicality, is interesting for two reasons: First, topicality tends to be strongly encapsulating, e.g., we shouldn't make any off-topic changes. Second, topicality tends to be weaker than strict relevance. Consider a panel of three papers on the topic of Kant's life and works. It would be entirely possible for each of the papers to have no bearing on the truth of any sentence in any of the other papers, and yet for all of the papers to be on topic. In this dissertation, I explore theories of logical topicality and their effect on formal theories of belief revision. Formal theories of belief revision (in the Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM) tradition) model the object of change (my beliefs, a book) as a collection of formulae in a supra-classical logic and provide a set of postulates which express constraints on the sorts of change that are, in principle, formally rational. In 1999, Rohit Parikh proposed that signature disjointness captured a reasonable notion of topicality but that taking topicality into account required changes in the standard AGM postulates (and thus, the notion of rational change). He, and subsequent theorists, abandoned this notion of topicality in order to deal with the revision of inconsistent objects of change. In this thesis, I show 1) that a disjoint signature account of topicality does not require changes to the AGM rationality postulates and 2) a disjoint signature account of topicality can apply to inconsistent objects of change. Additionally, I argue that signature disjointness has a strong claim to being at least a sufficient condition of logical topicality.
Structuralism and Natural Philosophy: Method, Metaphysics and Explanation
(2009) Cifone, Michael Christian; Bub, Jeffrey; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
This dissertation is an examination of the foundations of what I call a "fourth" tradition of analytical-scientific philosophy, the tradition of "structuralism". It is a disavowal of a metaphysics of substances and/or entities in the pursuit of scientific theory and truth. We look, in particular, at the current manifestation of this tradition, which advances the thesis of "structural realism"; we ask how tenable this thesis is, and whether we can weaken it. I argue that we should focus on methodology--a program for the formulation of scientific hypotheses about the sorts of things there are--rather than on metaphysics per se. We replace "substance" with "relation" as the basic ontic posit, and hold that substances or entities are metaphysically derivative from relational structure. Thus, the thesis is not that "there are no things" (or that "everything must go", as Ladyman et al. suppose); rather, the thesis is that the things (entities or substances) are relational structure, and there is no complete specification of an independent entity that is not itself more relational structure (so a metaphysics of substances is merely secondary to that of relational structure). I also suggest that there is no complete, unitary or monistic theory of what `structure' itself is. That is, I hold that there is no "total" structure of which everything that is relational structure is a "part", on the grounds that this would constitute an "illegitimate totality" in Russell's sense (the claim that "everything is structural" does not mean that there is a single structure which everything has--what a monistic theory of structure seems to demand). We then turn to the question of scientific explanation in light of structural realism: can there be explanation without a metaphysics of substances? I answer affirmatively. I then turn to two cases where, I argue, structuralism (and the specific thesis of structural realism) is in play regarding scientific explanation: quantum information theory, and the recent attempt to render quantum mechanics local by re-interpreting physical law time symmetrically. I conclude with a consideration of some objections to structuralism, and an articulation of the general view of metaphysics that structuralism seems to presuppose.
On Popular Sovereignty
(2009) Fan, Hsin-Hua; Morris, Christopher W.; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
Popular sovereignty is a frequently used concept in contemporary politics. Many states, governments, or rulers claim to base their rule on popular sovereignty. Politicians use this concept often in their rhetoric. When people go to polls to cast their votes or go on street to demonstrate, they think they are exercising popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty seems to be a well-recognized idea. However, in spite of its popularity, popular sovereignty often appears as an ambiguous notion. Could it be a myth or a fiction without much substance? Is it used only in political rhetoric, but has little objective reality? In his paper "The Very Idea of Popular Sovereignty: `We the People' Reconsidered," Christopher Morris does express skepticism about the possibility of attributing sovereignty to "the People". If democracy is understood as the rule by the People and for the People, then popular sovereignty is the foundation or essence of democracy. This implies that to understand and justify democracy, we have to understand and justify popular sovereignty. Or, if we cannot understand or justify popular sovereignty, then democracy would be problematic or impossible. Since democracy is increasingly deemed to be a universal value, clarifying and exploring its fundamental questions is not only unavoidable, but also important. An exact and thorough explication of the notion of popular sovereignty is therefore necessary. A skeptical view about popular sovereignty such as Morris's also needs to be reconsidered. Therefore, I aim to both construct and defend a theory of popular sovereignty. While providing an exact and thorough explication of popular sovereignty, I will also argue against skepticism about popular sovereignty. Specifically, there are three primary objectives in my theory: to clarify and reshape the notion of popular sovereignty; to discuss issues in realizing popular sovereignty; and to justify the People's right to sovereignty and explore the need for popular sovereignty. The general points I want to make in my theory are: the People in any state ought to be the sovereign; popular sovereignty can not only be understood, but also be exercised and realized.
Diversity, Modesty, Liberty: An Essay on State Neutrality
(2008) Baltzly, Vaughn Bryan; Galston, William A; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
Human beings have long disagreed about the best way to live. Of what significance is this fact for politics? In this dissertation, I argue that it is of the utmost significance, and that substantial theoretical conclusions follow from our decision to take it seriously. Arguing that few accounts of politics have given due consideration to the fact of persistent disagreement, among reasonable and well-intentioned individuals, as to what gives life meaning and value, I articulate what I hope to be the most defensible account of a politics that accommodates this fact. Citing a variety of possible inferences we might make in response to this `fact of diversity', I defend a humble assessment of our cognitive abilities in this regard as the most charitable inference on offer. Formulated from the perspective of those who would claim the right to exercise political power and authority, this epistemically-humble response to the fact of diversity issues in a principled refusal to endorse any particular account of the Good Life as authoritative for public purposes. The state manifests this principled refusal by adopting an attitude of `maximum feasible accommodation' with respect to its citizens' pursuits of their diverse conceptions of life's meaning and value. Such an attitude needs to be fleshed out in terms of policy, however, so in the final chapters I articulate and defend, as the best practical expression of a stance of maximum accommodation, a principle that restricts the use of the state's coercive power to only those measures needed to protect citizens' `expressive liberty' - that is, their right to live lives that express their cherished notions of life's meaning and value, free from coercive interference.
Entanglement and Information in Algebraic Quantum Theories
(2008) Valente, Giovanni; Bub, Jeffrey; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
The algebraic approach to physical theories provides a general framework encompassing both classical and quantum mechanics. Accordingly, by looking at the behaviour of the relevant algebras of observables one can investigate structural and conceptual differences between the theories. Interesting foundational questions can be formulated algebraically and their answers are then given in a mathematically compelling way. My dissertation focuses on some philosophical issues concerning entanglement and quantum information as they arise in the algebraic approach. The se two concepts are connected in that one can exploit the non-local character of quantum theory to construct protocols of information theory which are not realized in the classical world. I first introduce the basic concepts of the algebraic formalism by reviewing von Neumann's work on the mathematical foundations of quantum theories. After presenting the reasons why von Neumann abandoned the standard Hilbert space formulation in favour of the algebraic approach, I show how his axiomatic program remained a mathematical "utopia" in mathematical physics. The Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics is grounded in information-theoretical considerations. I take on some specific problems concerning the extension of Bayesian statistical inference in infinite dimensional Hilbert space. I demonstrate that the failure of a stability condition, formulated as a rationality constraint for classical Bayesian conditional probabilities, does not undermine the Bayesian interpretation of quantum probabilities. I then provide a solution to the problem of Bayesian noncommutative statistical inference in general probability spaces. Furthermore, I propose a derivation of the a priori probability state in quantum mechanics from symmetry considerations. Finally, Algebraic Quantum Field Theory offers a rigorous axiomatization of quantum field theory, namely the synthesis of quantum mechanics and special relativity. In such a framework one can raise the question of whether or not quantum correlations are made stronger by adding relativistic constraints. I argue that entanglement is more robust in the relativistic context than in ordinary quantum theory. In particular, I show how to generalize the claim that entanglement across space-like separated regions of Minkowski spacetime would persist, no matter how one acts locally.
Frame Problems, Fodor's Challenge, and Practical Reason
(2008) Deise, Erich Christopher; Carruthers, Peter; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
By bringing the frame problem to bear on psychology, Fodor argues that the interesting activities of mind are not amenable to computational modeling. Following exegesis of the frame problem and Fodor's claims, I argue that underlying Fodor's argument is an unsatisfiable normative principle of rationality that in turn commits him to a particular descriptive claim about the nature of our minds. I argue that the descriptive claim is false and that we should reject the normative principle in favor of one that is at least in principle satisfiable. From this it follows, I argue, that we have no reason for thinking the activities of our minds to be, as a matter of principle, unmodelable. Drawing upon Baars' Global Workspace theory, I next outline an alternative framework that provides a means by which the set of engineering challenges raised by Fodor might be met. Having sketched this alternative, I turn next to consider some of the frame problems arising in practical reason and decision-making. Following discussion of the nature of emotion and its influence on practical reason and decision-making, I argue that consideration of emotion provides one means by which we might contend with some of the frame problem instances that arise in that domain.
Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information Theory
(2009) Van Camp, Wesley W.; Bub, Jeffrey; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
The principle aim of this dissertation is to investigate the philosophical application of quantum information theory to interpretational issues regarding the theory of quantum mechanics. Recently, quantum information theory has emerged as a potential source for such an interpretation. The main question with which this dissertation will be concerned is whether or not an information-theoretic interpretation can serve as a conceptually acceptable interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will be argued that some of the more obvious approaches - that quantum information theory shows us that ultimately the world is made of information, and quantum Bayesianism - fail as philosophical interpretations of quantum mechanics. However, the information-theoretic approach of Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson introduces Einstein's distinction between principle theories and constructive theories, arguing that quantum mechanics is best understood as an information-theoretic principle theory. While I argue that this particular approach fails, it does offer a viable new philosophical role for information theory. Specifically, an investigation of interpretationally successful principle theories such as Newtonian mechanics, special relativity, and general relativity, shows that the particular principles employed are necessary as constitutive elements of a framework which partially defines the basic explanatory concepts of space, time, and motion. Without such constitutive principles as preconditions for empirical meaning, scientific progress is hampered. It is argued that the philosophical issues in quantum mechanics stem from an analogous conceptual crisis. On the basis of this comparison, the best strategy for resolving these problems is to apply a similar sort of conceptual analysis to quantum mechanics so as to provide an appropriate set of constitutive principles clarifying the conceptual issues at stake. It is further argued that quantum information theory is ideally placed as a novel conceptual framework from which to conduct this analysis.
How Many Minds? Individuating Mental Tokens in the Split-Brain Subject
(2009) Schechter, Elizabeth; Carruthers, Peter; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
The "split-brain" cases raise numerous difficult and fascinating questions: questions about our own self-knowledge, about the limits of introspection and phenomenology, about personal identity, and about the nature of consciousness and of mind. While the phenomenon is therefore of relevance to many areas of psychological inquiry, my dissertation explores the split-brain studies from the perspective of theoretical psychology. The dissertation uses the split-brain cases to develop criteria for individuating mental tokens, and then applies those criteria back to the split-brain subjects themselves, ultimately arguing that split-brain subjects have two minds and two streams of consciousness apiece. Because the dissertation defends a particular account of the constitutive conditions for mental tokens against competing functionalist accounts, it also ends up being about the proper form for functionalist theories of the mental to take. I argue throughout that psychofunctionalists who are realists about mental phenomena should accept that the constitutive conditions for mental tokens are partly neural. In particular I argue that, within an organism, multiple neural events that sustain mental phenomena causally independently of each other in some relevant sense cannot be identified with a unique mental token, regardless of how unified that organism's behavior may seem.
Consciousness, concepts and content
(2008-08-04) Veillet, Benedicte; Carruthers, Peter; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)
Concepts figure prominently in the defense and elaboration of representational accounts of phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, any adequate defense of (reductive) representationalism will require an appeal to so-called phenomenal concepts to deflect a group of related anti-physicalist (and hence anti-representationalist) arguments. What's more, an elaboration of representationalism requires a detailed account of the representational content of phenomenally conscious experience. The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the defense and elaboration of representationalism as it relates to concepts, first with a defense of demonstrative/recognitional accounts of phenomenal concepts (and a defense of the more general physicalist strategy in which they figure); and second, with the development of a partially conceptual account of perceptual experience.

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