Public Policy Research Works
Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/1619
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Item Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System(Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies Program, 2000-04) Fetter, Steve; Sessler, Andrew M.; Cornwall, John M.; Dietz, Bob; Frankel, Sherman; Garwin, Richard L.; Gottfried, Kurt; Gronlund, Lisbeth; Lewis, George N.; Postol, Theodore A.; Wright, David C.The National Missile Defense system under development by the United States would be ineffective against even limited ballistic missile attacks from emerging missile states. Moreover, its deployment would increase nuclear dangers from Russia and China, and impede cooperation by these countries in international efforts to control the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States should reconsider its options for countering the threats posed by long-range ballistic missiles and shelve the current NMD plans as unworkable and counterproductive.Item Toward True Security: A U.S. Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade(Union of Concerned Scientists, 2001-06) Fetter, Steve; Blair, Bruce G.; Cochran, Thomas B.; Collina, Tom Z.; Dean, Jonathan; Garwin, Richard L.; Gottfried, Kurt; Gronlund, Lisbeth; Kelly, Henry; McKinzie, Matthew G.; Norris, Robert S.; Segal, Adam; Sherman, Robert; von Hippel, Frank N.; Wright, David; Young, StephenThis report proposes a nuclear weapons policy for the United States for the next decade that reflects today’s political and strategic realities. By contrast, the official policies and doctrines of both the United States and Russia are mired in Cold War patterns of thought. Eleven years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, both countries still maintain massive nuclear arsenals ready for nearly instant use. Although nuclear war plans differ in size and detail from those drawn up 20 or more years ago, their basic structure remains unchanged. The US nuclear arsenal and doctrine were designed to deter a deliberate large-scale Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and a massive Soviet conventional attack on US European allies, as well as to preserve the option of a disarming first strike against Soviet nuclear forces. This force structure and doctrine are obsolete and jeopardize American national security.