Public Policy Research Works

Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/1619

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Author: search.filters.author.Gronlund, Lisbeth

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    Casualties and Damage from Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War
    (Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993-03) Fetter, Steve; Lewis, George N.; Gronlund, Lisbeth
    The proliferation of ballistic missiles has in recent years become a major international security concern. This increased concern is in part due to the highly visible role played by Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. However, it is also due to the widespread -- but incorrect -- perception that even conventionally-armed ballistic missiles are tremendously destructive. This perception that ballistic missiles are inherently weapons of great destructive capability may have played a key role in the politics of the Gulf War. Iraq fired more than 80 modified Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, causing 31 deaths, numerous injuries, and substantial property damage. However, with the exception of the Scud that hit a barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and killed 28 U.S. soldiers, the number of casualties caused by these Scuds was much lower than was generally anticipated.
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    Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System
    (Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies Program, 2000-04) Fetter, Steve; Sessler, Andrew M.; Cornwall, John M.; Dietz, Bob; Frankel, Sherman; Garwin, Richard L.; Gottfried, Kurt; Gronlund, Lisbeth; Lewis, George N.; Postol, Theodore A.; Wright, David C.
    The National Missile Defense system under development by the United States would be ineffective against even limited ballistic missile attacks from emerging missile states. Moreover, its deployment would increase nuclear dangers from Russia and China, and impede cooperation by these countries in international efforts to control the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States should reconsider its options for countering the threats posed by long-range ballistic missiles and shelve the current NMD plans as unworkable and counterproductive.
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    Why Were Scud Casualties So Low?
    (Nature Publishing Group, 1993-01-28) Fetter, Steve; Lewis, George N.; Gronlund, Lisbeth
    Patriot missiles were returned to the Gulf last week. But they were not the reason for the unexpectedly low casualty rate when Saddam attacked Israel with Scud missiles in 1991. Iraq fired more than 80 modified Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. These attacks caused 31 deaths, numerous injuries, and substantial property damage. With the exception of the Scud that hit a barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and killed 28 U.S. soldiers, however, the number of deaths and serious injuries caused by each Scud appear to be much lower than one would have expected based on the results of previous ballistic missile attacks. The relatively low casualty rate has been cited by several analysts as evidence of the success of the Patriot missile defense system. Others have argued that the same casualty data suggests that the Patriot may not have been very successful.
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    Response to Uzi Rubin’s “Comments on the UCS Report on Countermeasures”
    (Unions of Concerned Scientists, 2000-09-01) Fetter, Steve; Dietz, Bob; Garwin, Richard L.; Gottfried, Kurt; Gronlund, Lisbeth; Lewis, George N.; Postol, Theodore A.; Sessler, Andrew M.; Wright, David C.
    We recently received—via a third party—a critique of our report, Countermeasures. The critique, written by Uzi Rubin and titled “Comments on the UCS Report on Countermeasures,” is dated 18 July 2000. Rubin states that his study was “considerably less exhaustive” than the countermeasures report and was done by “a small team of experienced missile engineers.” Rubin’s critique has not been published, but instead has been distributed informally in the United States. Here we respond to Rubin’s points in the order that he makes them. As we will make clear, Rubin’s criticisms are either technically invalid or based on incorrect characterizations of the assumptions that underlay our work.
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    Toward True Security: A U.S. Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade
    (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2001-06) Fetter, Steve; Blair, Bruce G.; Cochran, Thomas B.; Collina, Tom Z.; Dean, Jonathan; Garwin, Richard L.; Gottfried, Kurt; Gronlund, Lisbeth; Kelly, Henry; McKinzie, Matthew G.; Norris, Robert S.; Segal, Adam; Sherman, Robert; von Hippel, Frank N.; Wright, David; Young, Stephen
    This report proposes a nuclear weapons policy for the United States for the next decade that reflects today’s political and strategic realities. By contrast, the official policies and doctrines of both the United States and Russia are mired in Cold War patterns of thought. Eleven years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, both countries still maintain massive nuclear arsenals ready for nearly instant use. Although nuclear war plans differ in size and detail from those drawn up 20 or more years ago, their basic structure remains unchanged. The US nuclear arsenal and doctrine were designed to deter a deliberate large-scale Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and a massive Soviet conventional attack on US European allies, as well as to preserve the option of a disarming first strike against Soviet nuclear forces. This force structure and doctrine are obsolete and jeopardize American national security.