Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland Research Works

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The Desirability and Feasibility of Strategic Trade Controls on Emerging Technologies
(Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 2023-06-22) Nancy W. Gallagher; Lindsay Rand; Devin Entrikin; Naoko Aoki
Policy problem: Policymakers must decide whether and how to regulate the development, sale, and use of emerging technologies so the security benefits outweigh the economic, technological, and political costs. They have faced that question before, so lessons can be learned from historical experience. It has never been easy to get agreement about what types of governance mechanisms are most desirable, or to implement those controls effectively enough to achieve the security objectives. Many different approaches have been tried but only some legacy arrangements could be applied to emerging technologies, while others would do more harm than good. Four features make the current iteration of the dual-use problem particularly challenging. (1) Emerging technologies are largely intangible rather than physical. (2) The private sector is now the main engine for innovation, often independent from and resistant to government control. (3) Concerns about dual-use emerging technologies expand beyond their relevance to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to their much broader utility for conventional warfighting. (4) Political and economic relations among the countries at the forefront of technology innovation are also very complex and uncertain, further complicating efforts to get agreement about what greatest security risks are, and what mix of competition and cooperation offers the most cost-effective way to reduce them. Methodology: This report employed a historical review of efforts to control dangerous dual-use technologies during and after the Cold War to identify key governance approaches and assess their effectiveness. This was followed by a socio-technical evaluation of five key emerging technologies including PNT, quantum computing, computer vision, hypersonics, and quantum sensing. The technical assessment focused on seven considerations that vary widely across different sectors to determine which strategic trade controls would be both feasible and desirable for a specific category or sub-category of emerging technology: technology makeup, fabrication process, stage of development and dispersion, dual-use applications, disruption mechanisms, stakeholder community and power distribution, and scientific promise. Key lessons for policymakers: The findings of the historical and technical survey contain important lessons for policymakers tasked with trying to manage the spread and use of emerging technologies: (1) Policymakers need to decide what the primary objective of strategic trade controls is. (2) The historical analysis shows that, even under relatively favorable geopolitical, economic, and technological conditions, any type of denial-based control effort will be a stopgap solution at best and is likely to have unintended negative consequences. (3) Using cooperative management as the primary governance approach for WMD relevant aspects of nuclear, chemical, and biological technologies has had strengths and weaknesses, too. (4) The socio-technological characteristics of critical emerging technology fields indicate that getting multi-stakeholder agreement on denial-based controls will be harder, implementation will be more challenging, and the outcomes will be less stable than they were in the past
Iranian Public Opinion after the Protests
(CISSM, 2018-07-09) Gallagher, Nancy; Mohseni, Ebrahim; Ramsay, Clay
Summary of Findings 1. More Iranians See Economy as Bad and Getting Worse Growing majorities say Iran’s economic situation is bad and getting worse. Less than a fifth now say the economic condition of their family has improved over the last four years. Most say economic mismanagement and corruption are having a greater negative impact than sanctions. Unemployment remains the top concern of the Iranian people. They are divided on whether the next generation will be better off financially than their parents are today. 2. Approval of Nuclear Deal Drops as Disappointment with its Benefits Rises Enthusiasm for the JCPOA has dropped significantly. Slightly more than half approve of the agreement, while a third oppose it. Two years into the implementation of the deal, majorities believe Iran has not received most of the promised benefits and that people’s living conditions have not been improved by the nuclear deal. An overwhelming majority says the deal did not improve Iran’s relations with the United States, but are more positive about its effect on relations with Europe. As Rouhani’s administration steps up its efforts to defend the deal against its domestic opponents, public misperceptions about the terms of the deal have undergone a revival. Clear majorities incorrectly believe that per the agreement, all U.S. sanctions on Iran must eventually be lifted, and that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is not allowed to inspect Iranian military sites under any circumstances. Most Iranians still believe that it is important for Iran to develop its nuclear program, although the percentage that is very supportive has decreased slightly since the JCPOA was signed. 3. Increasing Majority Supports Retaliation if U.S. Abrogates JCPOA Attitudes about how Iran should respond if the United States violates the JCPOA have hardened. A growing majority says that were the United States to abrogate the deal, Iran should retaliate by restarting the aspects of its nuclear program it has agreed to suspend under the JCPOA rather than taking the matter to the UN. A modest majority says Iran should withdraw if the United States withdraws, even if other P5+1 countries remain committed to the deal. Most Iranians, however, would support their government if it decides that remaining in the deal is in Iran’s best interest. 4. Staunch Resistance to Renegotiating the Nuclear Deal with Trump Large majorities say that Iran should refuse to increase the duration of the special nuclear limits it accepted under the JCPOA or to stop developing more advanced missiles, even if the United States threatens to re-impose sanctions lifted under the JCPOA or offers to lift more sanctions. 5. Majority Rejects Halting Development of Missiles An overwhelming majority thinks it is important for Iran to develop missiles, primarily to defend Iran, deter attacks, and increase Iran’s security. Large majorities say Iran should continue testing ballistic missiles despite U.S. demands for Iran to halt such tests. 6. Views of P5+1 Countries Iranians’ views of all the P5+1 countries besides the United States have improved, and a clear majority expresses confidence that these countries will uphold their end of the JCPOA. Majorities now regard Russia, China, Germany, and even France favorably, but retain negative views of the United States and Britain. For the first time, a majority now says they have an unfavorable view of the American people as well as of their government. A majority believes that Iranian relations with European countries have improved due to the deal; almost no one says that about the United States. Far from showing implacable hostility toward the West, a majority continues to think it is possible for the Islamic world and the West to find common ground, though the number who say conflict between the two is inevitable has increased. 7. Majority Sees No Value in Negotiations; Support for Self-Sufficiency Grows Two in three say the JCPOA experience shows that it is not worthwhile to make concessions as part of international negotiations, because Iran cannot have confidence that world powers would honor their sides of an agreement. Accordingly, an increasing majority thinks Iran should strive to achieve economic self-sufficiency rather than focus on increasing its trade with other countries. Willingness to compromise and make reciprocal concessions is higher among those who think the nuclear deal has improved the living conditions of ordinary Iranians, as well as those who voice confidence that the United States will abide by its side of the agreement. 8. Strong Sympathy with Complaints about Economic Policies and Corruption During late December 2017 and early January 2018, large street protests took place across Iran. These protests were organized by different groups of people for varying reasons. To see what proportion of the Iranian population sympathizes with each type of protest, this study asked respondents to indicate the degree to which they sympathized with each of the complaints voiced. Large majorities say they sympathize with complaints voiced by some protestors that the government should do more to keep food and gasoline prices from rising; not cut cash subsidies; and compensate people who lost money when some financial institutions in Iran collapsed. They also agree that the government is not doing enough to help the poor and farmers who are suffering as a result of the drought. Iranians are also almost unanimous in their demand that more should be done to fight financial and bureaucratic corruption in Iran. 9. Majorities Disagree with Protestors who Critiqued Iran’s Domestic Political System and Foreign Operations Three in four disagree that Iran’s political system needs to undergo fundamental change. Two in three also disagree with the view that the government interferes too much in people’s personal lives; indeed, six in ten reject the idea that the government should not strictly enforce Islamic laws. As in the past, about three in four believe that when making decisions, Iranian policymakers should take religious teachings into account. Clear majorities also reject other complaints voiced by some protestors—that the military should spend much less on developing missiles, and that Iran’s current level of involvement in Iraq and Syria is not in Iran’s national interests. U.S. expressions of support for protests were generally regarded as irrelevant or unhelpful. 10. Majority Approves of Police Handling of the Protests Two in three approve of how the police handled the protests and say they used an appropriate amount of force. Views about how arrested protestors should be treated depend on how they acted. Almost two in three think that protestors who were arrested while peacefully voicing their complaints against government policies should be released. A smaller majority wants protestors who accidentally injured bystanders to be prosecuted, but not punished harshly. Most Iranians want the judiciary to prosecute protestors who chanted slogans against Islam or Iran’s system of government, but only a minority demand harsh punishment. About six in ten want the judiciary to prosecute and harshly punish those who are found guilty of attacking the police, damaging public property, or burning Iran’s flag. 11. Media Consumption Habits Majorities follow news regarding domestic and international affairs. Domestic television, followed by social networking apps, such as Telegram, and the internet are the media used by a majority of Iranians to become informed about the news. The numbers of people relying on VOA and BBC news programs have declined significantly since the rise of social media in Iran. 12. A Range of Views on Regional Issues About half of Iranians say their government should try to find mutually acceptable solutions to regional problems, and the other half say that Iran should seek to become the most powerful country in the region. A large majority says Iran should either increase or maintain its current level of support for groups fighting terrorist groups like ISIS. Most Iranians want Iran to use its influence in Iraq to support policies that benefit both Shiites and Sunnis, rather than policies that primarily benefit Shiites. Now that Iran and Russia have declared victory over ISIS in Syria, almost as many Iranians want to end or reduce assistance to President Bashar Assad as want to continue it until his government regains full control over all Syrian territory. An overwhelming majority reject the idea that Assad should not be allowed to remain as Syria’s president and say the Syrian people should decide whether he remains in office. 13. General Soleimani’s Popularity Soars, while Rouhani and Zarif Slip General Qasem Soleimani’s popularity is at an all-time high, with two in three saying that they hold a very favorable opinion of him. He is followed in popularity by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, whose favorability rating has decreased slightly since June 2017. President Rouhani’s popularity has dropped sharply since his victory in the May 2017 presidential elections. Opinions of Ebrahim Raisi, Rouhani’s conservative opponent in the election, have held steady. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s former president, remains the most polarizing figure among Iranian politicians. 14. Majority Sees Climate Change as a Very Serious Problem Iranians almost unanimously see global climate change as a serious issue and a majority says these changes are harming people around the world today. Two in three say they are very concerned that climate change will affect them personally. A large majority wants the government to do more to protect the environment, even if the economy suffers as a result. Two in three say they approve of Iran taking steps to significantly reduce its air pollution over the next 15 years, even if it leads to higher prices and unemployment rates in the short-term.
Balancing Belligerents or Feeding the Beast: Transforming Conflict Traps
(2018-02-26) Hayden, Nancy
Even as the threat of international conflict between great powers re-emerges, violent civil conflict remains one of the greatest threats to human security and global stability. Persistent conflicts – those that have been active for twenty years or more – resulted in 65 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide at the end of 2017. This record high is an increase of 20 percent from the previous year. In Africa alone, more than 35 such conflicts continue to pose the utmost challenge for conflict resolution despite investments of over a trillion dollars in peacebuilding and foreign aid by the international community. The spread of extremist threats through conflicts across the Middle East and Africa—e.g., Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo–demonstrate that ignoring these conflicts is not an option. Creating the right balance and coordination among security assistance, military peace operations, humanitarian relief aid, and long-term peacebuilding remains an elusive goal. Are these intervention failures due to unsuitable policies and practices, to the fundamental intractability of the conflicts, or some combination of both? This question is the subject of many academic and policy studies. However, most studies of when, where, and how to intervene are limited in perspective, and fail to assess the combined effects of different types of interventions on human security over time. Practitioners and policy makers recognize that lifting social and political systems out of the “conflict trap” requires a systems approach. Such an approach holistically considers the nature and context of the conflict, in conjunction with the scope, timing, and dynamic interactions among different modes and types of interventions. Using twenty-five years of comparative data on persistent conflicts in Africa, supplemented by a case study of Somalia, this brief presents a scalable systems framework to (1) examine the relationship between conflict persistence and factors associated with conflict contexts, peacekeeping and aid interventions, and (2) identify the underlying principles and practices for those conflict interventions most likely to result in conflict transformation that increases human security, and those most likely to sustain conflict.
Arms Control as Uncertainty Management
(2018-04-23) Nelson, Amy
For decades or longer, policy-makers have sought to use arms control to reduce the uncertainty endemic to the international security environment. Because uncertainty is pervasive in these situations, however, practitioners themselves are naturally vulnerable to its effects. This paper seeks to help policy-makers optimize arms control outcomes by providing improved theory and best practices for goal-setting and strategy selection using the judicious application of decision theoretic concepts. The paper first lays out a suitable role for decision theory in the study and analysis of arms control, arguing that “uncertainty” is a more appropriate concept for description and analysis here than is “risk.” Prior approaches that rely on “risk” have tended to drive the search for arms control best practices, but “risk” requires the use of probability estimates that are frequently not available or not a good indicator of potential outcomes. Second, the paper argues that decision-makers are vulnerable to the effects of missing information and the uncertainty it causes in the run-up to and during arms control negotiations. Consequently, they are subject to biases and resort to the use of security-specific heuristics, including worst-case scenario thinking, limited-theater-of-war thinking, and low-dimension (or non-complex) thinking when setting goals and employing strategies for negotiating arms control agreements. The paper discusses the origins of this uncertainty and the strategies that states could employ as a result of these security-specific heuristics, arguing that they can best be grouped into two types—risk reduction versus uncertainty management. Finally, the paper makes recommendations for optimizing outcomes—for getting efficient negotiations that result in robust, durable agreements, capable of managing uncertainty about security, despite the effects of missing information.
Building Confidence in the Cybersphere: A Path to Multilateral Progress
(2018-03-31) Hitchens, Theresa; Gallagher, Nancy
As use of the Internet has become critical to global economic development and international security, there is near-unanimous agreement on the need for more international cooperation to increase stability and security in cyberspace. Several multilateral initiatives over the last five years have begun to spell out cooperative measures, norms of behavior, and transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) that could help improve mutual cybersecurity. These efforts have been painstakingly slow, and some have stalled due to competing interests. Nonetheless, a United Nations (UN) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) have achieved some high-level agreement on principles, norms, and “rules of the road” for national Internet activities and transnational cyber interactions. Their agreements include commitments to share more information, improve national protective capacities, cooperate on incident response, and restrain certain destabilizing state practices. Voluntary international agreements are worth little, unless states implement their commitments. So far, implementation has been crippled by vague language, national security considerations, complex relations between public and private actors in cyberspace, and privacy concerns. This is particularly true regarding the upfront sharing of information on threats and the willingness of participants to cooperate on incident investigations, including identifying perpetrators. With multilateral forums struggling to find a way forward with norm-setting and implementation, alternate pathways are needed to protect and build on what has been accomplished so far. Different strategies can help advance implementation of measures in the UN and OSCE agreements. Some commitments, such as establishing and sharing information about national points of contact, are best handled unilaterally or through bilateral or regional inter-governmental cooperation. Other objectives, such as protecting the core architecture and functions of the Internet that support trans-border critical infrastructure and underpin the global financial system, require a multi-stakeholder approach that includes not only governments but also private sector service providers, academic experts, and nongovernmental organizations. This paper compares what the GGE and OSCE norm-building processes have achieved so far and what disagreements have impeded these efforts. It identifies several priorities for cooperation identified by participants in both forums. It also proposes three practical projects related to these priorities that members of regional or global organizations might be able to work on together despite political tensions and philosophical disputes. The first would help state and non-state actors share information and communicate about various types of cybersecurity threats using a flexible and intuitive effects-based taxonomy to categorize cyber activity. The second would develop a more sophisticated way for state and non-state actors to assess the risks of different types of cyber incidents and the potential benefits of cooperation. The third would identify aspects of the Internet that might be considered the core of a public utility, worthy of special protection in their own right and for their support of trans-border critical infrastructure.
A Proposed Hierarchical Taxonomy for Assessing the Primary Effects of Cyber Events: A Sector Analysis 2014-2016
(2018-02-28) Harry, Charles
Publicity surrounding the threat of cyber-attacks continues to grow, yet immature classification methods for these events prevent technical staff, organizational leaders, and policy makers from engaging in meaningful and nuanced conversations about the risk to their organizations or critical infrastructure. This paper provides a taxonomy of cyber events that is used to analyze over 2,431 publicized cyber events from 2014-2016 by industrial sector. Industrial sectors vary in the scale of events they are subjected to, the distribution between exploitive and disruptive event types, and the method by which data is stolen or organizational operations are disrupted. The number, distribution, and mix of cyber event types highlight significant differences by sector, demonstrating that strategies may vary based on deeper understandings of the threat environment faced across industries.
Future Challenges for Israel’s Iron Dome Rocket Defenses
(2018-02-16) Kattan, Ari
After Hezbollah fired thousands of rockets at northern Israel during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, the Israeli government began a crash program to find a technological solution to the rocket threat. The result was Iron Dome, which shot down its first rocket on April 7, 2011, and saw large-scale combat during wars in 2012 and 2014. The system has been hailed in Israel and worldwide as a success, with the Israeli military claiming a 90 percent interception rate. Some American defense commentators have even touted Iron Dome as evidence in favor of ballistic missile defense. However, serious questions remain about Iron Dome’s true technical efficacy, both in terms of its past performance and how it is likely to perform in the future under different conditions. Because so much about Iron Dome is classified, information provided by the Israeli military cannot be independently verified. Analyses performed by outside experts—both those questioning Iron Dome’s efficacy and those defending the Israeli government’s claims—are inconclusive. Assuming for the sake of argument that Iron Dome did, in fact, perform as advertised during its previous engagements, it is far from certain that it will be as successful in future engagements, where the volume of rocket fire will be higher and the rockets more accurate. This paper argues that Israel may have already reached “peak Iron Dome,” and the system’s military and political benefits will decrease in future wars until another technological breakthrough is made on rocket defense. This is not to say that Iron Dome was not worth the cost and should not have been procured. But expectations about Iron Dome from the Israeli military, Israeli civilians, and interested parties abroad should be tempered. If they are not, Iron Dome’s decreased success rate in future wars may pose political problems for Israel domestically and give Israel’s adversaries a decisive propaganda victory.
The NATO/US-Turkey-Russia Strategic Triangle: Challenges Ahead
(2018-01-16) Goren, Nilsu
Turkey and NATO are experiencing a mutual crisis of confidence. Turkish policy makers lack confidence in NATO guarantees and fear abandonment—both prominent historical concerns. At the same time, policy makers within the alliance have begun to question Turkey’s intentions and future strategic orientation, and how well they align with NATO’s. One important factor contributing to this mistrust is Turkey’s recent dealings with Russia. Turkey is trying to contain Russian military expansion in the Black Sea and Syria by calling for a stronger NATO presence at the same time that is seeking to diversify its security strategy by improving ties with Russia and reducing its dependence on the United States and NATO. Turkey’s contradictory stance is no more apparent than in its evolving policy regarding the Syrian civil war. The threat topography of NATO’s southern flank reflects a complex web of state and non-state actors involved in asymmetric warfare. The Turkish shoot down of a Russian jet in 2015 highlighted the complexity and helped to precipitate military dialogue between NATO and Russia in Syria. Since then, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan seem to have overcome their strategic differences in their preferred outcome for Syria and have de-escalated the tensions following several rounds of peace talks headed by Russia, Turkey, and Iran and involving some, but not all, factions involved in the Syrian conflict. Yet several important questions about Turkish security policy and its impact on Turkish-U.S./NATO relations remain. What are the security implications of Turkey’s military actions on the southern flank? How is the continued fight against extremism in the region, including ISIS, likely to affect relations? And how should the West respond to Turkey’s security ties with Russia, including the Russian sale of advance military equipment to Ankara? The answers to all of these questions depend in part on whether Turkey’s behavior with Russia in Syria is a tactical move or a strategic shift away from NATO. Understanding these dynamics is key to devising policies and actions to minimize security risks between the U.S., NATO, and Russia. This paper argues that Turkey has economic and political interests in developing closer relations with Russia, but that these interests are not as strong as Turkey’s strategic alliance with the West, and NATO in particular. Turkish policymakers, who lack confidence in NATO, are pursuing short-term security interests in Syria as a way to leverage Western acquiescence to their interests regarding the Kurdish populations in Syria and Iraq. These objectives, however, are not aligned with Russia’s security objectives and do not add up to a sustainable long-term regional security strategy. In the short term, Turkey’s contradictory approaches to relations with NATO and Russia are likely to lead to ambiguity and confusion in the regional security architecture, with Syria being the most visible example of this disarray. To combat this approach, U.S. leadership and NATO should work to convince Turkey that the alliance takes Turkish security concerns in Syria seriously and to minimize the risks of Turkey’s acts as a spoiler in the region. For instance, addressing Turkish concerns over Washington’s arming of the Kurdish rebel group, the YPG, in northern Syria, will go a long way to resolving the key issue motivating Turkey’s decision to partner with Russia.
Contrasting Russian Perspectives on Coercion and Restraint in Russia’s Security Relations with the West
(2017-12-21) Loukianova Fink, Anya
This discussion paper analyzes a sample of 2014-2016 Russian-language publications focused on Russia’s security relations with the United States. It characterizes the Russian expert debate at that time as dichotomous in nature, where security policy analysts proposed either coercive or restrained policy approaches in dealing with perceived threats. It assesses similarities and differences of these two perspectives with regard to the nature of Russia’s political-military relationship with the West, as well as past challenges and then-future opportunities in nuclear arms control and strategic stability.
KEDO: How Multilateral Cooperation Helped an Unprecedented North Korean Project
(2017-09-07) Aoki, Naoko
In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, in which Pyongyang promised to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for energy aid and improvement of relations with Washington. An international consortium led by the United States was created to implement the key provisions of the deal, including the delivery of two light water reactor (LWR) units. While multi-national efforts are common in commercial nuclear projects, the case of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was unique. KEDO’s challenges ranged from the lack of diplomatic relations between its main members and North Korea, to the country’s poor infrastructure. This paper examines KEDO’s experience and concludes that cooperation among its member states—Japan, South Korea, the United States and others—helped ensure the project’s financial and political feasibility, even if work did not proceed smoothly. While the construction of the LWRs was never completed due to larger political changes, KEDO’s experience offers lessons for future nuclear projects that face similar hurdles.
OSCE Principles in Practice: Testing Their Effect on Security Through the Work of Max van der Stoel, First High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993–2001
(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-01-01) Yamamoto, Mariana
This monograph tests the OSCE approach to security. The OSCE approach to security encompasses all areas that can cause tensions and conflict between States, and is the result of a sustained effort by almost all of the world’s democracies on how to achieve both security and individual freedom. An important basis of the OSCE security concept is that international security cannot be achieved without the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms. The study first extracts from official OSCE documents a set of principles designed to achieve international security, and then uses the work of the first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Max van der Stoel, to test the effectiveness of the principles in practice. From 1993 to 2001, HCNM Max van der Stoel applied OSCE principles in cases involving minority tensions with a high potential for international conflict, and this experience provided the means to assess the practical effects on security when OSCE principles are implemented. The study examined three cases that involved potential conflict: Ukraine and separatism in Crimea; Estonia and tensions regarding the Russian minority; and Macedonia and tensions regarding the Albanian minority. The study found that in each of the three cases, the implementation of OSCE principles reduced national and international tensions involving minority issues, and increased security. The increase in security was seen within each State, between States, and in the region, and reduced the potential for conflict within and between OSCE States. The results were particularly significant in view of the instability, conflicts, and tensions of the post–Cold War period; the OSCE’s ongoing institutionalization during the period; and the limited resources and tools available to the OSCE and the HCNM. The study identified and articulated twenty OSCE security principles that addressed national and international security. The principles addressed the rights and responsibilities of State sovereignty; a comprehensive, cooperative, and common security approach; the prevention of security threats and the peaceful resolution of issues; the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms through democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy; rights and responsibilities pertaining to national minorities; the development and advancement of shared values; and processes and mechanisms. The monograph extended the research on the OSCE principles to express an OSCE security concept. The OSCE security concept is a security framework based on the idea that security depends on the development and implementation of principles guiding three areas: how States deal with each other and resolve problems; the protection and promotion of individual rights within States; and the processes and mechanisms to review and advance values, principles, and commitments. The study showed that the implementation of OSCE principles in Ukraine, Estonia, and Macedonia significantly increased security in those three countries and the OSCE region. The study found that the OSCE principles and the OSCE security concept constitute a significant body of thought and practice regarding security, and respect for the individual. The OSCE principles, the OSCE security concept, and the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities merit further examination, development, and application to national security policy and practice. The application to national security policy and practice is relevant to all security threats and problems.
Terrorism Against Democracy
(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-01-01) Yamamoto, Marianna
This monograph approaches the problem of terrorism from the perspective of the process of a terrorist attack; that is, how terrorism is intended to “operate.” Comprehension of the intended process of the terrorist attack can help defeat terrorists, reduce terrorism, and avoid the damage that can result from poor responses to attacks. Part I of the monograph analyzes terrorism. Chapter 1 analyzes what terrorism is, and what kinds of acts are and are not terrorism. Chapter 2 analyzes the ways that terrorism is intended to operate on third-parties—the governments, organizations, individuals, and groups from which terrorists seek to elicit responses. Chapter 3 analyzes the causes of terrorism, and the threats that terrorism poses. Part II addresses what to do about terrorism—how to prevent terrorism, respond effectively to attacks, and defeat terrorists. Analysis of the steps of the terrorist attack shows that terrorism can be prevented and countered at each step. The monograph then addresses a general counterterrorism strategy. The monograph uses the Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model as a guide to comprehending terrorism and how to combat it. The model illustrates the steps of the terrorist attack, and shows how terrorism is intended to operate. Adapted forms of the model show different aspects of terrorism such as the role of the media in terrorist attacks, and why people choose to use terrorism. The model can be used to identify ways to prevent terrorist attacks, respond effectively if they occur, and reduce the use of terrorism. The model has other uses, such as to identify the characteristics of terrorism. These characteristics can show the differences between terrorism and other forms of political violence, and can be used to analyze incidents to determine whether or not they are acts of terrorism. The model helps identify which characteristics must be included in any definition of terrorism, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of different definitions, and develop accurate and useful definitions. Appendices address the definition of terrorism, the problems involved with trying to obtain agreement on a definition of terrorism, and analysis of arguments that have been made to try to justify terrorist attacks. Analysis shows that terrorism can be accurately defined in more than one way, that obstacles to obtaining a widely agreed-upon definition can be overcome, and that none of the arguments that terrorists and their supporters use to try to justify terrorism are valid. The impetus to prepare this monograph came from Admiral Stansfield Turner’s course, “Terrorism & Democracy,” which he taught from 2002–2006 in response to the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2001. During the period that he taught the course, he encouraged the development of a number of the principles in the monograph and included them in his course, and until his retirement was involved with many aspects of the monograph.
Terrorism-- A Brief Explanation
(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-01-01) Yamamoto, Marianna
This information paper presents a simplified explanation of terrorism. The paper uses three methods to convey a basic understanding of terrorism. The paper first explains “victim-target differentiation,” the primary method of operation used in terrorist attacks. Victim-target differentiation (the strategy of attacking people or property in order to get other people to take some kind of action) is a concept that is not always clearly understood, and is essential to the comprehension of terrorism. The use of victim-target differentiation makes terrorism more complex than most forms of political violence, and more difficult to counter. Second, the paper explains terrorism by following and analyzing the steps of the terrorist attack. Analyzing each step shows how terrorism operates, and establishes the basis for counterterrorism efforts. The paper uses the Turner-Yamamoto Terrorism Model to illustrate the steps of the terrorist attack and show how terrorism is intended to operate. The model can also serve as a guide to comprehending terrorism and how to combat it. The model can be used to identify ways to prevent terrorist attacks, respond effectively if they occur, and reduce the use of terrorism. The paper then uses the analysis of the terrorist attack as a way to evaluate specific incidents to determine whether or not they are acts of terrorism. Using specific examples can help put the characteristics of terrorism into perspective, and can help individuals be better prepared to combat terrorism more effectively. This info paper was developed from the CISSM monograph, Terrorism Against Democracy, 2015. The monograph is based in part on Admiral Stansfield Turner’s course, “Terrorism & Democracy,” which he taught from 2002–2006 in response to the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2001.
Expanding Nuclear Weapons State Transparency to Strengthen Nonproliferation
(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-03-12) Siegel, Jonas
In the years since the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, NPT nuclear weapons states have engaged in consequential transparency measures about their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials. The level of transparency thus far achieved, however, has proven uneven in terms of the types and amounts of information released and in terms of the frequency of those releases—and most importantly, has not contributed significantly to fulfillment of these states NPT commitments. Nuclear weapons states should reassess the scope of their transparency efforts to date and consider expanding the types of information that they reveal to provide international assurances and achieve gains in support of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This paper identifies particular steps that these states could take to fulfill the desire for greater transparency that move beyond declarations of the number and status of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. In particular, it focuses on how transparency can be expanded about the operational practices and protocols that govern the day-to-day management of their military nuclear materials—their warheads, weapons components, and material stockpiles—and how transparency in this area would contribute to fulfilling their disarmament and nonproliferation commitments.
Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations
(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-06-23) Gallagher, Nancy; Mohseni, Ebrahim; Ramsay, Clay
As the marathon negotiation between Iran and the P5+1 countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) nears its third self-imposed deadline on June 30, many around the world wonder if this round of negotiations is going to resolve all remaining issues, and if so, whether the officials involved are going to be able to sell the deal they have worked out back in their own capitals. As to whether or not a deal will be reached, diplomats from Iran as well as the P5+1 countries have consistently been cautiously optimistic. While all sides indicate that they are committed to reaching a deal by the June 30 deadline, recent reports suggest that gaps remain between concrete positions on the main elements of a deal. And as negotiators struggle with various elements of the deal outside their capitals, there is significant controversy inside the capitals on what would constitute a “good deal.” The U.S. Congress has passed legislation giving Congress at least a month to review the details of any agreement reached before President Obama could waive any congressionally imposed sanctions on Iran. Lawmakers and officials in Tehran have been pressing their case that any deal that would not result in speedy termination of sanctions or would open Iran’s sensitive non-nuclear military and security installations to Iran-specific inspections is unacceptable. To better understand the domestic political environments that constrain how much negotiating room the key players have, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has conducted several studies of American and Iranian public opinion on the nuclear negotiations. Its first study of American public opinion, “Americans on Negotiations with Iran,” was conducted in collaboration with the Program for Public Consultation in July 2014, followed by another study which was released on March 3, 2015. Both of these reports are available at www.cissm.umd.edu. CISSM also conducted a study of Iranian public opinion on the nuclear negotiations in collaboration with the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) in July 2014, focusing mostly on the steps Iran would be willing to take in return for removal of unilateral and multilateral sanctions, and published the results of that study on September 17, 2014. The current study was conducted after Iran and the P5+1 reached an understanding regarding the main elements of the final deal in Lausanne, Switzerland. It seeks to illuminate the specific views and preferences of Iranian citizens regarding the ongoing nuclear negotiations, their support for a deal along the lines of the framework understanding, their assumptions regarding the elements of the final deal, and their expectations from a deal. This study also explores a broad range of Iranian political preferences and attitudes that shape the context in which the nuclear negotiations are occurring.
The OSCE Security Concept
(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-08-01) Yamamoto, Marianna
The OSCE security concept is a theoretical and operational framework based on the idea that international and domestic security depend on principles guiding three areas: how States deal with each other and resolve problems; the protection and promotion of individual rights within States; and the processes to develop, implement, and advance agreements regarding the principles. The OSCE security concept is based on principles that OSCE States began to develop in 1975 with the Helsinki Final Act, and continued to develop over the next decades and into the 21st century. This brief identifies and articulates the OSCE security principles by analyzing a series of official documents adopted by the OSCE States from 1975 to 2001. The concept was described in greater length in the CISSM monograph, OSCE Principles in Practice, which also tested the practical application of the principles in three case studies. The monograph then extended the research on OSCE principles to express an OSCE security concept. As a concept based on principles developed by democratic States, the OSCE security concept has significant policy implications. One highlighted in this brief is that international security cannot be achieved without the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms.
A Framework for Categorizing Disruptive Cyber Activity and Assessing its Impact
(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-08-04) Harry, Charles
While significant media attention has been given to the volume and range of cyber attacks, the inability to measure and categorize disruptive events has complicated efforts of policy makers to push comprehensive responses that address the range of cyber activity. While organizations and public officials have spent significant time and resources attempting to grapple with the complex nature of these threats, a systematic and comprehensive approach to categorize and measure disruptive attacks remains elusive. This paper addresses this issue by differentiating between exploitive and disruptive cyber events, proposes a formal method to categorize five types of disruptive events, and measures their impact along three dimensions of analysis. Scope, magnitude, and duration of disruptive cyber events are analyzed to locate each event on a Cyber Disruption Index (CDI) so organizations and policymakers can estimate the aggregated effect of a malicious act aimed at impacting their operations. Using the five different event classes and the CDI estimation method makes it easier for organizations and policy makers to disaggregate a complex topic, contextualize and process individual threats to their network, target where increased investment can reduce the risk of specific disruptive cyber events, and distinguish between events that represent a private-sector problem from those that merit a more serious public-sector concern.
Forwarding Multilateral Space Governance: Next Steps for the International Community
(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-08-06) Hitchens, Theresa
Over the past decade, concerns about ensuring sustainability and security in outer space have led the international community to pursue a range of governance initiatives. Governance issues regarding the use of space are complicated because of the physical realities of the space environment and because of the legal status of space as a global resource. As the number of space users grows and the types of activities in space expand, competition for access to space will only continue to grow. Different space actors have different priorities and perceptions regarding space challenges. As more and more militaries around the world turn to space assets, the potential development of counterspace weapons also increases tensions. Ongoing multilateral work on space governance has concentrated primarily on voluntary measures. There are currently three major multilateral governance initiatives in the field. The three—the EU Code of Conduct, the COPUOS Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidencebuilding measures—are related to each other, but each aims to address slightly different aspects of the governance problem. This paper reviews these initiatives and elucidates ways to forward their progress, for instance, by fully implementing the GGE recommendations, including a review of implementation of the Outer Space Treaty, the establishment of national focal points for data exchange, and by fully implementing the UN Registry. It also looks to identify additional steps beyond current activities at the multilateral level for establishing a foundational space governance framework, including institutionalizing the UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines; establishing a public space situational awareness database; and examining ways to move forward discussion on active debris removal, national legal obligations regarding military activities, and space traffic management.
Assessing the Iran Deal
(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-09-01) Gallagher, Nancy; Mohseni, Ebrahim; Ramsay, Clay
On July 14, 2015, after two years of negotiations, the United States, the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and Iran announced they had reached agreement on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran’s nuclear program. On July 20 the Security Council endorsed the agreement unanimously. Under terms agreed between the U.S. Congress and the White House, Congress has until September 17th to disapprove the JCPOA if it wants to prevent President Obama from suspending U.S. nuclear sanctions after Iran fulfills its nuclear commitments. Thus an intense debate is underway. Advocates on both sides have been making their appeals to the American public at a volume, and with a forcefulness, seen in foreign policy issues only a few times a decade. After the initial rollout of the agreement—a phase in which the White House essentially held the floor—critics of the agreement have been widely heard, both in and out of Congress. Media polls have been sporadic and inconsistent. In polls that offer respondents the opportunity to say that they do not have enough information to say, approximately half take it. In this case, the minority opposing the deal tends to outweigh those favoring it. In some polls that give respondents minimal information about the basic outlines of the deal, majorities have approved of it. Apparently Americans have low levels of information and their responses are affected by minimal inputs. Citizen Cabinet surveys are not meant to simply be another poll. Rather the goal is to find out what a representative panel of registered voters recommends when they are given a briefing and hear arguments for and against the key options. The process they go through is called a ‘policymaking simulation,’ in that the goal is to put the respondent into the shoes of a policymaker. The content of the simulation is vetted with Congressional staffers and other experts to assure accuracy and balance. Earlier Citizen Cabinet surveys on the Iran deal focused on the central debate at the time as to whether the US should make a deal based on allowing Iran limited uranium enrichment with intrusive inspections or if it should seek to ramp up economic sanctions in an effort to get Iran to give up its enrichment program entirely. Arguments for both options were found convincing but in the end, in February, 61% in a national Citizen Cabinet recommended in favor of making the deal. In June Citizen Cabinet surveys in three states (Oklahoma, Maryland, and Virginia) went through the same process but with more detail about the draft agreement. In all states seven in ten recommended the deal over ramping up sanctions. In the current Citizen Cabinet survey the simulation focused much more deeply on the terms of the deal, especially the terms that have been highly criticized by Members of Congress. Panelists were first briefed on the origins of the international dispute over Iran’s nuclear program and the main issues during the negotiations and given a detailed summary of the agreement’s main features. Then panelists evaluated a series of critiques—some general, some quite specific—prominent in the Congressional debate, and assessed a rebuttal offered for each. Panelists then assessed proposals for three alternative courses of action that have been proposed, evaluating arguments for and against each and also assessing each one’s chances of success. Finally panelists were asked what they would recommend to their member of Congress—to approve the deal, or disapprove of it, and, if the latter, what alternative course to take.
Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Agreement
(Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, 2015-09-09) Gallagher, Nancy; Mohseni, Ebrahim; Ramsay, Clay
The current study was conducted shortly after the JCPOA was released and approved by the U.N. Security Council. The survey seeks to understand how attitudes and expectations have changed since the nuclear deal was achieved. It also explores the relationship between Iranians’ assumptions about the terms of the deal, their expectations about its benefits and risks, and their attitudes toward their current political leaders, the United States, and the other countries in the negotiations. These assumptions, expectations, and attitudes set the context in which Iranian leaders will decide whether or not to approve the deal. They are also likely to influence how Iranian policymakers and the public respond to whatever actions the United States takes as it reviews the JCPOA and reassesses its policies towards Iran. The telephone poll of 1,000 Iranians was conducted August 8-18, 2015, by IranPoll.com, an independent, Toronto-based polling organization, for the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. The margin of error was +/- 3.2%. Full Report | Questionnaire and frequency tables. Summary of Findings 1. Iran - P5+1 Nuclear Agreement Vast majorities of Iranians approve of the nuclear agreement that was reached between Iran and the P5+1 countries in Vienna, whereas only a fifth disapprove of it. While about a third sees the agreement as mostly a victory for Iran, over four in ten see it as beneficial for both Iran and the P5+1, though Iran is perceived to have made fewer concessions. Iranians overwhelmingly approve of the performance of their negotiators. A majority of Iranians are optimistic that both the UN Security Council and the United States are likely to act in good faith and remove sanctions as the deal requires. Nevertheless, three in four continue to believe that the Majlis (Iran’s parliament) should be able to prevent the agreement from taking effect if it finds the terms to be at odds with Iran’s national interests. Also, almost all Iranians continue to believe that it is very important for Iran to develop its nuclear program. 2. Views of Rouhani As a result of the nuclear agreement, a large majority says it now has a better opinion of President Hassan Rouhani. As Iran’s parliamentary elections near, three in five Iranians now want Rouhani’s supporters to win, while only about one in five favor his critics. President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s already high approval ratings have risen even more since the agreement was reached while their opponents’ popularity has declined slightly. 3. Misperceptions about the Nuclear Agreement While Iranians have a positive view of the nuclear agreement, they also underestimate the scope and extent of the commitments Iran has made under the deal. Substantial majorities incorrectly believe that according to the agreement: -all U.S. sanctions, not just nuclear-related ones—will be lifted eventually; - the sanctions on Iran will start to be lifted either before or at the same time as Iran takes most of the steps it has agreed to take under the deal; -Iran has not agreed to any limitations on its nuclear research and development activities; -the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cannot inspect Iranian military sites under any conditions. Those who hold these misperceptions are far more supportive of the deal than those who don’t. Among those who don’t hold these misperceptions, support is lower, but generally half or more still approve of the deal. Also, Rouhani supporters are more likely to hold these misperceptions than critics. 4. High Expectations about Positive Effects of the Deal Iranians express high expectations that the nuclear deal will have significant positive effects in the near term. Growing majorities say that as a result of the deal they expect to see, within a year, better access to foreign medicines and medical equipment, significantly more foreign investment, a significant drop in Iran’s unemployment rate, and tangible improvement in living standards. Almost three in five Iranians now think that the economic conditions in Iran are getting better. Half of Iranians now think that rather than aiming to achieve self-sufficiency, Iran should strive to increase its trade with other countries—up from four in ten a year ago. 5. Iran’s Relations with the United States in the Wake of the Deal A majority of Iranians believes that relations with the United States will improve after the nuclear deal. Several trend questions show strong shifts on views of the United States. A majority no longer believes that Iran’s nuclear concessions will likely lead the United States to use pressure to extract more concessions on other issues. Majorities approve of Iran and the United States collaborating with each other to help the government of Iraq and counter ISIS. Large majorities continue to say that they have an unfavorable view of the United States, but a growing number believe that Iran and the United States should strive to mitigate conflicts between the two countries. 6. Changing Views of Other Countries and Economic Relations Iranians show warming attitudes toward the P5+1 countries as a whole and toward Europe. A plurality now says that it trusts the P5+1 countries, and large majorities say they expect relations with Europe to improve. Iranians also believe that as a result of the agreement, other countries view their country with more respect. Views of all P5+1 countries have become a bit more favorable and majorities now have favorable attitudes toward Germany, Russia, and China. Iranians are also showing increasing openness to economic relations with other countries.

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