Public Policy Research Works

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Author: search.filters.author.Fetter, SteveSubject: search.filters.subject.missile defense

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    Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System
    (Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies Program, 2000-04) Fetter, Steve; Sessler, Andrew M.; Cornwall, John M.; Dietz, Bob; Frankel, Sherman; Garwin, Richard L.; Gottfried, Kurt; Gronlund, Lisbeth; Lewis, George N.; Postol, Theodore A.; Wright, David C.
    The National Missile Defense system under development by the United States would be ineffective against even limited ballistic missile attacks from emerging missile states. Moreover, its deployment would increase nuclear dangers from Russia and China, and impede cooperation by these countries in international efforts to control the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States should reconsider its options for countering the threats posed by long-range ballistic missiles and shelve the current NMD plans as unworkable and counterproductive.
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    "Not So Fast: Comments on 'Estimates of Performance and Cost for Boost Phase Intercept' presented to the Marshall Institute’s Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy by Greg Canavan on 24 September 2004"
    (2005-01) Fetter, Steve; Oelrich, Ivan
    Dr. Greg Canavan’s paper, “Estimates of Performance and Cost for Boost Phase Intercept,” [http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=262] examines some implications of constellation size and interceptor cost and weight for the total costs and feasibility of a space-based boost-phase interceptor (SBI) system. The paper argues, in general, that a “concentrated” system, that is, one that is tailored to defend against missiles launched from a small geographic area, can be substantially cheaper than is currently believed. North Korea might be considered “small.” The paper states that reductions in expected cost come about from a combination of lower estimates of SBIs mass, lower estimates of individual satellite cost, and a constellation that requires fewer interceptors because it covers only a restricted range of latitudes. We believe that mass and cost estimates are wrong and the simple model of satellite coverage exaggerates the effect of concentration. All the errors together lead to an extreme underestimation of the cost. The paper’s SBI masses are based on unproven and very optimistic estimates of kill vehicle masses; its per satellite costs are based on unrealistic learning curve performance; and a more accurate model of satellite orbits shows that the benefits of concentration are somewhat smaller than the paper’s simple model suggests.
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    Response to Uzi Rubin’s “Comments on the UCS Report on Countermeasures”
    (Unions of Concerned Scientists, 2000-09-01) Fetter, Steve; Dietz, Bob; Garwin, Richard L.; Gottfried, Kurt; Gronlund, Lisbeth; Lewis, George N.; Postol, Theodore A.; Sessler, Andrew M.; Wright, David C.
    We recently received—via a third party—a critique of our report, Countermeasures. The critique, written by Uzi Rubin and titled “Comments on the UCS Report on Countermeasures,” is dated 18 July 2000. Rubin states that his study was “considerably less exhaustive” than the countermeasures report and was done by “a small team of experienced missile engineers.” Rubin’s critique has not been published, but instead has been distributed informally in the United States. Here we respond to Rubin’s points in the order that he makes them. As we will make clear, Rubin’s criticisms are either technically invalid or based on incorrect characterizations of the assumptions that underlay our work.