Auctioning Many Divisible Goods

dc.contributor.authorAusubel, Lawrence M.
dc.contributor.authorCramton, Peter
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-31T15:00:21Z
dc.date.available2007-08-31T15:00:21Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.description.abstractWe study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder’s decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Simultaneous clock auctions are especially desirable formats for auctioning many divisible goods. We examine the properties of these auctions and discuss important practical considerations in applying them.en
dc.format.extent154624 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citation"Auctioning Many Divisible Goods," (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) Journal of the European Economic Association, 2, 480-493, April-May 2004.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/7115
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherMIT Pressen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtEconomicsen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Behavioral and Social Sciencesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, MD)en_us
dc.subjectdivisible goodsen
dc.subjectclock auctionsen
dc.titleAuctioning Many Divisible Goodsen
dc.typeArticleen

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