Browsing Applied Research Laboratory for Intelligence and Security (ARLIS) by Author "Lucyshyn, William"
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- ItemCompromised Additive Manufacturing Supply Chain Workshop Report(University of Maryland, 2021-06-16) Sandborn, Peter; Lucyshyn, William; Boyd, Marcus; Das, Diganta; Akhavantaheri, Hirbod; Hedberg, Thomas JrThe potential widespread adoption of additive manufacturing (AM) technology represents a marked shift in the production value chain. This shift represents a transition from value residing within the physical parts and structures, built from traditional designs and fabricated using conventional manufacturing to systems and components produced via additive manufacturing processes, wherein the value resides in the digital technical designs themselves, e.g., technical data packages (TDPs). While the ability to produce parts and structures anywhere there are appropriate facilities and personnel provides great flexibility in the production process, the increasing reliance on digital data creates new challenges and complications (and new opportunities for malicious actors). Breaches of the data systems exchanging proprietary technical data packages enable anyone with access to the data and the appropriate equipment, to manufacture copies of the proprietary parts or structures and steal the intellectual property associated with the data package. Moreover, with the advent of affordable laser scanners, parts can be more readily reverse engineered to replicate the geometry (form & fit), but not necessarily function. These compromised parts could, in turn, be introduced into the supply chain, either for financial gain or other malicious purposes, without the requisite production controls (materials and processes), testing, evaluation, and qualification, leading to potential safety and liability issues. This Workshop focused on the unique issues posed by compromised AM parts and components and how they can be mitigated.
- ItemEnterprise Network Models for Counterfeit Part Supply Chains Workshop Report(University of Maryland, 2021-08-05) Sandborn, Peter; Lucyshyn, William; Boyd, Marcus; Das, Diganta; Akhavantaheri, Hirbod; Hedberg, Thomas JrCounterfeit electronic products have been a reality for many years. Nearly all of the treatment of this problem to date has focused on the detection of counterfeits, which is necessary, but a purely defensive step. Without a network model of the supply chain, disruptions can be haphazard and inadequately targeted. A network model that includes business strategies of distributors of obsolete parts, the ability of laboratories to detect counterfeit parts, impacts of buyback, and return policies is needed. The implications of enforcement (e.g., administrative, legal, or reputational) of anti-counterfeiting policies and the levels of penalties for supplying and accepting counterfeit parts also need to be accommodated in network models. The objective of the workshop is to examine enterprise network modeling as a tool for understanding and disrupting counterfeit electronics supply chains. Participants in the workshop included electronics supply-chain members from OCMs to users, supply-chain monitoring technology developers, academics, policymakers, legal and law enforcement, and other stakeholders.
- ItemIntersections of Illicit Trafficking and Counterfeit Parts Workshop Report(University of Maryland, 2021-10-28) Sandborn, Peter; Lucyshyn, William; Boyd, Marcus; Das, Diganta; Akhavantaheri, Hirbod; Hedberg, Thomas JrThe project that sponsored this workshop focuses on the disruption of the supply chains for counterfeit hardware used in critical systems. “Critical systems,” in the context of this project are defined as systems associated with human safety (e.g. transportation, medical), the delivery of critical services (infrastructure, energy generation), important humanitarian and military missions, and global economic stability. These systems are costly to procure, are generally expected to have a long service life, and as a result, they must be supported for long periods of time. However, counterfeit parts are only a single thread of a larger illicit trafficking tapestry. While the world’s largest firms have cracked down on illicit and illegal labor practices, illicit and illegal labor remains a key part of innumerable supply chains. Narcotics production is a hazardous criminal enterprise, but increased professionalization and the availability of quality parts and chemical precursors from China have allowed narcotrafficking cartels to manufacture massive quantities of fentanyl. Weapons traffickers and criminal entities now use additive manufacturing for weapons development and modification. Trafficking of wildlife, agricultural products, and animal parts present various serious concerns including the introduction of invasive species to the spread, and novel development, of viruses. Often, these differing types of criminal behavior are siloed, but as transnational criminal entities continue to replicate neoliberal business practices, they are agglomerating into polycrime entities. These polycrime entities bridge different lines of the trafficking business. Humans are trafficked for forced or illegal labor. People have been trafficked and forced to serve as caretakers of illegal cannabis plants. Mexican drug cartels have purchased 3D printers and hired engineers to develop weapons modifications, uparmor vehicles, and developed manufacturing techniques that increase the potency of various narcotics. This workshop sought to bring together social scientists, engineers, law enforcement, policymakers, and industry to push us out of our comfort zones to build connections and identify gaps. Individual sessions focused on modalities of trafficking: arms trafficking and construction, wildlife trafficking, labor trafficking, and narcotics manufacturing and trafficking.