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dc.contributor.authorCramton, Peter
dc.contributor.authorTracy, Joseph S.
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-08T13:46:57Z
dc.date.available2007-08-08T13:46:57Z
dc.date.issued1994
dc.identifier.citation"Wage Bargaining with Time-Varying Threats," (with Joseph S. Tracy), Journal of Labor Economics, 12, 594–617, 1994.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1903/7073
dc.description.abstractWe study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm's willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary over time. Strike payoffs change over time as replacement workers are hired, as strikers find temporary jobs, and as inventories or strike funds run out. We find that bargaining outcomes are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary. If dispute costs increase in the long-run, then dispute durations are longer, settlement rates are lower, and wages decline more slowly during the short-run (and may even increase). The settlement wage is largely determined from the long-run threat, rather than the short-run threat.en
dc.format.extent94495 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press
dc.subjectwage bargainingen
dc.subjectreplacement workersen
dc.subjectunions
dc.titleWage Bargaining with Time-Varying Threatsen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.relation.isAvailableAtDigital Repository at the University of Marylanden_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtEconomics Departmenten_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtCollege of Behavioral and Social Sciencesen_us
dc.relation.isAvailableAtUniversity of Maryland (College Park, Md.)en_us
dc.rights.licensehttp://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/


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