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The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes

dc.contributor.authorCramton, Peter
dc.contributor.authorTracy, Joseph S.
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-08T13:56:50Z
dc.date.available2007-08-08T13:56:50Z
dc.date.issued1994
dc.identifier.citation"The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes," (with Joseph S. Tracy), Journal of Labor Economics, 12, 180–209, 1994.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/7075
dc.description.abstractWe present a bargaining model of union contract negotiations, in which the union decides between two threats: the union can strike or continue to work under the expired contract. The model makes predictions about the level of dispute activity and the form the disputes take. Strike incidence increases as the strike threat becomes more attractive, because of low unemployment or a real wage drop during the prior contract. We test these predictions by estimating logistic models of dispute incidence and dispute composition for U.S. labor contract negotiations from 1970 to 1989. We find empirical support for the model's key predictions, but these associations are weaker after 1981.en
dc.format.extent119253 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press
dc.subjectU.S. labor disputesen
dc.subjectbargaining modelen
dc.subjectunion contracts
dc.titleThe Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputesen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtEconomics Departmenten_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Behavioral and Social Sciencesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_us
dc.rights.licensehttp://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/


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