Theses and Dissertations from UMD
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New submissions to the thesis/dissertation collections are added automatically as they are received from the Graduate School. Currently, the Graduate School deposits all theses and dissertations from a given semester after the official graduation date. This means that there may be up to a 4 month delay in the appearance of a give thesis/dissertation in DRUM
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Item When National Minorities Become Local Majorities: Federalism, Ethnic Politics and Violent Conflict(2013) Inman, Molly Jean; Birnir, Johanna K; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)What explains the variation in ethnic conflict in federal systems? Existing theory and empirical evidence are mixed, with some saying it decreases violence, and some saying increases it. This puzzle also leads to a number of research questions: why does federalism fail to resolve the problem of violent ethnic conflict? Why does local ethnic politics in federal units frequently lead to violence within the ethnic group? What effect does federalism have on violence between ethnic groups? Why do central governments intervene with force into local interethnic conflicts rather than simply allowing the local government of the federal unit to resolve the issue? Conversely, why does federalism sometimes work in preventing violent conflict and session in countries where ethnic politics is salient? The theory presented here asserts that the level of intraethnic political competition within the national minority/local majority and the political incentives created by devolving power to the local level determine the answers. I develop a new theory of local ethnic outbidding by minority groups in federal systems which explains how local ethnic politics turns violent when intraethnic political competition is high. Previous theories have focused almost exclusively on national level politics and violence and have largely ignored the subnational level. I also explain how central governments become involved in local ethnic conflicts in federal systems, because local minorities being targeted call upon them for assistance. Existing theories do not explain why the central government would expend resources and political capital to intervene in a local conflict. Finally, I theorize that the presence and active competition of ethnic political parties in federal units does not increase the likelihood of rebellion or secession. Only when interethnic conflict results from ethnic outbidding and the central government intervenes with force does the politically mobilized ethnic group in the federal unit respond with force in-kind. Existing theories try to link ethnic and regional parties in federal units with secession by theorizing that they reinforce local identities which makes an ethnic group want its own country. My theory asserts and the empirical analysis shows that the path to anti-regime violence by the local majority is much less direct and is contingent on central government actions. To test this theory using statistical analysis, I collected original data on intraethnic political competition for 112 ethnic groups in 21 federal countries from 1990-2006 and assembled a new dataset to test this theory about subnational violent ethnic conflict in federal systems. Additionally, I use process tracing to test the theory using case studies of three ethnic groups in Indonesia. The analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative results lends substantial support to the theory. (Word Count:435)Item The States on the Hill: Intergovernmental Advocacy in American Federalism(2013) Creek, Heather M.; Gimpel, James G.; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Federal lawmakers often praise the American state governments as "laboratories of democracy" conducting policy experiments from which other governments can learn. However, federalism scholarship recognizes that the federal government has strong incentives to preempt state policy and impose federal mandates in trying to achieve national policy goals. The safeguards of state power in the federal system - political, institutional, and democratic constraints - have changed and weakened over time, leaving the state governments vulnerable to the political interests of the national government. Like other interest groups, the states have developed techniques to safeguard the balance of power in the federal system as well as communicate their policy interests to national lawmakers and educate others about their unique policy developments. Prior studies of American federalism have relied on the behavior of public official associations representing multiple state governments as the source of information about intergovernmental advocacy and state policy goals. This dissertation argues that the study of aggregate intergovernmental interests through the positions of the associations conceals variation in the advocacy activity and goals of the individual state governments. Quantitative analysis of patterns in state lobbying behavior as well as qualitative analysis of congressional hearings is conducted using a unique database of the hearing testimony by state government officials and public official associations from the 103rd-108th Congress (1993-2004). This demonstrates that the state governments are dynamic participants in federal policymaking but their influence is not constant across all policy areas. Individual states are found to have varying levels of activity in federal policymaking which are dependent on the committee placement of members from the state's congressional delegation. In some cases the states' capacity to develop policy expertise and craft innovative policy is predictive of its participation in congressional hearings but this is not as important a factor as expected. Members of Congress are most likely to invite intergovernmental witnesses based on their relationship to the state government and, less frequently, based on the state's record of distinction in policy innovation.Item Confederate Federalism: A View From the Governors(2004-04-30) Powell, Michael A.; Belz, Herman J.; HistoryABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: CONFEDERATE FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE GOVERNORS Michael Albert Powell, Doctor of Philosophy, 2004 Dissertation directed by: Professor Herman J. Belz Department of History Examination of Confederate federalism to date generally has emphasized one of two interpretations: that the Confederacy either "died of state rights" or that the Confederacy, because of the war-time demands, created a government at least as centralized as the Union, if not more so. This dissertation argues that the reality was much more complex. Confederate federalism consisted of three phases. The first, or the cooperative, phase was represented by a high degree of cooperation between the states and central government and lasted from the formation of the Confederacy until the spring of 1862. The governors freely provided troops, arms, and equipment to both the Confederacy and each other with minimal conflict over constitutional lines of authority. The second phase, from the spring of 1862 to the fall of 1864, was marked by conflict between the states and the Davis administration, with the differences resolved through negotiated compromises. While conscription was a war-time necessity, compromises were negotiated between the governors and the Davis administration over exemptions, use of state courts in deciding the constitutionality of conscription, and changes in the law itself. Impressment and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were recognized by the governors as legitimate constitutional powers of the central government, but limitations were negotiated with respect to their enforcement. Lastly, fiscal policies were deemed by the governors to fall within the sphere of the Confederacy's constitutional authority and therefore beyond the scope of gubernatorial authority. The final phase of Confederate federalism, from the fall of 1864 until the end of the war in the spring of 1865, witnessed the states struggling for survival and the collapse of the Confederacy. The governors sought to keep troops and supplies for their states and to suppress or control local peace initiatives in an unsuccessful effort to win the war.