Theses and Dissertations from UMD
Permanent URI for this communityhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/2
New submissions to the thesis/dissertation collections are added automatically as they are received from the Graduate School. Currently, the Graduate School deposits all theses and dissertations from a given semester after the official graduation date. This means that there may be up to a 4 month delay in the appearance of a give thesis/dissertation in DRUM
More information is available at Theses and Dissertations at University of Maryland Libraries.
Browse
4 results
Search Results
Item Income Inequality, Government Welfare Effort, and Subjective Well-Being: Three Essays(2017) Livani, Talajeh; Graham, Carol; Swagel, Phillip; Public Policy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This dissertation consists of three essays on the relations of income inequality and government welfare effort with subjective well-being. The first essay introduces the concepts, reviews the literature linking income inequality and government welfare effort to subjective well-being, and identifies the research gaps. The paper concludes that the relationship between income inequality and subjective well-being is determined by how inequality is defined and what it signals. Similarly, the relationship between government welfare effort and subjective well-being is determined by factors such as ideology, quality of governance, and the magnitude of social assistance “stigma” effects. The second essay examines whether the relationship between life satisfaction and income inequality or government welfare effort differs by country income group, that is, low-income, lower middle-income, upper middle-income, and high-income countries. It further provides insight into the role of governance in mediating the relationship between inequality and life satisfaction. The essay concludes that the relationship between inequality and life satisfaction is similar (significant and negative) across all country income groups when inequality is perceived as or signals inherent unfairness. Similarly, the association between government welfare effort and life satisfaction is similar (significant and positive) across all country income groups when the government is perceived to be doing enough for the poor. Finally, it appears that confidence in national institutions and leaders may reduce the adverse effects of inequality. The final essay examines whether social protection spending is predictive of life satisfaction in Iraq, a conflict-affected and resource-rich developing country. The main finding is that there is a negative association between life satisfaction and the receipt of most types of public transfers. This negative association is mitigated and, in some cases, becomes positive for individuals in the lowest income quintiles. These patterns are also observed for families considered to be vulnerable based on region of residence and the gender of the household head. A noteworthy finding is that income assistance from private sources is also associated negatively with life satisfaction while income from property ownership and assets is associated positively with life satisfaction. This supports the idea that the source of income matters to individuals, even in the context of a conflict-affected resource-rich developing country like Iraq. This research aims to contribute to the current base of knowledge and to policy questions of interest to academia, research institutions, developing country governments, donors, and the public at large. The findings shed light on how socio-economic contexts are predictive of life satisfaction as well as on how social policies can be designed or modified to improve welfare in developing countries.Item ESSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT(2011) Douoguih, Kahwa C.; Cropper, Maureen; Ozbay, Erkut; Economics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)In an exploration of the joint concerns of economic development, namely efficiency and equality, I employ experimental methods to consider several issues regarding entrepreneurship and regulation with particular applications in developing countries. Entrepreneurship programs in developing countries may not take hold in rural populations if people there tend to shy away from competitive and uncertain economic opportunities, thus contributing to the systematic underdevelopment of rural areas. In a field experiment conducted among potential entrepreneurs in rural and urban Ghana, we found that rural subjects were 20 percent less likely than their urban counterparts to select an all-or-nothing tournament compensation scheme over a piece rate wage to per- form a simple matching task. The difference between the rural and urban tournament choice was driven by subjects who believed their own performance was the best within their group; urban subjects were twice as likely as their rural counterparts to believe that they had scored in first place and were thus more likely to select the tournament compensation. To examine behavior in a tax setting, we develop a simple tax evasion model as a signaling game between a taxpayer and an auditor that includes a non-strategic, always compliant taxpayer. In addition to the taxpayer's income report to the auditor, he has the option to send a costly message, a donation to charity that may serve as an indirect signal to the auditor of the taxpayer's ethical type. In the case where the taxpayer has misreported his income and is audited, he must pay unpaid taxes and a penalty. We establish a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium where taxpayers will use the charitable donation to signal honesty, thereby reducing the probability of audit. Auditors will optimally audit reports without charity donations more frequently than those with donations. To test our theoretical predictions, we use a two-sided signaling experiment where the taxpayer voluntarily reports his income to determine his tax liability and can make an observable and verifiable charity donation. Our aggregate experimental results indicate players employ mixed strategies in line with theoretical predictions.Item Four Essays in the Measurement of Governance Institutions(2010) Givens, David Michael; Murrell, Peter; Chao, John; Economics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This dissertation produces a new set of orthogonal governance measures based on expert assessment data. Chapter 1 constructs the measures using a factor model. Chapter 2 applies the measures to study comparative economic development. Chapter 3 conducts a number of robustness checks on results from the first two chapters. Chapter 4 uses Monte Carlo experiments to assess potential inaccuracy in my governance measures caused by the application of the maximum-likelihood estimator to polytomous data.Item ESSAYS ON COOPERATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRY INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS(2005-01-25) Thompson, Theresa Marie; Betancourt, Roger R.; Minehart, Deborah F.; Economics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)An industrial cluster is a group of firms that are specialized by sector, located in close geographic proximity and consist of mostly small and medium sized enterprises. An introduction to these clusters is provided in Chapter One. Chapter Two develops a model to examine the conditions under which clustered firms in a less developed country may cooperate in a "joint action" to market their output in a developed country, eliminating the role of an intermediary firm in the developed country. The clustered firms are heterogeneous in expected quality of output and know the quality type of other firms, but the foreign intermediary does not. The intermediary, however, has a lower marketing cost than the clustered firms. The main result of the model is that joint action can occur among high quality type firms, but the low quality firms always use the foreign intermediary to distribute their output. Chapter Three examines empirically two aspects of collective efficiency, one passive and one active, through the analysis of a survey of the surgical instrument cluster in Sialkot, Pakistan. First, I test an idea from relational contracting theory that informal relationships can substitute for formal enforcement through the judicial system. Inter-firm trust is measured as the amount of trade credit offered to customers. The results show that suppliers are more likely to offer trade credit when they believe in the effectiveness of formal contract enforcement and when they participate in business networks (proxied by inter-firm communication). Customer lock-in helps to develop inter-firm trust since firms give more credit when relationships are of longer duration. This is because locked-in customers are less able to find alternate suppliers. Chapter Three also examines the firm-level characteristics that determine the firms' interest in intra-cluster cooperation to market their own goods. The results demonstrate that firms are more likely to be interested in such initiatives once they have already had some direct experience in marketing, and when firms have a lower opportunity cost of leaving their current customers, where opportunity cost is measured by the length of the trading relationship.