UMD Theses and Dissertations
Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/3
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Item America's Commercial Cold War: Global Trade, National Security, and the Control of Markets(2019) Haddad, Ryan Issa; Sicilia, David; History; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Previous works considering the history of American trade policy during the Cold War have tended to focus on either the United States’ export control policy in the unilateral and multilateral context or the Cold War’s influence on the formation and evolution on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. While useful, these studies are limited by their narrowness. To date, no single work has emerged accounting for trade’s place in American Cold War strategy or the reciprocal impact that economic globalization and the Cold War had on each other. I argue that American Cold War trade policy was an “economic containment” exercise. The United States’ “Commercial Cold War” was conceptualized by strategists as a struggle between two rival, yet interdependent networks—one liberal and capitalist, and led by the United States; the other communist and led at the outset by the Soviet Union. The United States used trade both positively and negatively to achieve a variety of ends. Its overarching goal was to use trade to develop its network at the expense of the Soviet Union’s. This strategy assumed centralized, flexible control over trade policy in order to capitalize on diplomatic openings. Successive American presidents aspired to such trade policy control. But the diffusion of power throughout the U.S. government and across the Western alliance rendered that impossible. It proved far easier to deny East-West trade than to expand it, and more assertive American initiatives were often stymied. But despite the limits on unilateral action, the multilateral trade architectures that were established during the Cold War proved adequate to their purposes and remain in renovated form in the 21st Century.Item BARGAINING WITH THE RISING POWER: An Analytical Model of China's Trade Policy-making(2014) Xu, Susan Shan; Destler, I. M.; Public Policy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)In bilateral trade disputes with China, the US has greater aggregate power and bargaining resources, yet it had uneven success in extracting concessions. The dissertation aims to address this question: Why does American pressure encounter Chinese resistance, different in issue-topics and time period? In order to interpret China's trade policy-making, I build an analytical framework, which integrates three streams of scholarship: (1) Bounded rationality models how China, as a bounded rational player, adjusted behaviors based on its perception in the learning process; (2) The garbage can model studies the Chinese government as organized anarchies and its non-standard operation; and (3) The two-level game theory reveals how China strikes the balance between domestic bargaining and international negotiations. With the assistance of this model, I conduct a detailed case study of the Sino-American negotiations for the 1999 Bilateral Agreement on China's Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). My research reveals that China tended to yield to American threats when the Chinese reform-minded top leaders finished power transition, when trade was perceived as a solution to China's economic problems, and when the US Congress and executive branch united for credible threats. American pressure confronted strong Chinese resistance when the Chinese protectionists and nationalists had leverage so that the political cost of compliance was high for pro-trade officials, and when the Chinese perceived the divide in American commercial interests and the realignment in American political arena on China issue. Moreover, American pressure encountered less Chinese resistance in issue-topics, behind which were a politically weak industry and a ministry. By contrast, American pressure encountered strong resistance in issue-topics, behind which were a politically strong industry and agency created by long-term policy preference. Upon the case study, I argue that the effectiveness of American threats backed by trade sanctions declined. In bargaining with this rising power, the US should first discern how China perceives its self-interests and build strategic linkage of it to trade liberalization, and then employ the combination of persuasion with appeal to self-interests and tying hands by congressional pressure in bilateral trade negotiations.