Auctioning Securities
| dc.contributor.author | Ausubel, Lawrence M. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Cramton, Peter | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2007-08-07T16:09:27Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2007-08-07T16:09:27Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1998-03 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Treasury debt and other divisible securities are traditionally sold in either a pay-your-bid(discriminatory) auction or a uniform-price auction. We compare these auction formats with a Vickrey auction and also with two ascending-bid auctions. The Vickrey auction and the alternative ascending-bid auction (Ausubel 1997) have important theoretical advantages for sellers. In a setting without private information, these auctions achieve the maximal revenue as a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies. In contrast, the pay your-bid, uniform-price, and standard ascending-bid auction admit a multiplicity of equilibria that yield low revenues for the seller. We show how these results extend to a setting where bidders have affiliated private information. Our results question the standard ways that securities are offered to the public. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 54150 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.citation | "Auctioning Securities," (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) Working Paper, University of Maryland, March 1998. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1903/7065 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
| dc.publisher | University of Maryland | |
| dc.relation.isAvailableAt | Digital Repository at the University of Maryland | en_us |
| dc.relation.isAvailableAt | Economics Department | en_us |
| dc.relation.isAvailableAt | College of Behavioral and Social Sciences | en_us |
| dc.relation.isAvailableAt | University of Maryland (College Park, Md.) | en_us |
| dc.subject | auctioning securities | en |
| dc.subject | auction formats | en |
| dc.subject | comparison | |
| dc.title | Auctioning Securities | en |
| dc.type | Article | en |