Replication code for Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers

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dc.contributor.authorSweeting, Andrew
dc.contributor.authorYao, Xinlu
dc.contributor.authorTao, Xuezhen
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-10T17:41:04Z
dc.date.available2024-07-10T17:41:04Z
dc.date.issued2024-07-01
dc.description.abstractWe model repeated pricing by differentiated product firms when each firm has private information about its serially-correlated marginal cost. In a fully separating equilibrium of the dynamic game, signaling incentives can lead equilibrium prices to be signif icantly above those in a static, complete information game, even when the possible variation in the privately-observed state variables is very limited. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry, and show that, without any change in conduct, our model can explain increases in price levels and changes in price dynamics and cost pass-through after the 2008 MillerCoors joint venture. The software in this repository allows all of the simulated numbers to be recalculated. It provides information on where the IRI dataset used in the empirical work can be found. Code to process the data is included.
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation SES-1658670 (Sweeting) National Natural Science Foundation of China Grant 72003120 (Tao)
dc.description.urihttps://www.aeaweb.org/content/file?id=19768
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.13016/zwk3-j4na
dc.identifier.citationSweeting, Andrew, Xuezhen Tao and Xinlu Yau, "Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming (2024)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/33124
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtEconomicsen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Behavioral and Social Sciencesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, MD)en_us
dc.subjectoligopoly
dc.subjectdynamic games
dc.subjectdynamic pricing
dc.subjectasymmetric information
dc.subjectsignaling
dc.subjectfirm conduct
dc.subjecthorizontal mergers
dc.subjectcoordinated effects
dc.subjectmerger retrospectives
dc.subjectbeer industry
dc.titleReplication code for Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers
dc.typeSoftware
local.equitableAccessSubmissionNo

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