Government & Politics Theses and Dissertations
Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/2775
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Item A Collection of Red States and Blue States: Out-Party Threat and Contemporary State Lawmaking(2021) Miras, Nicholas Scott; Rouse, Stella M; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)How does the balance of partisan control at the national level influence state politics? Unlike decades past, partisan control of the federal government is now virtually up for grabs in every election. As a result, when one side manages to gain unified control of the presidency and Congress, they face strong partisan incentives to actually act on their agenda. This is deeply problematic for those in the minority. Not only do they have little control over the national policymaking process, but their past policy achievements and favored programs are jeopardized by the majority. Outside of Washington, this political context also has implications for state lawmakers. Unlike national politics, unified control of state governments has reached historic levels, with 38 states under unified government (as of September 2021)---up from a low of 19 states in 1998. Meanwhile, average seat margins in state legislatures have expanded considerably, with veto-proof majorities also reaching all-time highs. As a consequence, majority-party lawmakers are increasingly free to run their states in a way that is consistent with their party’s governing philosophy, with little to no resistance. In this dissertation, I advance a theory of contemporary state policymaking centered on the idea of out-party threat, in which majority-party lawmakers---guided by electoral considerations---exhibit more partisan policy activism as their state’s policy preferences are increasingly threatened by federal action from the opposing party. As the balance of national partisan control changes, so does this out-party threat, which, in turn, re-calibrates the political calculus for state lawmakers. I test my theory by examining state lawmaking from 2001 to 2019, a period during which the federal government oscillated between unified and divided partisan control. Using data on bill introduction and enactment across twelve of the most common policy areas in state politics, I find that more threatening political contexts lead to higher volumes of bills introduced in states controlled by the national out-party, particularly in policy areas more important to the party's base and in states that are less nationally competitive. Only among Democratic-controlled states, however, does this heightened volume actually translate into more bills enacted into law. These results serve to re-shape our understanding of contemporary state policymaking and federal-state relations, shedding light not only on why states may choose to engage in partisan policy activism, but under which national political conditions.Item The States on the Hill: Intergovernmental Advocacy in American Federalism(2013) Creek, Heather M.; Gimpel, James G.; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)Federal lawmakers often praise the American state governments as "laboratories of democracy" conducting policy experiments from which other governments can learn. However, federalism scholarship recognizes that the federal government has strong incentives to preempt state policy and impose federal mandates in trying to achieve national policy goals. The safeguards of state power in the federal system - political, institutional, and democratic constraints - have changed and weakened over time, leaving the state governments vulnerable to the political interests of the national government. Like other interest groups, the states have developed techniques to safeguard the balance of power in the federal system as well as communicate their policy interests to national lawmakers and educate others about their unique policy developments. Prior studies of American federalism have relied on the behavior of public official associations representing multiple state governments as the source of information about intergovernmental advocacy and state policy goals. This dissertation argues that the study of aggregate intergovernmental interests through the positions of the associations conceals variation in the advocacy activity and goals of the individual state governments. Quantitative analysis of patterns in state lobbying behavior as well as qualitative analysis of congressional hearings is conducted using a unique database of the hearing testimony by state government officials and public official associations from the 103rd-108th Congress (1993-2004). This demonstrates that the state governments are dynamic participants in federal policymaking but their influence is not constant across all policy areas. Individual states are found to have varying levels of activity in federal policymaking which are dependent on the committee placement of members from the state's congressional delegation. In some cases the states' capacity to develop policy expertise and craft innovative policy is predictive of its participation in congressional hearings but this is not as important a factor as expected. Members of Congress are most likely to invite intergovernmental witnesses based on their relationship to the state government and, less frequently, based on the state's record of distinction in policy innovation.Item Electoral Systems and Representation: the Effects of District Magnitude(2013) Taylor, Jeffrey Alan; Herrnson, Paul S.; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)District magnitude (the number of representatives elected from a district) influences the strategies legislators adopt to build and maintain electoral security. In comparison to single member districts (SMDs), representatives in multimember districts (MMDs) compete for votes alongside a large set of candidates, and often share a party affiliation with other candidates competing for one of many available seats in the same district. This project sheds new light on the effects of district magnitude on the political careers of elected representatives and the nature of representation provided by a legislature. Utilizing a unique data set of campaign and legislative behavior in conjunction with personal interviews of current state legislators in four states, I find that those elected in MMDs build and maintain electoral support differently from those in SMDs. Specifically, I find that district magnitude influences the way candidates interact on the campaign trail, attention to local governments and organized interests, the degree to which representatives specialize, and the balance of power in the legislative chamber. The results have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between electoral systems and democratic representation, and suggest that many long-standing assumptions regarding the influence of district magnitude on elite political behavior may be in need of revision.Item Representation in State Legislatures: Searching for Responsiveness in an Age of Polarization(2006-04-24) Bigelow, Nathan S.; Herrnson, Paul S; Government and Politics; Digital Repository at the University of Maryland; University of Maryland (College Park, Md.)The purpose of this dissertation is to assess the degree to which state legislators are responsive to their various constituencies. The guiding research questions are: 1) Under what circumstances are state legislators most responsive to their districts, parties, and interest group supporters? 2) What drives certain legislators to take extreme issue positions? And 3) What explains and what are the consequences of state legislative polarization? I propose a theory of conditional responsiveness that specifies circumstances (issue type, electoral competition and legislative professionalism) under which responsiveness is most likely to occur. I systematically test my hypotheses using an original data set that includes information on over 4,000 state legislators and their districts in 30 different states. I find legislators to be most responsive to constituents on high salience social issues. On lower salience economic issues, state representatives are much more responsive to their interest group supporters. In addition, I find members from electorally safe districts to be most responsive to their districts as safe members are more likely to reflect their district's demographic and political homogeneity. Legislative professionalism if found to enhance responsiveness. This discovery supports the view of many scholars who saw the professionalization of state legislatures in the latter half of the 20th century as a healthy development. Across the country, I find a good deal of ideological extremism among state legislators. This legislative extremism, when aggregated, results in chamber level polarization. This polarization cuts into the productivity of the legislatures, making stalemate a more common legislative outcome. Policy responsiveness occurring in state legislatures is a reassuring finding; responsiveness, however, is conditional. Certain conditions influence the degree to which constituency opinion really matters. Perhaps the most important condition is the level of public interest on a given policy issue - when people care, legislators respond. This observation has practical implications for our democratic system of government. Representatives, without an informed or caring citizenry, can get away with straying from the wishes or needs of their constituents. As such, a necessary component of representative democracy must be an informed and vigilant citizenry.