Philosophy Theses and Dissertations
Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/2799
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Item Novels and Their Instances: A Metaphysical Exploration(2017) Aliev, Alexey; Levinson, Jerrold; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)What is the ontological status of novels? Are they inscriptions (i.e., concrete texts typically written or printed on something or displayed on the screen of some electronic device)? Sets of inscriptions? Mental representations of some semantic content? Structures of meanings? Syntactic sequences? Or something else? Furthermore, what is the ontological status of instances of a novel (i.e., entities that manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this novel)? Are they readings (i.e., sequences of sounds generated as a result of reading aloud)? Inscriptions? Both readings and inscriptions? Or some other entities? My goal in this dissertation is to answer these questions. The dissertation is structured as follows. In Part 1, I provide some terminological clarifications that must be made before addressing the issues concerning the ontological status of novels and their instances. In particular, in Chapter 1 ("Defining 'a Novel'"), I define "a novel," and in Chapter 2 ("Defining 'an Instance of an Artwork'"), I define "an instance of an artwork." Part 2 is aimed at clarifying the ontological status of instances of novels. I begin, in Chapter 3 ("Against Inscriptions as Instances of Novels"), by arguing against the most widely endorsed ontology of instances of novels–the ontology according to which the paradigmatic, or most typical, entities that serve as such instances are inscriptions. Next, in Chapter 4 ("An Ontology of Instances of Novels"), I put forward and defend an alternative ontology–the one according to which instances of novels are readings and mereological sums of readings and graphic elements. Finally, in Chapter 5 ("The Novel as a Performing Art"), I examine a peculiar consequence of the foregoing ontology–that the novel is a performing art. The purpose of Part 3 is to clarify the ontological status of novels. I begin, in Chapter 6 ("What a Novel Is Not"), with a critical overview of the most promising existing ontologies of novels, arguing that none of these ontologies stands up completely to criticism. Then, in Chapter 7 ("An Ontology of Novels"), I expound and defend a new ontology of novels. According to this ontology, novels are a peculiar kind of concreta–namely, concrete types composed of certain sonic, semantic, syntactic, contextualist, and visual elements.Item Internalist Deflationism: On the Limits of Ontological Investigation(2015) Vogel, Christopher A.; Pietroski, Paul M; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Since Frege(1879), the history of semantics identifies the meanings of natural language expressions with the mind external things they denote, be they pedestrian objects (e.g., cows and chairs), less pedestrian objects (e.g. mereological sums), or abstracta (e.g., sets of possible worlds). For the Quinean Realist, a language with such a semantics is fruitful for ontological investigation, insofar as analyzing the denotational meanings of (the constituents of) sentences in that language reveals which objects populate the (external) worldly domain. However, consigning meaning over to truth in this manner comes at a cost. The externalist thesis is only had by sacrificing the explanatory adequacy of our theory of meaning. Three arguments suggest this: first, facts about the rapid human acquisition of natural language suggests that languages are internal to the human mind, as an innate module in cognitive architecture; second, naturalist commitments suggest that there is no sui generis, mind-independent kind `word' to stand in the word-to-world relations posited by the externalist; third, natural languages exhibit lexical flexibility, as manifest in the distribution of natural language speaker judgments, and this property cannot be easily explained by an externalist semantics. The Realist might respond to these arguments by appealing to the languages utilized to express our best scientific theories, using those invented languages as ontological guides. Since these scientific languages are constructed with the expressed purpose of perspicuously describing reality, the Realist could contend that expressions in those languages have an externalist semantics. I argue, using examples from evolutionary biology, that scientific languages exhibit lexical flexibility as well, casting doubt on the claim that these languages have meanings that admit to externalist treatment. The Realist then should reject the metaphysical methodology which assumes the externalist thesis that the meaning of a linguistic expression determines its truth-conditions.Item The Metaphysics of Multi-Level Explanation(2013) McElhoes, David; Frisch, Mathias; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)It is widely presumed that the world exhibits hierarchical structure: that the objects of science can be arranged into levels and that some of those levels are higher than others. Organisms, on this view, are at a higher level than cells, which are at a higher level than molecules, which are at a higher level than atoms. Although it is popular, this "layered worldview" faces notable challenges. Some critics contend that it is hopelessly idealized or even ultimately incoherent. Others contend that it makes no difference to our explanatory practices and has no metaphysical or epistemic significance. I argue that these critics are mistaken. By undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the logical and metaphysical nature of hierarchical structures and their application within contemporary philosophy and ecology, I argue for three claims: that hierarchies exist (insofar as the objects of scientific discourse exist); that the domain of ecological interests is hierarchically structured in a way that is incompatible with ontological reductionism - the idea that everything in the scientific domain is, in fact, contained within the "fundamental level of reality"; and that the hierarchical structure of the world often (but not always) justifies the practice of describing, explaining, and analyzing things using hierarchical terms. My analysis begins with a review of the existing accounts of hierarchies in ecology, biology, sociology, and economics. Arguing that these accounts are inadequate, I then develop an improved account called Core Hierarchy Theory (CHT). CHT, I argue, is an improvement over its predecessors in two respects: generality and simplicity. Other accounts are either too narrow (e.g., failing to count branching hierarchies as genuine hierarchies) or make unnecessary theoretical commitments. Using a formalized version of CHT, I then prove four theorems that are relevant to well-known philosophical debates that involve hierarchies. For example, I show that two of the core metaphysical commitments of the ontological reductionist - that the higher level sciences reduce to fundamental science and that all of reality is, in fact, contained within the fundamental level - are in fact inconsistent with the most basic and unrestricted conception of hierarchical structures provided by CHT.Item Freud, Modularity, and the Principle of Charity(2010) Gibson, Joel; Rey, Georges; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Within the philosophy of mind, a `hermeneutical' tradition sees psychology as discontinuous with natural-scientific domains. A characteristic ingredient of this tendency is `normativism', which makes obedience to rational norms an a priori condition on agency. In this thesis, I advance an argument against normativism which trades on the notion of a psychological module. Specifically, I show how modules can be envisioned which, because of their high degree of irrationality, challenge the normativist's principle of charity. As an illustration, I describe such a module that incorporates key features of the Freudian `id', and I suggest that Freudian theory generally puts pressure on charity constraints. In sum, I seek to substantially undermine the hermeneutical view of the mind by attacking one of its central pillars. In Chapter 1, after setting out the essential features of hermeneuticism, I sketch the historical background of recent normativism by considering Quine's employment of charity in his theory of meaning and mind. Most centrally, I reject pragmatic and heuristic readings of Quinean charity in favor of one that sees it as a constitutive constraint on attribution. In Chapter 2, I begin to clarify the content of Davidsonian charity, against which--in the first instance--my argument levels. I identify Maximization and Threshold Principles in Davidson's early papers, contrast Davidsonian charity with Richard Grandy's Principle of Humanity, and rebut typical arguments for charity principles. In Chapter 3, after identifying two additional Davidsonian charity principles (a Competence and a Compartment Principle) and describing the conception of a module figuring in my argument, I present my argument in schematic form. Then I critique attempts to rebut my argument through excluding modular processes from the scope of normativism (notably, via a personal-subpersonal distinction). In Chapter 4, I develop my argument in detail by describing a module that embodies basic forms of Freudian wish-fulfilment and demonstrating how it violates charity principles. Further, I rebut possible objections to my use of Freudian theory. In Chapter 5, I canvass various models of Freudian phenomena more generally and suggest that a version of my argument can be run with respect to such phenomena too.Item Structuralism and Natural Philosophy: Method, Metaphysics and Explanation(2009) Cifone, Michael Christian; Bub, Jeffrey; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)This dissertation is an examination of the foundations of what I call a "fourth" tradition of analytical-scientific philosophy, the tradition of "structuralism". It is a disavowal of a metaphysics of substances and/or entities in the pursuit of scientific theory and truth. We look, in particular, at the current manifestation of this tradition, which advances the thesis of "structural realism"; we ask how tenable this thesis is, and whether we can weaken it. I argue that we should focus on methodology--a program for the formulation of scientific hypotheses about the sorts of things there are--rather than on metaphysics per se. We replace "substance" with "relation" as the basic ontic posit, and hold that substances or entities are metaphysically derivative from relational structure. Thus, the thesis is not that "there are no things" (or that "everything must go", as Ladyman et al. suppose); rather, the thesis is that the things (entities or substances) are relational structure, and there is no complete specification of an independent entity that is not itself more relational structure (so a metaphysics of substances is merely secondary to that of relational structure). I also suggest that there is no complete, unitary or monistic theory of what `structure' itself is. That is, I hold that there is no "total" structure of which everything that is relational structure is a "part", on the grounds that this would constitute an "illegitimate totality" in Russell's sense (the claim that "everything is structural" does not mean that there is a single structure which everything has--what a monistic theory of structure seems to demand). We then turn to the question of scientific explanation in light of structural realism: can there be explanation without a metaphysics of substances? I answer affirmatively. I then turn to two cases where, I argue, structuralism (and the specific thesis of structural realism) is in play regarding scientific explanation: quantum information theory, and the recent attempt to render quantum mechanics local by re-interpreting physical law time symmetrically. I conclude with a consideration of some objections to structuralism, and an articulation of the general view of metaphysics that structuralism seems to presuppose.Item It's Just Semantics: What Fiction Reveals About Proper Names(2008-04-18) Tiedke, Heidi; Pietroski, Paul M; Philosophy; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Sentences like the following entail puzzles for standard systematic theories about language: (1) Bertrand Russell smoked a pipe. (2) Sherlock Holmes smoked a pipe. Prima facie, these sentences have the same semantic structure and contain expressions of the same semantic type; the only difference between them is that they contain different proper names. Intuitively, (1) and (2) are true, but they are made true and false, respectively, in different ways. Presumably (1) is true because the individual, Bertrand Russell, has or had the property of being a pipe smoker. In contrast, (2) is true for a reason something like this: the sentence 'Holmes smokes a pipe' or an equivalent thereof, or a sentence entailing this sentence, was inscribed in the Holmes novels by Arthur Conan Doyle (2002). I show that the existence of fictional names, and the truths uttered using them, are not adequately explained by any extant account of fictional discourse. A proper explanation involves giving a semantics for names that can account for both referential and fictional uses of proper names. To this end, I argue that names should not be understood as expressions that immediately refer to objects. Rather, names should be understood as expressions that encode information about a speaker's act of introducing novel uses for them. Names are not linked to objects, but to what I call "contexts of introduction". I explain how this allows room for an explanation of fictional names, and how it also accommodates Kripkean uses of proper names.