Replication code for Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers

Abstract

We model repeated pricing by differentiated product firms when each firm has private information about its serially-correlated marginal cost. In a fully separating equilibrium of the dynamic game, signaling incentives can lead equilibrium prices to be signif icantly above those in a static, complete information game, even when the possible variation in the privately-observed state variables is very limited. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry, and show that, without any change in conduct, our model can explain increases in price levels and changes in price dynamics and cost pass-through after the 2008 MillerCoors joint venture.

The software in this repository allows all of the simulated numbers to be recalculated. It provides information on where the IRI dataset used in the empirical work can be found. Code to process the data is included.