Theses and Dissertations from UMD
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New submissions to the thesis/dissertation collections are added automatically as they are received from the Graduate School. Currently, the Graduate School deposits all theses and dissertations from a given semester after the official graduation date. This means that there may be up to a 4 month delay in the appearance of a give thesis/dissertation in DRUM
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Item To Campaign, Protest, or Take up Arms: Ethnic Minority Strategies under the Shadow of Ethnic Majority Fragmentation(2018) Hultquist, Agatha Skierkowski; Birnir, Johanna K.; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Why do some ethnopolitical minority organizations use violence to achieve their political goals, whereas others eschew force and engage in nonviolence or take part in elections? The literature leads us to expect that the more fragmented the ethnic minority group is, the more likely it is that ethnopolitical minority organizations will use violence against the state. Ethnopolitical minority organizations, however, vary considerably in their strategies. To explain this puzzle, I argue that an under-explored factor - fragmentation within ethnically mobilized groups that control the state - affects how minority organizations select their strategies. Using two original measures of majority fragmentation in combination with existing data on minority strategies in Sri Lanka for 1960-2005, I find that ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to use violence when fragmentation within the political majority is relatively low and more likely to engage in nonviolence or to participate in electoral politics when majority fragmentation is relatively high. I also determine that minority organizations are more likely to use mixed strategies of electoral politics and violence and violence and nonviolence as majority fragmentation increases. Finally, I find that majorities are more likely to outbid in positions and policies against minorities when minorities use violence than nonviolence. These results demonstrate that the shadow of majority group fragmentation impacts the nonviolent and violent strategies of ethnic minorities, and introduce a new avenue for research on the role of ethnicity in conflict processes.Item Violence and Belonging: The impact of citizenship law on violence in Sub-Saharan Africa(2016) Fruge, Anne Christine; Birnir, Johanna K; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Many countries in Africa are embroiled in heated debates over who belongs where. Sometimes insider/outsider debates lead to localized skirmishes, but other times they turn into minor conflict or even war. How do we explain this variation in violence intensity? Deviating from traditional explanations regarding democratization, political or economic inequality, or natural resources, I examine how nationality laws shape patterns in violence. Citizenship rules determine who is or is not a member of the national political community. Nationality laws formalize these rules, thus representing the legal bond between individuals and the state. Restrictive nationality laws increase marginalization, which fuels competition between citizenship regime winners and losers. This competition stokes contentious insider/outsider narratives that guide ethnic mobilization along the dual logics of threat and opportunity. Threats reduce resource levels and obstruct the exercise of rights. Opportunities provide the chance to reclaim lost resources or clarify nationality status. Other work explains conditions necessary for insider/outsider violence to break out or escalate from the local to the national level. I show that this violence intensifies as laws become more exclusive and escalates to war once an outsider group with contested foreign origins faces denationalization. Groups have contested foreign origins where the “outsider” label conflates internal and foreign migrants. Where outsiders are primarily in-migrants, it is harder to deny the group’s right to citizenship, so nationality laws do not come under threat and insider/outsider violence remains constrained to minor conflict. Using an original dataset of Africa’s nationality laws since 1989, I find that event frequency and fatality rates increase as laws become more restrictive. Through case studies, I explain when citizenship struggles should remain localized, or escalate to minor or major conflict. Next, I apply a nationality law lens to individual level conflict processes. With Afrobarometer survey data, I show that difficulty obtaining identity papers is positively correlated with the fear and use political violence. I also find that susceptibility to contentious narratives is positively associated with using violence to achieve political goals. Finally, I describe the lingering effects of a violent politics of belonging using original survey data from Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.Item When National Minorities Become Local Majorities: Federalism, Ethnic Politics and Violent Conflict(2013) Inman, Molly Jean; Birnir, Johanna K; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)What explains the variation in ethnic conflict in federal systems? Existing theory and empirical evidence are mixed, with some saying it decreases violence, and some saying increases it. This puzzle also leads to a number of research questions: why does federalism fail to resolve the problem of violent ethnic conflict? Why does local ethnic politics in federal units frequently lead to violence within the ethnic group? What effect does federalism have on violence between ethnic groups? Why do central governments intervene with force into local interethnic conflicts rather than simply allowing the local government of the federal unit to resolve the issue? Conversely, why does federalism sometimes work in preventing violent conflict and session in countries where ethnic politics is salient? The theory presented here asserts that the level of intraethnic political competition within the national minority/local majority and the political incentives created by devolving power to the local level determine the answers. I develop a new theory of local ethnic outbidding by minority groups in federal systems which explains how local ethnic politics turns violent when intraethnic political competition is high. Previous theories have focused almost exclusively on national level politics and violence and have largely ignored the subnational level. I also explain how central governments become involved in local ethnic conflicts in federal systems, because local minorities being targeted call upon them for assistance. Existing theories do not explain why the central government would expend resources and political capital to intervene in a local conflict. Finally, I theorize that the presence and active competition of ethnic political parties in federal units does not increase the likelihood of rebellion or secession. Only when interethnic conflict results from ethnic outbidding and the central government intervenes with force does the politically mobilized ethnic group in the federal unit respond with force in-kind. Existing theories try to link ethnic and regional parties in federal units with secession by theorizing that they reinforce local identities which makes an ethnic group want its own country. My theory asserts and the empirical analysis shows that the path to anti-regime violence by the local majority is much less direct and is contingent on central government actions. To test this theory using statistical analysis, I collected original data on intraethnic political competition for 112 ethnic groups in 21 federal countries from 1990-2006 and assembled a new dataset to test this theory about subnational violent ethnic conflict in federal systems. Additionally, I use process tracing to test the theory using case studies of three ethnic groups in Indonesia. The analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative results lends substantial support to the theory. (Word Count:435)Item Ethnic Rebellion in Democratic Experiments(2007-11-28) Pate, Amy; Wilkenfeld, Jonathan; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Numerous studies have found that, in general, democracy decreases intensity of ethnic rebellion. However, the recent transition experiences of multinational states problematize the assumption that social peace accompanies democratization. Especially in the post-Communist world, democratization has been followed by increases in ethnic rebellion. This dissertation explores the question of why some ethnic groups maintain or increase levels of rebellion following democratization while others rely on nonviolence or at least decrease the level of violence employed against the state. I conduct a large-N cross-national comparative investigation of these questions, employing Barry Weingast's (1998) reciprocal vulnerability framework, focusing on the impact of conflictual histories, political institutions, form of democratization and uncertainty. The analysis includes 102 ethnic groups in 42 countries that attempted democratization between 1980 and 2000 and employs data from the Minorities at Risk dataset, the Polity dataset and original data on ethnic participation in democratization, autonomy and federalism, and repression. Multiple statistical methods are employed to test 13 hypotheses derived from the reciprocal vulnerability framework. Findings provide only limited support for reciprocal vulnerability as a generalizable explanation of ethnic rebellion. However, findings strongly support grievance-based theories of ethnic rebellion, and provide limited support for collective action theory of ethnic rebellion, particularly in terms of the effects of repression.Item Third Party Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: A Force for Peace or Spiraling Violence(2004-08-03) Khosla, Deepa; Gurr, Ted R.; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This dissertation examines how interventions by external states can influence the degree of violence of internal ethnic conflicts. We know that foreign state interventions can alter the trajectory of domestic disputes but scholars disagree about the potential effects. Outside support can increase the destructiveness and duration while potentially threatening to diffuse hostilities across states boundaries. Third parties can alternatively help promote a resolution through mediation or by ensuring the victory of one of the parties. This project tests several hypotheses about the effects of key variables including the goals and prior political activism of ethnic groups, the regime type of host states, the impact of the Cold War, the type of state intervenor, the form of assistance supplied, the recipients of the interventions, and ethnic linkages between the parties. The cases comprise twenty-nine ethnopolitical conflicts that emerged in the Third World in the 1980s and the 1990s. Major findings that refine our existing knowledge include how interventions during the Cold War were most likely to occur in conflicts that escalated and that major and regional powers were the main participants. In the 1990s, or the post-Cold War era, most foreign states intervened in ethnic disputes that were either stalemated or decreased in violence. Neighboring states are now the most frequent intervenors in escalating conflicts. Further, higher levels of assistance are unexpectedly associated with internal wars that stalemate or decrease in violence. Challenges to the conventional wisdom include the findings that groups seeking autonomy or secession are very likely to be involved in more intense disputes, neighboring state involvement does not usually exacerbate hostilities, and there is no relationship between competing interventions (support each side) and changes in domestic violence. Further, while military aid is most frequently furnished, it is economic, and secondly, mixed aid (usually economic and military) that is critical in escalating conflicts. Finally, foreign state involvement prior to the eruption of violent hostilities has been little studied. Yet, prior engagement is significantly associated with greater future violence.